Opinion
No. 110,527.
2014-10-3
Rondal Gene SPILLMAN, Appellant, v. Terry L. STANTON, Appellee.
Appeal from Pawnee District Court; Bruce T. Gatterman, Judge.Brian C. Wright, of Wright Law Office, Chartered, of Great Bend, for appellant.Ward Loyd, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Pawnee District Court; Bruce T. Gatterman, Judge.
Brian C. Wright, of Wright Law Office, Chartered, of Great Bend, for appellant. Ward Loyd, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ARNOLD–BURGER, P.J., STANDRIDGE and SCHROEDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Rondal Gene Spillman was lawfully stopped for speeding. As a result of the stop, Spillman was arrested for obstructing official duty, driving under the influence, driving under the influence with a concealed carry handgun, illegal tag display, failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, no proof of liability insurance, and speeding. After resolving the traffic and misdemeanor charges, he filed this suit against Master Trooper Terry L. Stanton, the arresting officer, alleging malicious prosecution, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and false arrest and imprisonment. The district court granted Stanton's motion for summary judgment on all three of Spillman's claims. Spillman appeals the single issue of the district court granting summary judgment on his claim of false arrest and imprisonment. We affirm.
Facts
After observing Spillman speeding 73 mph in a 65–mph zone on Kansas State Highway 156 in Pawnee County, Stanton attempted to pull Spillman over. During a time period lasting over 4 minutes, Stanton activated his lights and siren and used his PA system, CB radio, and spotlight in an attempt to pull Spillman over. After 4 miles, Spillman finally did so but then failed to exit the semi-truck in a timely manner, despite Stanton's repeated orders to exit with his hands up. When Spillman finally exited the semi-truck, he did so with his hands near his pants pockets. Stanton once again commanded Spillman to put his hands up, which Spillman did. Stanton then ordered Spillman to turn around and walk backward toward his patrol car with his hands locked on top of his head. When Spillman was directly in front of the patrol car, Stanton ordered Spillman to kneel on the ground and cross his legs, where he remained until a second officer arrived on the scene.
When the second officer arrived, Stanton handcuffed and frisked Spillman. As a result of the frisk, the officers discovered a .380 Kel–Tec semi-automatic handgun in Spillman's right front pants pocket. The handgun “was loaded with a cartridge chambered and was ready to be fired.” Stanton then checked the cab of the semi-truck to verify no one else was in the cab. In the cab of the semi-truck, Stanton and the second officer found “a loaded .357 Mag Smith & Wesson Revolver above the driver's seat in the console, a box of .380 ammunition by the revolver with missing cartridges, [ ] a box of .38+P ammunition with missing cartridges sitting on the floor by the driver's seat[,]” along with two pills, which turned out to be codeine. The semi-truck cab smelled of burnt marijuana.
When Stanton radioed for information regarding the semi-truck and trailer, he discovered the tag displayed on the semi-truck did not belong to it. The correct tag was found lying on the dashboard of the semi-truck. Spillman was unable to provide proof of motor vehicle liability insurance.
At the police station, Spillman consented to a urinalysis. The Kansas Bureau of Investigation Forensic Laboratory determined Spillman's urinalysis reflected he was not under the influence at the time of his urinalysis. Spillman was ultimately charged with driving 73 mph in a 65–mph zone in violation of K.S.A.2010 Supp. 8–1558, displaying a tag not assigned to the vehicle he was operating in violation of K.S.A.2010 Supp. 8–135, and failure to provide proof of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage in violation of K.S.A.2010 Supp. 40–3104. After Spillman provided proof of insurance, the State dropped the tag and insurance charges, and Spillman pled no contest to speeding.
Spillman subsequently filed a claim against Stanton for malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and violation of his civil rights under color of law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stanton filed a motion to dismiss based on Spillman's failure to state a claim under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–212(b)(6) or, in the alternative, summary judgment. First, Stanton argued he was immune to suit and liability under the Kansas Tort Claims Act and had qualified immunity to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stanton then argued Spillman had failed to present any substantial evidence that his arrest was unlawful or without legal justification or excuse; Spillman had failed to present evidence that Stanton acted without probable cause; and there was no evidence of malice or improper motive.
In his response to Stanton's motion, Spillman admitted he had been speeding, he had displayed a tag not assigned to the vehicle he was operating, and he could not provide proof of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage for the semi-truck and trailer. Nevertheless, Spillman claimed the facts—when viewed in a light most favorable to him—were sufficient to establish a jury question that “would allow an inference that [Stanton] had no rational basis for believing [Spillman] was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Spillman argued the fact that the prosecutor did not bring charges on anything other than traffic offenses indicated Stanton lacked probable cause to arrest Spillman. The district court rejected Spillman's argument and granted summary judgment in favor of Stanton.
Standard of Review
When the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. The district court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 296 Kan. 943, 962, 298 P.3d 250 (2013).
An issue of fact is not genuine unless it has legal controlling force as to the controlling issue. A disputed question of fact that is immaterial to the legal issue presented does not preclude summary judgment. In other words, if the disputed fact, however resolved, could not affect the judgment, it does not present a genuine issue material fact to preclude summary judgment. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013); Carr v. Vannoster, 48 Kan.App.2d 19, 21, 281 P.3d 1136 (2012).
On appeal, the same rules apply; summary judgment must be denied if reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. 296 Kan. at 962. “Because entry of summary judgment amounts to a question of law—it entails the application of legal principles to uncontroverted facts—an appellate court owes no deference to the trial court's decision to grant the motion and review is unlimited.” Golden v. Den–Mat Corporation, 47 Kan.App.2d 450, 460, 276 P.3d 773 (2012).
Analysis
To prevail on his false arrest and imprisonment claim, Spillman is required to prove he was intentionally restrained, confined, or arrested without justification or legal excuse. See Thompson v. General Finance Co., Inc., 205 Kan. 76, 87–88, 468 P.2d 269 (1970); PIK Civil 4th 127.20. Pursuant to K.S.A. 22–2401, a law enforcement officer is permitted to arrest a person—and therefore is legally justified to restrain, confine, or arrest that person for purposes of defeating a false arrest claim—if the officer (1) has a warrant for the person's arrest; (2) has probable cause to believe there is an outstanding warrant for the person's arrest; or (3) has probable cause to believe that the individual is committing or has committed a crime. Courts evaluate whether an officer has probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances, given “the information and fair inferences therefrom, known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Sloop v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 296 Kan. 13, 20, 290 P.3d 555 (2012).
Upon review of the evidence and arguments of counsel, and resolving all facts and inferences in favor of Spillman, we find the undisputed facts readily establish that Stanton was legally justified to restrain, confine, or arrest Spillman based on probable cause to believe Spillman was committing the crime of obstructing official duty. See K.S.A. 21–3808(a) (“knowingly and instructionally obstructing, resisting or opposing any person authorized by law to serve process ... in the discharge of any official duty”).
At all times and for all purposes, Stanton was acting in the regular scope of his duties for the Kansas Highway Patrol and was on patrol in Pawnee County. As such, Stanton was acting pursuant to his authority as a law enforcement officer. See K.S.A. 74–2108(a) (“The superintendent and members of the Kansas highway patrol are hereby vested with the power and authority of peace, police and law enforcement officers anywhere within this state irrespective of county lines.”). At the time he pursued and eventually confronted Spillman, Stanton was carrying out his principal function.
“The principal function of the Kansas highway patrol shall be enforcement of the traffic and other laws of this state relating to highways, vehicles and drivers of vehicles except as otherwise provided in this subsection (a). The superintendent and members of the highway patrol in performing their duties under this act shall wear badges and uniforms of office.” K.S.A.2010 Supp. 74–2105(a)(l).
Stanton observed and clocked Spillman operating his semi-truck in excess of the posted speed limit. Speeding in this case was prohibited by K.S.A.2010 Supp. 8–1558(a)(4). Having personally observed this traffic infraction, Stanton activated the lights on his patrol car, and then his siren, and finally his spotlight, in an effort to get Spillman to stop his semi-truck. Spillman failed to obey and resisted stopping as commanded for at least 4 miles of unyielding pursuit, despite repeated demands that he do so communicated by CB radio, PA address system, wailing siren, and flashing lights. A review of the DVD recording reflects that Spillman declined to stop for over 4 minutes after the emergency lights were activated on the patrol car and that Stanton gave no less than 10 audible commands for Spillman to stop his vehicle during that period of time. Then, after Spillman finally did stop his vehicle, Spillman failed to respond to repeated and continual requests to exit the truck. In Stanton's words, there was “a standoff.”
Spillman does not dispute any of the material facts set forth above. Instead, Spillman claims there is a dispute of material fact as to whether he knowingly obstructed, resisted, or opposed Stanton's attempts to discharge his official duty of enforcing the traffic and other laws relating to highways. But the factual dispute alleged by Spillman is not material to disposition of his false arrest and imprisonment claim on summary judgment. The issue before the court is whether the undisputed facts establish that Stanton had probable cause to believe Spillman was committing the crime of obstructing official duty. An officer has probable cause to arrest one suspected of a crime when “the officer's knowledge of the surrounding facts and circumstances creates a reasonable belief that the defendant committed a specific crime.” Smith v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 291 Kan. 510, 515, 242 P.3d 1179 (2010). Notably—and fatal to Spillman's claim that his intent to obstruct, resist, or oppose the discharge of official duty was a disputed, material fact that precludes summary judgment on his false arrest and imprisonment claim—“[p]robable cause does not require an officer [to] have evidence of every element of the crime.” 291 Kan. at 515. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Stanton had probable cause to believe Spillman was committing the crime of obstructing official duty and, therefore, was legally justified in arresting Spillman. For this reason, we affirm the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Stanton.
Affirmed.