Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-5366
January 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant Warner-Jenkinson d/b/a/ Sensient Technical Colors' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial (Doc. No. 40). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion will be denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff Gennaro Anthony Spignesi, filed a complaint for breach of his employment agreement (the "Agreement") against his former employer, Defendant Warner-Jenkinson d/b/a Sensient Technical Colors. Plaintiff alleged breach of contract, violation of the Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 260.1, et seq. (the "WPCL"), and requested specific performance. Defendant claimed that the Agreement was not binding on it because the Agreement was not authorized by Defendant's President, John Mudd. After Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant removed the case to this Court based upon diversity. Defendant also brought a third-party complaint against one of its former employees, Third-Party Defendant Barry D. Dobinsky, for indemnification. Defendant claimed that Dobinsky was liable to it for negotiating and signing the Agreement without proper authority. Plaintiff argued that the Agreement was valid for three alternative reasons: (1) Dobinsky had express authority from Mudd to sign the Agreement; (2) Dobinsky had apparent authority to sign the Agreement; (3) Defendant ratified the Agreement when it failed to immediately repudiate the Agreement as not authorized.
On December 8, 2003, this case proceeded to trial. At the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendants moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 for a judgment as a matter of law. (12/9/03 Tr. at 113.) We denied that motion. ( Id. at 121.) After all the evidence was heard, Defendant renewed its motion pursuant to Rule 50. (12/10/03 Tr. at 50.) We granted Defendant's motion in part, finding that while the jury should decide whether or not Mudd gave Dobinsky express authority to sign the Agreement, Plaintiff's two other theories of liability were not viable. With respect to Plaintiff's apparent authority theory, we concluded that because Plaintiff admitted that he knew of the limitations on Dobinsky's authority, no reasonable jury could find that Dobinsky had apparent authority. ( Id. at 67.) With respect to Plaintiff's ratification theory, we concluded that because Defendant promptly repudiated the Agreement after it determined that the Agreement was not authorized, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant ratified the Agreement. ( Id. at 68.) We also found that the question of whether Defendant acted in good faith when it repudiated the Agreement was an issue for the jury. ( Id.) After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The jury found that Dobinsky had express authority to enter into the Agreement, but that Defendant acted in good faith when it repudiated the Agreement. Defendant filed the instant motion, seeking a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial.
II. Standard of Review
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
A judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury" to find in favor of the non-moving party. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). "Such a motion should be granted only if, `viewing all the evidence which has been tendered and should have been admitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor.'" Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1985)). In deciding a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, we "may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] version of the facts for the jury's version." Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1992)). "The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find for that party." Walter, 985 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Patzigv. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1978)).
B. Motion for New Trial
A new trial may be granted after a jury verdict "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a). For example, a new trial may be granted where "the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence." Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988). Also, we may grant a new trial if the trial was unfair, Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 802 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, (3d Cir. 1993), or if the verdict "was influenced by extraneous matters such as passion, prejudice, sympathy or speculation," Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 234 F. Supp.2d 494, 498 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
When a party seeks a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence to support a jury's verdict, a new trial is proper "only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience." Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (3d Cir. 1991)). "Where the subject matter of the litigation is simple and within a layman's understanding, the district court is given less freedom to scrutinize the jury's verdict than in a case that deals with complex factual determinations. . . ." Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1352. "Where evidence is in conflict and subject to two interpretations, the trial judge should be reluctant to grant a new trial." Klein, 992 F.2d at 1295.
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial, for two reasons. First, Defendant claims that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Dobinsky testimony was the only evidence that he had express authority from Mudd to sign the Agreement. Defendant argues that other evidence presented at the trial renders Dobinsky's testimony incredible, and, therefore, no reasonable jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff. Second, Defendant argues that a new trial is needed to prevent the injustice that arose when the jury was exposed to evidence ultimately rendered irrelevant when we granted Defendant's Rule 50 motion in part at the close of the evidence. Specifically, Defendant claims that the jury was prejudiced when it was exposed to evidence that was only relevant to the issues of apparent authority and ratification, which issues we ultimately decided not to submit to the jury for its consideration.
A. Weight of the Evidence
It is undisputed that Dobinsky did not have the authority to sign the Agreement on behalf of Defendant without Mudd's approval. However, Dobinsky testified that he received Mudd's approval to sign the Agreement. (12/9/03 Tr. at 56-57.) Specifically, Dobinsky testified that "I have a very clear recollection that I spoke with Mr. Mudd, I got the approval . . .[and] I signed the agreement. . . ." ( Id. at 57.) Dobinsky testified that he was "virtually certain" that he spoke with Mudd and got his approval on January 28, 2002, ( id.), that he "believed" that he called Mudd, and that he spoke to Mudd on the telephone in his office, ( id. at 73.).
On direct examination, Mudd testified that he did not remember approving the Agreement. ( Id. at 126-27.) He also testified that some of the Agreement's terms were unusual, and that he thought he would have remembered approving those terms had he done so. ( Id. at 127-28.) On cross-examination, Mudd admitted that while he did not remember approving the Agreement, he could not say with "100 percent certainty" that he did not do so. ( Id. at 130.) Dobinsky, on the other hand, never expressed any doubt that he spoke with Mudd and obtained his approval to sign the Agreement. ( See, e.g., id. at 72.)
Defendant claims that other evidence presented at the trial renders Dobinsky's testimony incredible. For instance, Defendant argues that the Agreement's terms were so unusual that it is virtually impossible to believe that any company ever would have approved them. Defendant also points to telephone records it produced of calls made from Dobinsky's office. Those records show that Dobinsky did not place a telephone call from his office to Mudd's office on January 28, 2002. ( Id. at 149-154.) Defendant argues that Dobinsky's testimony is even more incredible because Dobinsky failed to note the alleged telephone call with Mudd in his diary. Dobinsky wrote in the diary that he spoke with Mudd during the week of January 28, 2002, but the diary did not contain anything about Dobinsky getting Mudd's approval for the Agreement. (12/10/03 Tr. at 43-46.) Other testimony during the trial showed that there were no writings, faxes, e-mails, or other documents reflecting Mudd's approval of the Agreement. Finally, Defendant argues that even if Dobinsky spoke to Mudd on January 28, 2002, there is no way Mudd could have approved the Agreement because he had not received a copy of the Agreement at that time and therefore could not have understood what the terms meant. (12/9/03 Tr. at 80.)
If Dobinsky called Mudd using an "800" number, however, or if Mudd called Dobinsky, those calls would not be reflected in the telephone records Defendant produced.
After considering all the evidence, we are satisfied that the jury's verdict must stand. The most important piece of evidence supporting the verdict is Dobinsky's unqualified testimony that he spoke with Mudd on the telephone and obtained his approval to sign the Agreement. The jurors were obligated to assess the credibility of this testimony, and they obviously found Dobinsky credible. "Since the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly for the jury it is an invasion of the jury's province to grant a new trial merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict." Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir. 1960). While some evidence produced at the trial may cast doubt on Dobinsky's testimony, we will not disturb the credibility determination of the jury. Moreover, Plaintiff produced viable explanations for much of the evidence that supposedly undermines Dobinsky's testimony. For instance, evidence showed that Plaintiff was a unique and highly valued employee of the Defendant, which could explain why Mudd agreed to the unusual terms in the Agreement. ( See, e.g., 12/9/03 Tr. at 48-49.) Also, while the telephone call between Dobinsky and Mudd was not reflected in the records produced at trial, Defendant failed to produce other records that may have shown that a telephone call did take place between Dobinsky and Mudd on January 28, 2002. ( Id. at 155-157.) Dobinsky offered reasons why the telephone call was not reflected in his diary, explaining that the purpose of his diary was not related to the controversy over the Agreement and that the diary was not comprehensive of everything he did at work that week. (12/10/03 Tr. at 47.) The fact that Plaintiff did not produce any writings, faxes, e-mails, or other documents reflecting Mudd's approval of the Agreement is not inconsistent with the jury's verdict, given that Dobinsky testified that Mudd orally approved the Agreement. Finally, Mudd's inability to say with certainty that he did not orally approve the Agreement stands in stark contrast to Dobinsky's unequivocal testimony that he obtained Mudd's approval. Considering all of this evidence, we conclude that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence, and must stand.
B. Jury's Exposure to Irrelevant Evidence
Defendant also argues that the jury was prejudiced because it was exposed to evidence during the trial that ultimately was rendered irrelevant when we granted Defendant's Rule 50 motion in part at the close of the evidence. Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial was unfair because the jury heard evidence related to apparent authority and ratification, even though we decided not to submit those issues to the jury for its consideration. We disagree. The suggestion that the jury could not fairly decide whether Dobinsky had express authority to sign the Agreement because it heard evidence relating to apparent authority and ratification is silly. Defendant's argument implies that Plaintiff's three theories of liability (express authority, apparent authority and ratification) should not have been tried before the same jury. Defendant has provided no authority in support of this unusual proposition and we are aware of none. In any event, the jury was properly instructed that our decision to narrow the issues should not affect in any way its consideration of whether or not Dobinsky had express authority from Mudd. (12/10/03 Tr. at 73.) Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial was fair, and that the jury's verdict should stand.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ___ day of January, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant Warner-Jenkinson d/b/a/ Sensient Technical Colors' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial (Doc. No. 40), and all papers filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.