Opinion
No. 325, 1998.
February 3, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, C.A. Nos. IS97110379 and IS97110380.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
VINCENT L. SPICER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 325, 1998. In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: December 1, 1998. Decided: February 3, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, C.A. Nos. IS97110379 and IS97110380.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HARTNETT, Justices.
ORDER
This 3rd day of February 1999, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Vincent L. Spicer appeals from his conviction in the Superior Court of one count each of unlawful sexual conduct in the second degree and offensive touching. Spicer claims that the trial court erred in permitting the State to use its peremptory challenges solely against males without requiring a gender-neutral explanation for this conduct.
(2) Spicer's trial took place on May 26, 1998. After some initial peremptory challenges by both sides, the State announced that it was content with the jury. At this point, the jury consisted of six males and six females. After several more peremptory strikes by both sides, the State again announced that it was content. The jury then consisted of seven males and five females. After one more round of peremptory strikes, voir dire ended, with the final panel consisting of eight males and four females. During the course of voir dire, the State exercised four peremptory strikes, all against male prospective jurors. At the close of voir dire, the jury consisted of eight males and four females.
Spicer used seven peremptory challenges, six of them against female prospective jurors.
(3) After the trial court announced the two alternate jurors, Spicer objected to the State's use of peremptory challenges against only male prospective jurors. The trial court denied Spicer's objection, finding instead that Spicer had failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes by the State. At this point, Spicer exercised his final peremptory challenge against the female alternate juror.
(4) This Court will review factual determinations made by the Superior Court in connection with an objection to a peremptory challenge under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1996).
(5) Spicer claims that the trial court failed to apply the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. The Batson inquiry requires the objecting party first to make a prima facie showing that the other party based its peremptory challenge on race. If it meets this burden, the non-objecting party must proffer a race-neutral explanation for its actions. If it does so, the burden shifts back to the objecting party, who must then establish intentional discrimination. This Court has expressly adopted the Batson analysis. More recently, the United States Supreme Court expressly extended the Batson inquiry to cases involving peremptory challenges based on gender.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 96-98.
See Riley v. State, Del. Supr., 496 A.2d 997 (1985); Dixon, 673 A.2d 1220.
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
(6) In this case, following Spicer's objection, the trial court found that Spicer had failed to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. The trial court considered the make-up of the jury to determine that the State had exercised no discriminatory purpose. Although it did not explicitly mention this, its analysis is strengthened by the fact that the State had expressed contentment with two previous empanelments, both of which had fewer male jurors than the final panel. This is not a logical strategy for a party bent on eliminating as many males as possible from the jury. Absent such a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent by Spicer, the Batson analysis ends and the State need not offer any gender-neutral reasons for its decision to strike only male prospective jurors.
(7) The trial court, arguably, did not realize that it needed to apply any special inquiry to peremptory challenges used in an allegedly gender-discriminatory manner. But this, alone, does not rise to clear error. Even if it did not realize it was doing so, the trial court properly followed the inquiry required in a Batson analysis.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Superior Court be, and it hereby is,
AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT: ______________________________ Chief Justice