Opinion
Civil No. 02-CV-70750-DT
October 11, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Waukeen Robert Spraggins, ("petitioner"), presently incarcerated at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility in Munising, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, petitioner challenges his conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit uttering and publishing, M.C.L.A. 750.157a; M.S.A. 28.354(1); M.C.L.A. 750.249; M.S.A. 28.446; one count of uttering and publishing, M.C.L.A. 750.249; M.S.A. 28.446; and being a fourth felony habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.12; M.S.A. 28.1084. For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
I. Background
Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the above charges in the Oakland County Circuit Court, in exchange for which two additional charges of obtaining money under false pretenses over $ 100.00 and conspiracy to commit false pretenses over $ 100.00 were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight and one half to twenty years in prison. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Spraggins, 227855 (Mich.Ct.App. September 1, 2000); lv. den. 463 Mich. 976; 623 N.W.2d 601 (2001). Petitioner now seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
I. Conviction obtained by plea of nolo contendere was without understanding, knowledge, or voluntariness.
II. Violation of 180 days/the right to a speedy trial/because prosecution failed to disclose evidence.
II. Standard of Review
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 1997).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. An "unreasonable application" occurs when the state court identifies the correct legal principle from a Supreme Court's decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be "unreasonable" "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
III. Discussion
A. Claim # 1. The involuntary plea claim.
Petitioner first claims that his plea of nolo contendere was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made.
In order for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to be voluntarily and intelligently made, the defendant must be aware of the "relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of his plea. Hart v. Marion Correctional Institution, 927 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991). The defendant must also be aware of the maximum sentence that can be imposed for the crime for which he or she is pleading guilty. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994). When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition challenging his plea of guilty (or nolo contendere), the state generally satisfies its burden by producing a transcript of the state court proceedings showing that the plea was made voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 1993). The factual findings of a state court that the guilty plea was properly made are generally accorded a presumption of correctness. Petitioner must overcome a heavy burden if the federal court is to overturn these findings by the state court. Id. A federal court will uphold a state court guilty or nolo contendere plea if the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and consequences of the charges and voluntarily chose to plead guilty or nolo contendere. See Hoffman v. Jones, 159 F. Supp.2d 648, 655-656 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
A review of the plea transcript demonstrates that petitioner's nolo contendere plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Prior to accepting petitioner's plea, the trial court advised petitioner of the maximum penalties for all of the criminal charges. The trial court advised petitioner of the trial rights that he would be relinquishing by pleading nolo contendere. In response to the trial court's questions, petitioner indicated that it was his own choice to plead nolo contendere and specifically denied that any promises or threats had been made to get him to plead. The trial court further advised petitioner that any appeal from a plea would be by an application for leave to appeal and not by right. (Plea Tr., pp. 7-12). The record from the trial court clearly establishes that petitioner's nolo contendere plea was knowingly and intelligently made.
Petitioner argues that his plea of nolo contendere was not knowingly or intelligently made because he was never informed that he was giving up his right to appeal by pleading nolo contendere or that he was "gravely impairing this right by pleading in such a manner." In the present case, petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal where the trial court specifically explained the waiver issue in the plea colloquy and where petitioner indicated that he understood that he was giving up his right to appeal his nolo contendere plea as a matter of right. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1188-1189 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Brown, 9 Fed. Appx. 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2001).
See Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, p. 3.
To the extent that petitioner is arguing that his plea of nolo contendere is involuntary because the trial court did not advise him that an unconditional plea of nolo contendere would constitute a waiver of all pre-plea constitutional violations, including his 180 day/speedy trial claim, See Issue II infra, this argument must also be rejected. Neither the courts nor the prosecution have a duty, either statutory or constitutional, to inform defendants that they have a right to enter a conditional plea of guilty so as to preserve issues for appellate review. See United States v. Fisher, 772 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1985); See also United States v. Wise, 179 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 1999) (neither court nor the government has duty to advise a defendant of the availability of the conditional plea procedure). Moreover, a court is not required to inform a defendant that by pleading guilty, he is waiving his right to appeal any antecedent rulings or constitutional violations. United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1992) (neither Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or decisional law required district court to advise defendant that by pleading guilty, he would be waiving his right to seek appellate review of the denial of his speedy trial motion). Moreover, the fact that petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea because he thought that the trial court's ruling on the "180 day rule" claim was illegal and he sought to appeal the ruling does not render the plea involuntary. See Slicker v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d 768, 769 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1987) (a plea of no-contest is not involuntary merely because it was based upon the defendant's belief that the trial court wrongly decided a pretrial motion and would be reversed on appeal). Finally, petitioner admits that he entered into this nolo contendere plea so that his plea could not be used against him for purposes of civil liability if the victim attempted to file a lawsuit against him at a later date. In light of the fact that petitioner pleaded nolo contendere for civil liability purposes, there is insufficient support for his claim that a conditional plea was critical to his decision to plead nolo contendere. See United States v. Timley, 1998 WL 295575, * 6 (D. Kan. 1998). Petitioner has failed to show that his nolo contendere plea was involuntarily made.
B. The "180 day rule"/Speedy trial claim.
Petitioner next claims that he was brought to trial in violation of the 180 day rule set forth in M.C.L.A. 780.131; M.S.A. 28.969(1) and M.C.R. 6.004(d). Petitioner claims that this violated his right to a speedy trial.
In the present case, petitioner knowingly and intelligently pleaded nolo contendere to these charges. A voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including the right to a speedy trial. Maples v. Stegall, 175 F. Supp.2d 918, 922- 923 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Petitioner's nolo contendere plea therefore forecloses habeas review of his speedy trial claim. Id.
A nolo contendere plea also constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects. United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 1982).
In any event, petitioner's speedy trial claim is based solely upon the prosecutor's alleged violation of Michigan's "180 day rule". A violation by state officials of a state speedy trial law, taken alone, does not present a federal claim reviewable in a habeas petition. Poe v. Caspari, 39 F.3d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1994). Petitioner's contention that the State of Michigan violated its own 180 day rule would not entitle him to relief. The Third Circuit rejected a similar claim when it ruled that Pennsylvania's 180 day rule does not define the contours of the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 256 (3rd Cir. 1991). By the same token, Michigan's 180 day rule "does not define the contours of the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial and the violation of this rule alone would not entitle petitioner to federal habeas relief." See Russell v. Pitcher, 2000 WL 1769568, * 3 (E.D. Mich. October 24, 2000). Petitioner is therefore not entitled to habeas relief on his second claim.
IV. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.