[1, 2] The only assignment of error is that the court erred in rendering judgment in favor of respondent as against the right of the city to receive a deed at any time before re-sale by the county. In a former appeal under the same title as the present appeal ( 153 Wn. 462, 279 P. 724) we decided that Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., p. 472, chapter 171, superseded chapter 170, id. Respondent contends that that decision is decisive of the present case.

" [8] We have also expressed our opinion relative to an emergency clause, in the following language in Spokane County v. Certain Lots in Spokane, 153 Wn. 462, 279 P. 724, quoted from the early case of Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wn. 29, 34 P. 164: "'But we are also of the opinion that where two conflicting acts upon the same subject-matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, and one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, that one containing the emergency clause must be taken to overcome the other.

Another rule is, the fact of there being an emergency clause tends to show that the subject-matter of the act was more clearly and pointedly before the legislature than the subject-matter of the other act; and, third, a special act, prior in time, passed at the same session of the legislature as a general act, may prevail over the latter act. Whitfield v. Davies, 78 Wn. 256, 138 P. 883; Spokane County v. Certain Lots in City of Spokane, 153 Wn. 462, 279 P. 724; State ex rel. Wenatchee etc. Dist. v. Banker, 179 Wn. 343, 37 P.2d 1115. Chapter 111 is a general law because it operates throughout the entire state.