( People ex rel. East Side Levee Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee Sanitary District (1973), 54 Ill.2d 442; People ex rel. Carey v. Covelli (1975), 61 Ill.2d 394; People ex rel. Continental Air Transport Co. v. Strouse (1969), 41 Ill.2d 567.) Although this case does not involve conflicting court orders, it does involve an attempt by the Department to exercise authority which is vested exclusively in the circuit court. Where one tribunal clearly without the authority to act attempts to usurp the jurisdiction of another, we believe that the extraordinary writ of prohibition is justified. In re Mattison (1958), 120 Vt. 459, 144 A.2d 778; State ex rel. Marion County Plan Com. v. Superior Court (1956), 235 Ind. 607, 135 N.E.2d 516; State ex rel. Haddock Engineers Ltd. v. Swope (1952), 56 N.M. 782, 251 P.2d 266; Creighton v. District Court (Okla. 1961), 359 P.2d 581; Spraker v. Carroll (Okla. 1966), 416 P.2d 946. Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the appellate court insofar as it authorized departmental confiscation hearings, and affirm its judgment affirming the judgment of the circuit court denying a writ prohibiting the Department from assessing a penalty under section 18b. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Our decisions establish that garages are workshops. Gooldy v. Lawson, 155 Okla. 259, 9 P.2d 22 (1932); City of Tulsa v. State Industrial Commission, 316 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1957). Also see Spraker v. Carroll, 416 P.2d 946 (Okla. 1966), involving an operation considered to have characteristics of both garage and filling station. The Court held that Claimant's work was more hazardous than the work usually performed in filling stations, and that his place of employment was a workshop within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
It is unnecessary to review and distinguish numerous decisions, cited in support of this argument, involving retail establishments, used car lots, bottling plants, and restaurants. See Hurley v. O'Brien, 192 Okla. 490, 137 P.2d 592; Spraker v. Carroll, Okla., 416 P.2d 946 (1966); Teague v. State Industrial Commission, 112 Okla. 292, 240 P. 1053 (1925); Parlor v. John Mongold Drive-In Cafe, 204 Okla. 458, 230 P.2d 887 (1951). The decisions are inapplicable, and fallacy of the argument predicted thereon is apparent.
Further, prohibition will lie to prohibit a district court from attempting to proceed in a matter already properly before another office or tribunal, same being an unwarranted and unauthorized application of judicial force. Rex Truck Lines, Inc. v. Simms, Okla., 401 P.2d 520; Stewart v. Harris, Okla., 434 P.2d 902; Genet v. Smith, Okla., 400 P.2d 161; Skelly Oil Co. v. Dist. Ct., Okla., 401 P.2d 526; Hampton v. Clendinning, Okla., 416 P.2d 617; Spraker v. Carroll, Okla., 416 P.2d 946; Turk v. Coryell, Okla., 419 P.2d 555; State, etc. v. Lohah, Okla., 434 P.2d 928. Respondent urges that of the five grounds asserted by petitioner as basis for prohibition only the contention relative to respondent's lack of jurisdiction properly could be urged under an objection to jurisdiction, other grounds relating to defensive matters.
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147; E.M. Mildred Agency v. Yates, 200 Okla. 168, 191 P.2d 581; King v. Carl B. King Drilling Co., 194 Okla. 71, 147 P.2d 463. Claimant in support of his position cites the sole case of Spraker v. Carroll, Okla., 416 P.2d 946, wherein we held that an employee burned in a fire which occurred while he was siphoning gasoline from a car to be used for the purpose of cleaning another car in a used car lot was working at work "more hazardous than the work usually performed in filling stations, and that his place of employment was a workshop within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law." The decision is not in point and does not modify but affirms prior decisions of this court in Cross v. Brown, supra; Skelly Oil Company v. Waters, supra; and Rider v. Bob Hiner Service Station, supra, holding that "employees in filling stations are not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
See People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919 (1947), where the defense of sovereign immunity was presented by motion. See also Spraker v. Carroll, 416 P.2d 946 (Okla. 1966); State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Superior Court, 237 Cal.App.2d 416, 46 Cal.Rptr. 891 (1965); Skelly Oil Company v. District Court, 401 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1964); State ex rel. Haddock Engineers v. Swope, 56 N.M. 782, 251 P.2d 266 (1952). In these cases it was held that prohibition is proper to test the court's ruling on a motion to dismiss based on the lack of jurisdiction of compensation claims.