Opinion
2005-645 WC.
Decided May 1, 2006.
Appeal from an order of the City Court of Yonkers, Westchester County (Arthur J. Doran, III, J.), entered October 5, 2004. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the action and denied plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment.
Order affirmed without costs.
PRESENT:: RUDOLPH, P.J., TANENBAUM and LIPPMAN, JJ
Plaintiff brought the instant small claims action to recover from defendant Continental Airlines the sum of $2,500 for breach of contract. Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the action was frivolous, stating that this was the fifth small claims action brought by plaintiff against defendant within the past two years ( see UCCA 1810). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment, contending that there was merit to the past four claims, some of which had been dismissed upon plaintiff's failure to appear, and that there was merit to the instant claim as well, which, he contended, was not identical to the previous claims.
In the instant action, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to perform in accordance with the conditions of its contract, i.e., to provide air transportation in exchange for OnePass frequent flyer miles. Specifically, he had attempted to reserve a flight to Italy, using his OnePass mileage, and was advised that there was no availability. Since defendant allegedly breached its agreement to provide tickets in exchange for miles, plaintiff sought the sum of $2,500 in exchange for 100,000 miles. The court ultimately granted defendant's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's cross motion.
At the outset, we note that plaintiff's breach of contract claim was not preempted by federal statute. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens ( 513 US 219), the United States Supreme Court held that the preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) ( 49 USC § 41713 [b] [1]), when read together with the savings clause of the Federal Aviation Act (49 USC § 1506), barred states from imposing "their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services," but did not preempt routine breach of contract claims where a party "claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated" ( id. at 232-233), since such "suits alleg[e] no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seek recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings" ( id. at 228). The Court stated that "[t]his distinction between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement" ( id. at 233).
Plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its agreement in that it failed to permit him to redeem his frequent flyer miles for a flight. However, he was aware of the fact, from prior litigation involving defendant's "OnePass Program," that seat availability was limited and might not be available on all flights, and that usage of his frequent flyer mileage was subject to capacity control. He failed to demonstrate that defendant in any way breached the terms and conditions of its agreement. Moreover, to the extent that he alleged that defendant was engaged in deceptive advertising, a claim which is raised for the first time on appeal, such claim is preempted by the ADA, since it relates to "rates" and "services" ( id. at 226).
Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment, plaintiff, an attorney, contends that motion practice should not be entertained in small claims court and that it was inappropriate for defendant to make a motion to dismiss in a small claims action. There is, however, no prohibition against motion practice in small claims court. Indeed, the court rules governing small claims procedure provide for the hearing of motions ( see 22 NYCRR 210.41 [l]). Although plaintiff questions in particular the very propriety of making a motion to dismiss in the context of a small claims action, it is noted that this court has, in the past, reviewed and affirmed orders granting CPLR article 32 motions for accelerated judgment made in small claims court ( see e.g. Senti v. Ace Auto Body Towing, NYLJ, Aug. 11, 1998 [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists; see also Hardin v. Northport — East Northport Union Free School Dist., 4 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50636[U] [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists]).
Section 1810 of the Uniform City Court Act authorizes the small claims court, should it be of the opinion that a claimant is bringing a claim for purposes of oppression and harassment, to deny the claimant use of the small claims part to prosecute the claim. Plaintiff also takes issue with defendant's having brought the instant motion under said statute, noting that the statute does not, by its terms, afford a defendant a right to seek relief thereunder. We need not pass on that issue, however, since, in any event, the merits of plaintiff's claim were fully addressed in the papers submitted in the court below and since it was readily apparent that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had a viable cause of action. In view of the foregoing, we see no impropriety in the court's dismissal of the instant action.
We note that costs and sanctions for frivolous conduct in civil litigation are not available "in proceedings in a small claims part of any court" ( 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and Lippman, JJ., concur.