Opinion
James W. Heyer, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants. plaintiffs-appellants.
Wood, Ris & Hames, Stephen E. Connor, Denver, for defendants-appellees.
Page 19
SMITH, Judge.
A house, leased by the plaintiffs Sperry from the defendants Siverts, was destroyed by a fire which caused the destruction of most of the Sperrys' personal property, permanent injuries to their two young sons, and death to their two-year-old daughter. In the resulting negligence action, jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs were entered. However, upon defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, these verdicts were set aside and judgment was entered for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal and we reverse.
The pre-trial order specified that the case would be tried on the issue of whether a latent defect existed in the gas system of the house and whether, if such a defect existed, it was the cause of the fire. If the plaintiffs established the existence of a defect, unknown to them, which caused the fire and the defendants lessors knew, or with the exercise of reasonable care ought to have known, of the existence of the defect, then the lessees were entitled to recover. Baughman v. Cosler, 169 Colo. 534, 459 P.2d 294.
The criteria for granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under C.R.C.P. 50(b) are essentially the same as those governing a motion for a directed verdict. Burenheide v. Wall, 131 Colo. 371, 281 P.2d 1000. The trial court, in order to grant the motion, must be convinced that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonable minds could not differ in arriving at a result contrary to the jury's determination. McGlasson v. Barger, 163 Colo. 438, 431 P.2d 778.
Although the evidence was complex and the testimony widely divergent, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that, on several occasions prior to the fire, the lessors had been advised of problems in the heating system by complaints of previous occupants of the house concerning the odor of gas. There was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the defendants knew, and the plaintiffs did not, of the possibility of the fire danger. The jury could well have accepted the evidence which indicated that a gas leak caused the fire on the first operation of the heating system after plaintiffs took possession. Reasonable minds could differ concerning inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. The solving of that evidentiary puzzle was a task for the jury, not for the trial court. Roth v. Spelts, 137 Colo. 406, 326 P.2d 80.
We reverse and remand with directions to reinstate the verdicts and to enter judgment thereon.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and PIERCE, J., concur.