Opinion
No. 3-389 / 02-1219
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forStory County, Timothy J. Finn, Judge.
Petitioner appeals denial of unemployment benefits. AFFIRMED.
Russell E. Holmes of Legal Aid Society of Story County, Nevada, for appellant.
Danielle M. Shelton, Margaret C. Callahan, and Michael R. Reck of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Becker-Underwood.
Anita M. Garrison, Des Moines, for appellee Employment Appeal Board.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Gerald Spragg appeals the denial of unemployment benefits after being terminated from Becker-Underwood, Inc. We affirm.
Background Facts. Gerald Spragg was hired as a maintenance worker at Becker-Underwood, Inc. (Becker) in July 2000. On the morning of July 17, 2001, Spragg presented Laurie McCracken, Human Resource Manager, with a "Personal Time Request Form" asking for unpaid leave for a "personal family emergency" from July 18 to July 24, but refused to elaborate further. As Spragg's personal time off balance was at zero, McCracken told him the only other option was if he qualified for the Family Medical Leave Act, which he did not. McCracken testified she denied Spragg's request for time off on the spot for lack of information as he had only told her he had a "personal family emergency." In addition to verbalizing the denial, McCracken stated she put a copy of the form indicating Spragg's request was denied in his work space. However, Spragg did not receive the written denial because he did not return to his work space that day as he had been assigned an outdoor mowing task. Spragg testified that McCracken stated she would discuss the leave with him later in the day but never did and he claims he had no idea his request had been denied. The same day, Spragg attempted to discuss the leave with his direct supervisor, Mike Wildt, but claimed Wildt said he was too busy. After work that evening, Spragg called Wildt at work and left a message that he would be gone until July 24 and that he had submitted the request to McCracken.
Just after midnight on July 18, 2001, Spragg left on a Greyhound bus for Connecticut to meet his adult son and bring him to Iowa. Spragg did not attend work on July 18, 19, or 20. On July 19 at 4:20 p.m. while he was in Connecticut, Spragg called Wildt, leaving another message that he was still out of town but would be back in a couple of days and that he would be checking his messages.
When Spragg returned to work on Monday morning, July 23, McCracken and Wildt explained to Spragg that he had been terminated in a letter mailed July 20. The letter stated "[s]ince it has now been three consecutive work days since you have reported to work, we have no choice but to accept your absences as job abandonment."
Spragg subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. The Iowa Workforce Development denied Spragg unemployment benefits providing the following brief explanation: "Our records indicate you voluntarily quit work on 07/17/01, because of family responsibilities. Even though you had good personal reasons, this is not considered good cause related to your work. Your quitting was not caused by your employer." The disqualification of benefits was made under Iowa Code section 96.5(1) (2001), "Voluntary Quit." Spragg appealed asserting that he did not voluntarily quit.
On appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that benefits were properly denied, however, the proper code section was 96.5(2), "Discharge for Misconduct," in an order dated October 3, 2001. Spragg further appealed to the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) which affirmed the ALJ's ruling. The district court affirmed the agency's ruling. Spragg appeals.
Scope of Review. The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code section 17A.19(10), governs our review of agency action. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2003). Our review is for the correction of errors at law, not de novo. Id. (citing Locate.Plus.Com, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 2002)). The agency, not the court, weighs the evidence; we are obliged to broadly and liberally apply those findings to uphold rather than defeat the agency's decision. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 632 (Iowa 2000) (citing Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Iowa 1981)). On review, the question is not whether the evidence supports a finding different from the agency's but whether the evidence supports the findings the agency actually made. Id. (citing City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 554 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1996)). In other words, the agency's findings are binding on appeal unless a contrary result is compelled as a matter of law. Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 238.
Discussion. Spragg contends he should have been granted unemployment benefits when Becker fired him for "job abandonment" because there was not substantial evidence to find he was discharged for misconduct. Becker argues the prior decisions finding Spragg was discharged for misconduct are supported by substantial evidence and should therefore be affirmed. "Misconduct" is defined as,
A deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(a).
Spragg was denied unemployment benefits under Iowa Code section 96.5,
2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.
Becker's employment policy manual requires an employee to notify superiors of any absences at least one hour prior to the start of their scheduled shift and provide the reason for the absence and date of expected return. The manual continues,
Absences without acceptable reasons may subject employee to disciplinary action or termination. An employee who is absent for one day without reporting to his or her supervisor, may result in dismissal of employment. Failure to report for two consecutive days without reporting to the supervisor is cause for automatic termination.
Despite Spragg's claim here that he did not know McCracken denied his request for time off, the ALJ found that McCracken orally informed Spragg of the denial for time off at the time of request. It was further determined that Spragg's failure to report for work on July 18, 19, and 20 "constituted insubordination and a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest." The ALJ found that Spragg was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because his unexcused absence violated company rules which justified his discharge for misconduct.
Spragg argues that under Iowa code section 96.5(1)(c) and (f) (both listing exceptions to the disqualification of benefits under the heading "voluntary quit") he should not be disqualified for benefits because he left his employment to take care of his son who was ill. For the exceptions under (c) and (f) to apply, the ALJ would have had to make a finding that Spragg quit his job, but even Spragg did not make this assertion. Instead, Spragg claimed he needed time off and the ALJ subsequently found Spragg had committed misconduct by violating company rules on absenteeism.
Iowa Code section 96.5(1) provides that an individual will not be disqualified from benefits if
c. The individual left employment for the necessary and sole purpose of taking care of a member of the individual's immediate family who was then injured or ill, and if after said member of the family sufficiently recovered, the individual immediately returned to and offered the individual's services to the individual's employer. . . .
or
f. The individual left the employing unit for not to exceed ten working days . . . for compelling personal reasons, if so found by the department, and prior to such leaving had informed the individual's employer of such compelling personal reasons, and immediately after such compelling personal reasons ceased to exist the individual returned to the individual's employer and offered the individual's services and the individual's regular or comparable work was not available . . . .
At the hearing, Spragg testified his son had a medical condition that was confidential in nature. However, at the time of his request for leave he did not provide his employer with even that general assertion, but only that he needed time off for "personal family emergency." Therefore it was appropriate for the agency to consider only the information available to the employer at the time the request for leave was made. McCracken testified that "a little information would have been helpful" but she denied and documented the request for leave based on "lack of information." Regardless of Spragg's later testimony of his reasons for being absent for three days, there was substantial evidence that no specific reason was given at the time of the request beyond, "personal family emergency." Moreover, under Iowa Code section 96.5(2), "Discharge for Misconduct," there are no exceptions allowed for "compelling personal reasons" and we cannot read an exception into the statute. See Moulton v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 239 Iowa 1161, 1172, 34 N.W.2d 211, 216 (1948) ("The court is not at liberty to read into the statute provisions which the legislature did not see fit to incorporate, nor may it enlarge the scope of its provisions by an unwarranted interpretation of the language used."). We therefore agree there was substantial evidence for the agency to find Spragg had engaged in misconduct and affirm the denial of unemployment benefits.