Opinion
No. TSR CV06 4001072-S
February 7, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On May 15, 2006, petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was amended on August 14, 2006. The amended petition essentially alleges that the board of pardons and paroles (board) is incorrectly interpreting and applying Gen. Stat. § 54-125a. This alleged misinterpretation has resulted in the board's incorrectly establishing petitioner's parole eligibility at a date later than under petitioner's interpretation of § 54-125a. The respondents' return denies petitioner's claims and raises two special defenses: first, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and second, that the petition fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Petitioner filed a reply denying both special defenses.
The matter came before the court on October 20, 2006 for a trial on the merits. Witnesses included Mary Jane Steele, Fred Levesque and Richard Sparaco. The court has reviewed and considered the testimony, the exhibits, the parties' memoranda of law and their closing arguments. After applying the law to the facts, judgment of dismissal shall enter on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Department of corrections records specialist II.
Department of corrections director of offender classification.
Parole supervisor for the board of pardons and parole.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On or about July 2, 1996, petitioner was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) in lieu of posting an appearance bond in his criminal case known as docket number CR96-015525-S in the judicial district of Hartford. Thereafter, under this docket number, on or about July 24, 1997, petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and committed to the custody of the commissioner for fifteen years execution suspended after four years with probation for five years. As a result of this conviction, a sentencing mittimus was issued by the court and forwarded to the commissioner. Thereafter on June 30, 2000, having completed the imposed portion of his sentence, petitioner was discharged from corrections.
CR96-150525 is the sole docket number at issue in this matter.
General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1).
On or about May 26, 2004, petitioner was arrested for violation of probation in CR96-150525. On June 23, 2004, petitioner was discharged on bond, but thereafter, on August 3, 2004, was readmitted to corrections. On November 1, 2004, petitioner was convicted of violation of probation and was committed to the custody of the commissioner for seven years. As a result of his conviction of violation of probation, a sentencing mittimus was issued by the court and forwarded to the commissioner. Within days of the imposition of the seven-year violation of probation sentence, the commissioner prepared a "time sheet" for petitioner. At a later point in time, the commissioner's time sheet was forwarded to the board who then calculated its own time sheet for petitioner.
General Statutes § 53a-32.
Known as an RT56.
Upon the commitment of each sentenced prisoner to the commissioner's custody, a time sheet is prepared to determine the prisoner's release date and his parole eligibility date. For an original sentence, a prison release date is calculated by determining the length of the sentence imposed by the court less any pretrial credit. This figure is then added to the date of sentencing and the resulting date becomes the prisoner's release date. The parole eligibility date, on the other hand, is determined by adding to the date of sentencing, the sum of fifty percent of the imposed sentence less any pretrial credit. As above, this figure is added to the date of sentencing to determine a prisoner's parole eligibility date.
The length of a prisoner's sentence is set out in his sentencing mittimus.
If a prisoner is discharged at the end of his sentence but is thereafter readmitted on a conviction for violation of probation in the same docket number, the commissioner calculates a new release date by aggregating the length of the violation of probation sentence and the length of the original sentence and subtracting therefrom the prisoner's pretrial credit from the violation of probation and his credit from the original sentence. This sum is then added to his violation of probation sentencing date and the result is the prisoner's new release date.
His new parole eligibility date, on the other hand, is calculated by first taking fifty percent of the sum of the length of the violation of probation sentence and the length of the original sentence, and thereafter subtracting the sum of the prisoner's pretrial credit from the violation of probation and his credit from the original offense. The resulting aggregated sum is then added to the prisoner's violation of probation sentencing date and the result is the prisoner's new parole eligibility date.
In petitioner's case, after his sentencing on the violation of probation, the commissioner calculated his new parole eligibility date as fifty percent of the sum of seven years and four years, minus the sum of 119 days and 1461 days. This figure was then added to November 1, 2004 and petitioner's new parole eligibility date was determined to be January 2, 2006.
The sentence imposed for petitioner's conviction of violation of probation.
The sentence imposed for petitioner's conviction of sexual assault in the first degree.
Pre-trial credit on the violation of probation case.
All pre-trial and sentence credit earned toward the original sentence.
Petitioner's sentencing date on the violation of probation.
While the board generally agrees with the commissioner in the calculation of parole eligibility for an original sentence, for persons who are readmitted to corrections after a conviction of a violation of probation, the board calculates parole eligibility by a different method. For those prisoners, the board calculates a parole eligibility date by taking fifty percent of the sum of the length of the violation of probation sentence minus any pretrial credit accrued on the violation of probation case. The board then adds this figure to the prisoner's violation of probation sentencing date. In the present case, using this formula, the board calculated petitioner's parole eligibility date by taking fifty percent of the sum of seven years minus 119 days. The board then added this sum to November 1, 2004 and determined that petitioner's new parole eligibility date was January 2, 2008.
Petitioner claims that the board's method of calculation of his violation of probation parole eligibility date does not comport with the requirements of Gen. Stat. § 54-125a.
DISCUSSION
The respondents have first raised as a special defense that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant habeas corpus petition. More specifically, the respondents assert that this court lacks jurisdiction because there is no unlawful detention or illegal confinement, as well as there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole eligibility.
Whether this court has jurisdiction over the instant petition is categorically addressed by the Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. (2007). In Baker, the Supreme Court explicitly held, after reviewing relevant statutes, regulations and case law, that ". . . parole eligibility under § 54-125a does not constitute a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke habeas jurisdiction." Consequently, and based on the Supreme Court's decision in Baker, the instant petition must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's decision was made publicly available as an advance release decision on Monday, February 5, 2007. The official release date of that decision, however, is Tuesday, February 13, 2007.
Accordingly, judgment of dismissal shall enter based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner's counsel shall prepare and file the judgment file within thirty days.
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT