Opinion
Opinions on pages 854-886 omitted.
For Opinion on Hearing, see 221 Cal. Rptr. 538, 710 P.2d 338.
[204 Cal.Rptr. 257]Bruce A. Ray and Baxley, Mautino & Ray, San Diego, for plaintiffs and appellants.
John W. Witt, City Atty., Ronald L. Johnson, Sr. Chief Deputy, C. Alan Sumption, Chief Deputy, City Attys., Nina B. Deane and Celeste Stahl Brady, Deputy City Attys., for defendants and respondents.
D. Dwight Worden and W. Scott Williams, Solana Beach, for intervenors and respondents.
BUTLER, Associate Justice.
This appeal concerns the rights of owners of a rental housing project (the project) constructed under a conditional use permit to convert the rental units to condominiums. The issues presented include the nature of the conditional use permit, its effect on successors in interest, applicability and constitutionality of San Diego's condominium conversion ordinance and validity of an injunction reverting the project to a non-profit basis and fixing 55 years old as the age requirement of at least one occupant of a rental unit. We hold the ordinance as applied inapplicable in the circumstances presented, the injunction overbroad and reverse.
I
On March 17, 1962, the Foundation for Specialized Group Housing applied to the City of San Diego for a conditional use permit: "to construct and operate a non-profit senior citizen housing project under the requirements specified in the Federal Housing Act, Title II, Section 231. The project will consist of 549 apartment units in 78 buildings providing beautiful and adequate community facilities. The project will be operated by a qualified non-profit organization, The Foundation for Specialized Group Housing. Occupancy is restricted to senior citizens who qualify."
At the time the application was filed, the City owned the property on which the project was to be constructed. On April 17, 1962, a month after the Foundation applied for the permit, the City conveyed the property to University City, Inc., a corporation organized for profit. San Diego issued the conditional use permit on June 28, 1962. The permit was never recorded in the County Recorder's office.
The conditional use permit is set out here:
[204 Cal.Rptr. 258]The Foundation did not acquire the property or construct the project and has long since disappeared. University City, Inc., the for-profit corporation, retained title and in 1963, acting on its own without the Foundation being involved, substituted a revised plot plan for the project reducing the number of units, deleting a medical facility and eliminating references to federally insured financing for elderly citizen housing. The revision to the conditional use permit was approved by the City. No mention was made of the Foundation in the City's approval of the revision.
Title to the property then passed to and through various for-profit corporations coming to rest in University City Leisure Life Village, a for-profit corporation. That corporation then constructed the project with private financing insured under provisions of the National Housing Act, title II, section 221, subdivision (d)(4), low and moderate income housing, instead of elderly housing provisions of section 231, as set out in the conditional use permit application. The project was operated for profit and tenants initially were limited to those 50 years of age or older.
National Housing Act (1934) Public Law 73-479 as added by Housing Act of 1954, Public Law 83-560.
In 1965, the owner of the project defaulted on the federally insured financing, the lender foreclosed, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) acquired and operated the project renting to persons 21 years of age or older until 1968. HUD then sold the project to Penasquitos, Inc. and 220 North Kingshighway, Inc. (now Koplar Enterprises, Inc., an appellant here), both for-profit corporations, who earlier had agreed between themselves to acquire and operate the project as a joint venture for profit.
In 1974, appellant Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. acquired Penasquitos' interest and appellant Chase Hotels, Inc., a subsidiary of Koplar, acquired an interest in the joint venture in 1978. Koplar, Sports Arenas and Chase Hotels are corporations organized for profit and are now as joint venturers the owners of the project and will be so referred to collectively in this opinion. At all times, the project was assessed and taxed as a for-profit entity.
II
In June of 1979, the Owners filed an application for a tentative subdivision map with the City to convert the project from [204 Cal.Rptr. 259] rental apartments to condominium units. The application was denied by the City Council.
On September 10, 1979, the City enacted its condominium conversion ordinance (San Diego Mun.Code, §§ 101.0990-101.0999) and in February 1980, the Owners applied for a condominium conversion permit under the new ordinance and reapplied for a subdivision map. The City denied the subdivision map application as being inconsistent with single family zoning, the provisions of the conditional use permit and the condominium conversion ordinance. The condominium conversion permit was denied on the grounds the project was a "public interest project" having been developed to provide for elderly rental housing and the Owners failed to make provisions to perpetuate the use of the project for elderly rental housing.
The applicable San Diego Municipal Code section reads as follows:
The Owners filed petitions for writs of mandate and for declaratory relief as to the 1979 and the 1980 applications and denials. University City Village Tenants Association and Gertrude Evans, a tenant, intervened in both cases (collectively the "Tenants"). San Diego cross-complained against the Owners seeking an injunction to require the Owners to operate the project on a non-profit basis and to rent only to "senior citizens." The cases were consolidated for trial.
The court upheld the condominium conversion ordinance, denied the writs of mandate and ordered the Owners to operate the project on a non-profit basis (gross operating income not to exceed reasonable operating expenses) and to rent apartment units to tenants one of whom must be at least 55 years old.
This appeal by the Owners ensued.
III
We state applicable standards of appellate review. The petitions for writ of mandate ask for review of City actions in denying the tentative subdivision maps and the application for a condominium conversion permit. The parties agree the petitions sound in administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. On appeal, we are governed by the rules applicable to the trial court: whether the City acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b)). A prejudicial abuse of discretion is committed if the City failed to proceed in the manner required by law, if the decision is not supported by the findings or if the findings are not supported by the evidence (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b)).
In determining whether the findings are supported by the evidence, a reviewing court applies either the "independent judgment" test or the "substantial evidence" test. If the "substantial evidence" test applies, the role of the court is to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (Topanga Assn. For A Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 510, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12; Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)
The "independent judgment" test applies only if a fundamental vested right is involved, and "[c]ases involving abuse of discretion charges in the area of land use regulation do not involve fundamental vested [204 Cal.Rptr. 260] rights." (PMI Mortgage Ins. Co. v. City of Pacific Grove (1981) 128 Cal.App.3d 724, 729, 179 Cal.Rptr. 185.) The exception is where a property owner has performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance on a building permit or on all necessary project approvals. (PMI Mortgage Ins. Co. v. City of Pacific Grove, supra; Billings v. California Coastal Com. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 729, 735-736, 163 Cal.Rptr. 288.)
The Owners have never obtained any approvals for their condominium conversion project. They have no fundamental vested rights at stake to provide a basis for applying the independent judgment test, even assuming they have incurred expenses in the application process. (Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Board (1984) 35 Cal.3d 858, 865-866, 201 Cal.Rptr. 593, 679 P.2d 27.) Absent good faith reliance on a building permit or final discretionary project approval, expenditures alone do not provide a basis for a vested rights claim. (Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 311, 325-326, 140 Cal.Rptr. 725; Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 793, 132 Cal.Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546.) The "substantial evidence" test applies to a review of the mandamus judgment here.
IV
The Owners' 1979 effort to convert the project to condominiums through the filing of a subdivision map was rejected by the City on findings the subdivision map was inconsistent with the R-1, single-family zoning, city development regulations and the provisions of the conditional use permit. The City denied the 1980 subdivision map on the same basis and denied the permit to convert under the ordinance, finding the project was developed to provide elderly rental housing, was thus a public interest project and no provisions were made to perpetuate the use for which the project was developed. We consider the issues presented on this appeal as to denial of the filing of the subdivision maps applicable to both cases (San Diego Superior Court Case Nos. 448425 and 456802). Issues as to denial of the condominium conversion permit relate to Case No. 456802. Consistent with the position of the parties on this appeal, we do not differentiate further between the two cases and treat them in our discussion as one.
V
We first address the conditional use permit and the status of the project as a "public interest project" requiring a perpetuation of use as elderly housing to qualify for a condominium conversion permit.
We refresh the reader's memory. The conditional use permit recites in its preamble issuance of a permit "... requested by the Foundation for Specialized Group Housing to construct and operate a non-profit Senior Citizens Housing Project ..." as documented in the application. The phrase "senior citizens housing project" appears once again in paragraph 1 concerning need to submit the building plans to the City's Planning Director for approval. The phrase is not used elsewhere in the permit.
The conditional use permit does not set forth as conditions any requirement the project be operated to provide rental housing by a non-profit entity for elderly persons and does not define non-profit, senior [204 Cal.Rptr. 261] citizen or housing project. The application speaks in generalities and does not document or define or explicate the proposed uses. The Foundation is not identified as a non-profit corporation, entity, association or otherwise.
The National Housing Act (Tit. 12, U.S.C.A., ch. 13, §§ 1701-1750g) refers to public or non-profit private agencies. "The term 'corporation' means any incorporated private institution or foundation [p] (A) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any member, founder, contributor, or individual; [p] (B) which has a governing board (i) the membership of which is selected in a manner to assure that there is significant representation of the views of the community in which such project is located and (ii) which is responsible for the operation of the housing project assisted under this section; and [p] (C) which is approved by the Secretary as to financial responsibility. (§ 1701q, subd. (d)(2).)
The phrase "senior citizen" did not have a legal or dictionary definition in 1962. The National Housing Act, supra, as of 1962, defined elderly persons as 62 years of age or older (§ 1701q, subd. (d)(4); § 1715l, subd. (f); § 1715v, subd. (a)(2)). The Slum Clearance, Urban Renewal and Farm Act defined elderly persons as 62 years of age or older (tit. 42, ch. 8A, § 1471). The Social Security Act defines an aged individual as 65 years or older (tit. 42, U.S.C.A., ch. 7, Social Security, § 1382c; 1395c).
California legislation enacted since 1962 uses various phrases in reference to older persons. The California Interdepartmental Committee on Aging provides services and programs for "older Californians" (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9340-9353) and area agency aging advisory councils are concerned with "older persons" (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9360-9365). The Elder Abuse Reporting Act refers to an "elder" as a person 65 years of age or older (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9380-9386). In 1977, the phrase "senior citizen" first appears in the Multipurpose Senior Citizens Project legislation in defining a "senior citizen" as a person 65 years of age or older (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9400-9413) and in 1983 the Multipurpose Senior Services Program provided for persons aged 65 or older (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9400-9409). The Senior Companions Program defines adults 60 years of age or older as "senior companions" (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9520-9527) and the Foster Grandparent Program refers to those participating as being 60 years or older (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 9540-9544). The California Community Crime Resistance Program defines an "elderly or senior citizen" as an individual 55 years of age or older (Pen.Code, § 13841, subd. (b)). A claimant under the Senior Citizens Homeowners and Renters Property Tax Assistance Law is an individual 62 years of age or older (Rev. & Tax.Code, § 20505) who owns or rents a residence. The California Commission on Aging acts on behalf of "older persons" (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 9201).
We conclude the conditional use permit is vague, uncertain and ambiguous and on its face is not susceptible to the interpretation given by the City and the Tenants, i.e., the project was developed to provide for elderly rental housing and thus is a public interest project under the condominium conversion ordinance. We examine the conduct of the parties as an aid to interpretation of the conditional use permit.
We have reviewed the administrative record of the 1979 and 1980 proceedings before the Planning Commission and the City Council. We find allusions in presentations by the Owners the project initially was intended for rentals to persons aged 50 years or older and was so operated for about a year. While not so intended, the default and subsequent foreclosure suggests the operation was indeed operated on a non-profit basis. During HUD's ownership, the project was rented to persons aged 21 years or older. Following the HUD sale in 1968 to 1980, the administrative record does not include any evidence the project was operated for elderly rental housing. At the trial, results of a 1978 survey of project occupancy suggest one and two-person households totaled 96%, retired persons totaled 75% and persons aged 20 to 49 were 4%, 50 to 64 were 23%, 65 to 70 were 26% and 70 and over totaled 47%. A 1980 update shows an increase in occupancy by younger people.
As we have seen, the project was never owned by a non-profit entity or operated on a non-profit basis except during HUD's three years of ownership and operation. The City's approval of the 1963 amendment to the conditional use permit evidenced city acquiescence in the for-profit ownership and operation of the project.
The conditional use permit does not mandate the project be owned or operated on a non-profit basis or by a non-profit entity and does not require tenancy be limited to any particular age group. The conduct of [204 Cal.Rptr. 262] the parties is consistent with that interpretation of the conditional use permit.
VI
Our views are fortified by an analysis of the effect of the conditional use permit on the appellants here, who are successors in interest to University City, Inc., the for-profit corporation that constructed and initially operated the project.
A
A conditional use permit allows a particular use not permitted under a zoning ordinance if that use promotes the public welfare and does not impair the character of the zoned area (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 1974) Constitutional Law, § 484, p. 3783). Conditional use permits allow a usage in a zoning pattern considered by the City to be desirable to the community but which, by their nature, such as noise, traffic or size, militate against their existence in every location within a zone or in any location without restrictions tailored to fit the special problems which the use presents (8 Cal. Real Estate Law & Practice, Zoning and Land Use Control, § 265.50, Hagman and Volpert, Matthew Bender (1984)).
In 1962, San Diego's zoning ordinances did not provide for conditional use permits for elderly housing. Such usage was authorized if applied for and carried on by non-profit entities. Conditional use permits for housing for the elderly may now be issued in any residential zone (San Diego Mun.Code, § 101.0506).
B
The enforcement of conditional use permits has received little attention in the cases. The question arises in contexts requiring determination as to entitlement of benefits and assumption of burdens under the permits.
We note with interest San Diego's past and present practice as to policing the use of property under a conditional use permit. A senior planner testified at the Planning Commission hearing on the condominium conversion permit:
Acceptance of a conditional use permit and use of benefits afforded thereunder carries the burden of limitation on use on a theory of promissory estoppel (County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 511, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472, 564 P.2d 14; Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 40 Cal.2d 642, 651, 255 P.2d 772). County of Imperial v. McDougal, supra, as an alternative ground for holding a successor in interest enjoying the benefits was bound by the conditions of a permit, observed conditional use permits "... run with the land" (Id., at p. 510, 138 Cal.Rptr. 472, 564 P.2d 14) and cited Cohn v. County Board of Supervisors (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 180, 184, 286 P.2d 836, as authority for that proposition. There, the owner of land succeeded to the uses authorized by a conditional use permit secured by lessees who dropped plans to develop a project authorized by the permit. Responding to the contention the permit was personal to the applicants, the court noted without discussion "special use permits under zoning ordinances run with the land." (Id., at p. 184, 286 P.2d 836.)
Without discussion of implications of the creation of estates in real property [204 Cal.Rptr. 263] by issuance of conditional use permits, commentators have cited Cohn and McDougal as authority for the proposition conditional use permits "run with the land." (8 Cal. Real Estate Law & Practice, supra, § 265.50; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 1984 Supp.) § 484, pp. 440-441.) We find no reference to or definition of permits that "run with the land" or the consequences attendant upon the creation of such an interest in real property. Neither Cohn nor McDougal refer to or discuss provisions of our Civil Code defining and explicating the creation and the effect of covenants running with the land. Covenants that run with the land are contained in grants of estates in real property and bind successors in interest (Civ.Code, § 1460). The only covenants that run with the land are those specified in Civil Code, Division Third, Title 3 (Civ.Code, § 1461). Civil Code sections 1462-1470 deal with various consequences attaching to covenants running with the land in all instances reiterating the subsisting need for a grant of an estate in real property.
4 Miller & Starr, Current Law of California Real Estate, §§ 25.1-25.4, Bancroft-Whitney Co. (1977).
Cohn and McDougal on their facts used the phrase "run with the land" as meaning owners or immediate successors in interest to the original issuees of conditional use permits were entitled to the benefits and subject to the burdens of the permits under equitable concepts sounding in estoppel. Neither case is authority for the proposition urged upon us by the City and the Tenants that conditional use permits are covenants running with the land (e.g., 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 676-679, pp. 4589-4594).
C
The Owners acquired title through their predecessors who purchased the project from HUD. The grant deed conveying the project to the predecessors is subject to easements, restrictions and reservations of record. The conditional use permit as issued in 1962 and revised in 1963 was never recorded and is not mentioned in the deed. The purchasers were required to sign a Regulatory Agreement (used for entities other than non-profit) requiring compliance with local laws providing among other things for nondiscrimination and equal opportunity in housing and conformance to rental rates established by the Federal Housing Administration. The Regulatory Agreement does not contain any provisions limiting rentals to elderly persons.
The Tenants and the City contend the Owners had constructive notice of the conditional use permit requirements the project was non-profit and for senior citizens. There are two answers to this contention. The record does not include any evidence to support it and, as we have seen, the permit itself does not give notice of such requirement. We note, however, the Owners are charged with notice the project rentals were required to conform to HUD rates for low and moderate-income families. While low-income housing may qualify as a public interest project under the condominium conversion ordinance, the conditional use permit was granted for elderly housing and City denials of conversion were based on failure to perpetuate such use.
We conclude the denial of the subdivision maps and refusal to issue the condominium conversion permits on the basis the project was a public interest project requiring a perpetuation of use for elderly housing is not supported by substantial evidence. We thus do not reach the issue of constitutionality of the condominium conversion ordinance concluding as we do the project does not fall within a public interest project as defined in the ordinance.
VII
We next consider Owners' contentions the applications for the subdivision [204 Cal.Rptr. 264] maps should have been granted by the City. The Owners contend (1) the reasons stated by the City for denial are not grounds for denial under the Subdivision Map Act (GOV.CODE, § 66474), and (2) the maps were not inconsistent with local zoning as a matter of law as well as fact.
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.
Section 66474, subdivisions (a) and (b), allows denial of a tentative subdivision map on the basis of specific findings of inconsistency with general and specific plans. The Subdivision Map Act (Gov.Code, tit. 7, div. 2, § 66410 et seq.) as to Subdivision Map Act issues presented here is applicable (San Diego Mun.Code, § 102.0101). San Diego's general plan and the specific plan applicable to the project area do not include any reference to or definite objectives or portions specifically directed to the conversion of existing buildings into condominium projects. Accordingly, the City may not deny the tentative maps on the basis of inconsistency with the general plan or a specific plan (§ 66427.2). The Subdivision Map Act does not specifically allow denial of the tentative maps for inconsistency with zoning or city development regulations. While San Diego as a charter city may adopt subdivision map procedures supplemental to the state Subdivision Map Act (Benny v. City of Alameda (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1011, 164 Cal.Rptr. 776), San Diego subdivision map provisions do not specify zoning or city development regulation inconsistencies as grounds for disapproving tentative maps. We note specific requirements for approval are provided for tentative maps of property in the City's planned urbanizing area as defined in the City's Progress Guide and General Plan (San Diego Mun.Code, § 102.0301). Additionally, we find no evidence in the record supporting the City's findings of inconsistency as to zoning and development regulations.
We thus agree with the Owners. Denial of approval of the subdivision maps for inconsistency was wrong as a matter of law and fact.
VIII
The court mandated the Owners to operate the project on a non-profit basis and to rent apartment units to persons aged 55 years or older or to people living together one of whom has attained that age. As we have seen, the conditional use permit as issued and amended does not require the project be now so operated and rented by the Owners. Further, we find no evidence in the record to support the court's definition of nonprofit, i.e., gross operating income not to exceed reasonable operating expenses or the court's conclusion persons aged 55 or over are senior citizens as that phrase is used in the conditional use permit. The condominium conversion ordinance defines elderly persons as being aged 62 years or older.
The judgments are reversed, the injunction is vacated and set aside and the cases are remanded to the court to consider whether the matters should be returned to the City for reconsideration in the light of our opinion or to order the City to take such further action as may be enjoined upon it by law or otherwise, all as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (f). The order staying the rent increase is vacated.
GERALD BROWN, P.J., and WORK, J., concur.
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of San Diego, as follows:
"That Conditional Use Permit, Case No. 4826, requested by The Foundation for Specialized Group Housing to construct and operate a non-profit Senior Citizens Housing project located south of Governor Drive between Genesee Avenue and Boundary Freeway, in the R-1 zone, documented as No. 639744, May 31, 1962, in the office of the City Clerk, be, and the same is hereby approved subject to the following conditions:
"1. That prior to the issuance of any building permits, complete building plans of the proposed senior citizens housing project (including signs) shall be submitted to the Planning Director for approval. Said plans shall be in substantial conformity with Exhibit 'A' on file in the Office of the Planning Department. The property shall be developed in accordance with the approved building plans except where regulations and this and/or other governmental agencies require deviation therefrom.
"2. That prior to the issuance of any building permits, a complete landscaping plan, including a permanent watering system, shall be submitted to the Planning Director for approval. Approved planting shall be installed prior to occupancy of the subject property.
"3. That prior to the issuance of any building permits, a final subdivision map covering the entire subject property shall be recorded, said map to include dedicated improved streets in lieu of the private roadways shown on Exhibit 'A'.
"4. That not to exceed 550 apartment units shall be placed on the subject property in the approximate locations shown on Exhibit 'A'.
"5. That prior to the occupancy of any building, not less than 602 parking spaces plus one parking space for every 300 square feet of gross floor area in the medical facilities building shall be provided; said parking spaces to be in either private garages or carports or in the parking areas shown on Exhibit 'A'. Each parking space in the designated parking areas shall be not less than 180 square feet in area, exclusive of aisle and driveway areas, and all offstreet parking spaces shall be surfaced with not less than 2"' A.C. or its equivalent, and each space shall be marked and provided with substantial stops.
"6. That no vehicular parking shall be permitted at any time on any of the private driveways within this development.
"7. That any floodlighting employed on the subject property shall be directed away from all adjoining property at all times.
"8. That construction and operation of the proposed use shall comply at all times with the regulations and requirements of this and other governmental agencies.
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Council of the City of San Diego finds [the] following facts to be true:
"1. That the proposed use at the particular location is necessary or desirable to provide a [204 Cal.Rptr. 264] service or facility which will contribute to the general well-being of the neighborhood or the community.
"2. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or improvements in the vicinity;
"3. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations and conditions specified in the Code for such use; and
"4. That the granting of this conditional use will not adversely affect the Master Plan of the City or the adopted plan of any governmental agency.
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED by the Council of The City of San Diego, that the appeal of The Foundation For Specialized Group Housing is hereby SUSTAINED, and that the action taken by the Planning Commission on May 23, 1962, is hereby OVERRULED."
"SEC. 101.0992.2 PUBLIC INTEREST PROJECT
"An application for a condominium conversion map for a residential project that was financed by funds obtained from a governmental agency to provide for elderly, handicapped, disabled or low-income housing shall not be considered for a condominium conversion map.
"An application for a condominium conversion map for a residential project that was developed to provide for elderly, handicapped, disabled, or low-income rental housing shall not be considered for a condominium conversion map unless provisions are made to perpetuate the use for which the project was developed. Such provisions shall be made a part of the conditions of approval of the condominium conversion map."
Non-profit activities, non-profit associations, non-profit charitable organizations, non-profit community organizations, non-profit cooperative associations, non-profit corporations, non-profit organizations, non-profit property owners' associations and other non-profit agencies found in our codes suggest myriad forms of such activities and include specific definitions (see West's Ann.Cal.Codes, Gen. Index, MO to Q, West Pub. Co. (1981)).
"MR. KLEIN: Maybe if I can help, since I was here in 1962 when this particular project was approved. At that time we did not have a conditional use permit procedure for housing for the elderly. We did not have the PRD vehicle available. In order to qualify for a conditional use permit it had to be an application of a non-profit organization. Otherwise, there could not have been any application made. Therefore, the application was for the non-profit group and to operate it as a non-profit organization. And the housing for the elderly was included in that request, but we did not have a lot of the criteria or anything we have today with respect to housing-for-the-elderly projects. I think this was the only one that was granted under the non-profit conditional use permit. As far as compliance is concerned in those days, as today, conditional use permits were reviewed on a complaint basis and we never were advised or never became aware that this particular project was apparently not being operated as a non-profit organization because we never received any complaints on it. And, therefore, again, we would enforce this in terms of a complaint situation."