Opinion
CIVIL NO. SA-19-CV-001135-XR
02-13-2020
STACY JAMES SPENCER, #2259742, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Before the Court are Plaintiff Stacy James Spencer's ("Spencer") Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and "Motion: Plaintiff's Request for Speedy Grand Jury Trial." (ECF Nos. 9, 13). Spencer, who is pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis, filed his Amended Complaint after this Court rendered a Show Cause Order allowing him to amend his original Complaint to avoid dismissal. (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 9). Upon consideration of Spencer's Amended Complaint, the Court finds it fails to state a non-frivolous claim. (ECF No. 9). Therefore, to the extent he seeks monetary damages, Spencer's section 1983 Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a non-frivolous claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b). To the extent he seeks habeas corpus relief, his section 1983 Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of a habeas corpus action after he has exhausted his available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
With regard to his motion for a "speedy grand jury trial," it appears Spencer is requesting an immediate jury trial with regard to his section 1983 claims. (ECF No. 13). Based on the Court's Order of Dismissal, Spencer's motion is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the appellate brief filed by Spencer's state-court appointed appellate counsel in the Fourth Court of Appeals, Spencer was convicted of assault-bodily injury of a family member as a repeater. http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=a7be5e62-91da-45be-bb7b-c3abb061bda3&coa=coa04&DT=Brief&MediaID=2b8a46b4-c94e-488e-aa73-4aa9c1abf62f (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). The trial court sentenced Spencer to ten years' confinement, but the sentence was suspended; he was placed on community supervision. Id. The State of Texas ultimately filed a motion to revoke, which was granted by the trial court. Id. After revocation, the trial court sentenced Spencer to six years' confinement. Spencer filed an appeal, which is pending. http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=04-19-00268-CR&coa=coa04 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
After he was sentenced and confined, Spencer filed his original section 1983 Complaint. (ECF No. 1). After review, the Court determined the Complaint was deficient and gave Spencer an opportunity to amend to avoid dismissal for failure to state a non-frivolous claim. (ECF No. 7). In response, Spencer filed his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 9). He subsequently filed a "Motion: Plaintiff's Request for Speedy Grand Jury Trial." (ECF No. 13).
APPLICABLE LAW
According to section 1915A(b)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code, this Court is required to screen any civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks relief against a government entity, officer, or employee and dismiss the complaint if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (directing court to dismiss case filed in forma pauperis at any time if it is determined that action is (i) frivolous or malicious, or (ii) fails to state claim on which relief may be granted). Typical examples of claims that may properly be dismissed pursuant to section 1915(e) include: (1) claims where it is clear the defendants are immune from suit, see, e.g., Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 76-77 (5th Cir. 1995); (2) claims of infringement of a legal interest that clearly does not exist, see, e.g., Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 2007); and (3) claims barred by limitations, see, e.g., Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999).
An action is frivolous where there is no arguable legal or factual basis for the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A complaint is factually frivolous when "the facts alleged are 'fantastic or delusional scenarios' or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is 'indisputably meritless.'" Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
In evaluating whether a complaint states a claim under sections 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court applies the same standards governing dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570 (2007)); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). These factual allegations need not be detailed but "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A conclusory complaint—one that fails to state material facts or merely recites the elements of a cause of action—may be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See id. at 555-56.
APPLICATION
In his Amended Complaint, Spencer filed section 1983 claims against: (1) the State of Texas, (2) Judge Ron Rangel, who presided over his criminal case, (3) Assistant District Attorney Ryan Kyle Wright, who prosecuted Spencer, (4) Deputy District Clerk Jessica Rays, and (5) Community Supervision Officer Darold Crow, who apparently supervised Spencer prior to the revocation of his community supervision. (ECF No. 9.). Spencer alleged each of the defendants committed "illegal error's," resulting in his conviction and subsequent false imprisonment. (ECF No. 9). Spencer contends he is entitled to lost wages, "$71 Hundred Million Dollars," and release from incarceration. (Id.).
As set out above, an IFP plaintiff's complaint is considered frivolous and subject to dismissal if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Here, Spencer has failed to state a viable claim.
No Allegation of Deprivation of Constitutional Right or Right Secured by Federal Law
To state a claim pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff's allegations must present "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," which means that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level;" "labels and conclusions ... will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570 (2007); see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (stating pleadings must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]"). A conclusory complaint, or one that fails to state material facts, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 2006).
To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing he has been deprived of a constitutional right or a right secured by federal law and the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Spencer complains about "illegal error's" [sic] committed by Defendants. (ECF No. 9). However, Spencer has failed to state material facts to support his claims, providing nothing more in the Amended Complaint than bare conclusions, and he has not alleged a violation of a constitutional right or right secured by federal law. See Rios, 444 F.3d at 426; Cornish, 402 F.3d at 549; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Accordingly, he has failed to state a non-frivolous claim upon which this Court may grant relief. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. State of Texas
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suits by private citizens against a state in federal court. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 662 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2011); K.P. v. Leblanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978)); see U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). It divests federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over suits against a state, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has enacted a valid override. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002).
Section 1983 does not include a waiver of the states' sovereign immunity and the State of Texas has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979); Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 1996). In addition, it is well settled that "a State is not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
We find Spencer's claims against the State of Texas are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, Spencer has failed to state a non-frivolous claim on which relief may be granted with regard to the State of Texas. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
2. Judge Ron Rangel and Assistant District Attorney Ryan Kyle Wright
Federal claims against state employees in their official capacities are the equivalent of suits against the state. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (1989); Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. at 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). The bar of the Eleventh Amendment is in effect when state officials are sued for monetary damages or retrospective relief in their official capacities. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169; Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982). This is so because "a judgment against a public servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents." Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)).
With regard to section 1983 claims, a state is not considered a "person" within the meaning of the statute. Will, 491 U.S. at 64. Thus, although state officials literally are persons, if sued in their official capacities, they are not deemed "persons" for purposes of section. Id. at 71. A suit against an official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official, but rather is a suit against the official's office. Id.; Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471. As such, it is no different from a suit against the state itself. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55). Thus, section 1983 suits brought against state officials in their official capacities for monetary damages or retrospective relief are, likewise, barred under the Eleventh Amendment. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169; Cory, 457 U.S. at 90.
Based on the foregoing, Spencer's claims against Judge Rangel and ADA Wright, to the extent the are asserted against them in their official capacities, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment with regard to any claim for monetary damages or retrospective relief. Thus, in this regard, Spencer has failed to state a non-frivolous claim on which relief may be granted. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
Absolute Immunity
1. Judge Ron Rangel - Judicial Immunity
"The federal civil rights laws do not provide a vehicle ... to sanction the conduct of state court judges for actions taken within the scope of their judicial authority." Bogney v. Jones, 904 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1990). It is well settled that a judge enjoys absolute immunity in his individual capacity from liability for damages for judicial acts performed within his jurisdiction. Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1996); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.1986). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity protects judges from liability for all actions taken in their judicial capacities, so long as they do not act in a clear absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity protects judicial officers not only from liability, but also from suit. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Davis v. Tarrant County, Texas, 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity applies to judicial acts of judges acting within their jurisdiction even in suits brought pursuant to section 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Mays, 97 F.3d at 111.
Absolute judicial immunity does not apply in certain limited circumstances. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Davis, 565 F.3d at 221. First, judges are not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Davis, 565 F.3d at 221. Second, judges are not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Davis, 565 F.3d at 221. Finally, judges are not immune when the plaintiff seeks prospective relief for an allegedly ongoing violation of federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the claims against Judge Rangel in his individual capacity for monetary or other retrospective relief are barred by judicial immunity. See Mays, 97 F.3d at 110-11; Bogney, 904 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1990); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It appears from the Amended Complaint that the "illegal error's" [sic] attributed to Judge Rangel by Spencer occurred during his trial, which Judge Rangel presided over. (ECF No. 9). There is nothing in the Amended Complaint to suggest the judge took actions beyond his judicial capacity or acted in the absence of jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Nor does Spencer seek prospective relief for an allegedly ongoing violation of federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56. Thus, as to Judge Rangel, Spencer has failed to state a non-frivolous claim upon which this Court may grant relief. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
2. Assistant District Attorney Ryan Kyle Wright - Prosecutorial Immunity
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability in their individual capacities in a civil rights suit seeking monetary or other retrospective relief for any actions taken by them within the course and scope of representing governmental agencies and subdivisions in judicial proceedings, i.e., when acting as advocates of the state. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269-73 (1993); Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1993); see U.S. CONST., amend. XI. "[A]cts undertaken by the prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Prosecutors are immune even if their actions are malicious or willful if the actions occur in the exercise of the advocatory function. Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003). However, like judges, prosecutors are not immune when a plaintiff seeks prospective relief for an allegedly ongoing violation of federal law. See Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56.
Spencer's allegations against ADA Wright arise out of his prosecution of Spencer. (ECF No. 9). Spencer has not alleged any facts showing ADA Wright was acting outside the course and scope of his role as an advocate for the State of Texas, nor has he sought prospective relief for an allegedly ongoing violation of federal law. (Id.); Accordingly, Spencer's action against ADA Wright in his individual capacity is barred. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56. With regard to the prosecutor, Spencer has failed to assert a non-frivolous claim upon which relief may be granted. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
3. Deputy District Clerk Jessica Rays - Absolute Immunity
Court clerks are absolutely immune in their individual capacities from actions "for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's discretion." Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001); see Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981). The reason for such immunity is based on the ministerial nature of a clerk's duties in Texas. As recognized by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a court clerk's performs ministerial duties at the behest of a judge. See Sharp v. State, 677 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Thus, a court clerk's immunity is similar to that of a judge. See Clay, 242 F.3d at 682.
Spencer's claims against Deputy District Clerk Rays in her individual capacity for monetary or other retrospective relief are barred to the extent they were taken at the behest of the judge. See Clay, 242 F.3d at 682. Spencer has failed to allege sufficient facts to overcome her immunity, thereby failing to state a non-frivolous claim upon which relief may be granted. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
To the extent Spencer contends Deputy District Clerk Rays was not acting at the behest of a judge, she is still entitled to qualified immunity, which is discussed in the following section.
Qualified Immunity
"A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights[,] and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation. Valentine v. Jones, 566 Fed. App'x 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011)). A right is clearly established if "the contours of [the] rights are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
Spencer has failed to plead facts showing why Officer Crow or Deputy District Clerk Rays, who are public officials, would not be entitled to qualified immunity with regard to claims brought against them in their individual capacities. (ECF No. 9). He has not alleged facts showing any act or omission by these individuals that violated his constitutional rights and were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time. (Id.); see Valentine, 566 Fed. App'x at 294. Thus, he has failed to state a non-frivolous claim upon which relief may be granted against Officer Crow and Deputy District Clerk Rays in their individual capacities. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
Suit Against Bexar County Via County Employees
Under a liberal construction of his Amended Complaint, it could be argued Spencer is attempting to sue Bexar County, Texas based on acts or omissions by Officer Crow and Deputy Districk Clerk Rays, who are county employees. (ECF No. 9). Insofar as Spencer seeks to recover monetary damages from Bexar County based on allegedly wrongful actions of county employees Officer Crow and Deputy District Clerk Rays, those efforts run afoul of the well-settled principle that vicarious liability does not apply to section 1983 claims. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (holding government may not be sued under section 1983 for injuries inflicted solely by its non-policymaking employees or agents).
A county or municipality is liable only for an employee's acts undertaken pursuant to official policy or custom. See id. at 690-91. Thus, to the extent Spencer seeks to sue Bexar County, to establish liability he had to demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. See id. Spencer's Amended Complaint fails not only to allege a Bexar County policy or custom that caused a constitutional deprivation but fails to allege an actual constitutional deprivation. (ECF No. 9). Thus, any section 1983 claim by Spencer against Bexar County cannot be based on allegedly wrongful acts or omissioms by Officer Crow or Deputy District Clerk Rays because Spencer has failed to allege they acted pursuant to a Bexar County policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional deprivation.
Heck v. Humphrey
In his Amended Complaint, Spencer contends he was wrongly convicted upon "illegal error's" [sic] by Defendants, resulting in false imprisonment. (ECF No. 9). In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that to recover for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or other harm caused by unlawful action that would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff pursuing a section 1983 action "must prove his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
Spencer does not allege, much less prove, that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question. See id. In fact, records from the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals show the appeal from his conviction is still pending. http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=04-19-00268-CR&coa=coa04 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). Accordingly, in this section 1983 suit, Spencer cannot recover for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or other harm caused by alleged unlawful action that might render his conviction or sentence invalid. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
28 U.S.C. § 2254
In addition to monetary relief, Spencer requests release from confinement based on alleged violations of his civil rights that resulted in his conviction and imprisonment. (ECF No. 9). Spencer can obtain such relief only pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus after exhaustion of his available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Ruiz v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2006). Under the exhaustion doctrine, state prisoners must exhaust all state remedies prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief in order to give the State an opportunity to pass upon and correct any alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Ruiz, 460 F.3d at 642. To exhaust state remedies, a prisoner is required to present the substance of his claims to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals by petition for discretionary review or application for writ of habeas corpus. See Bautista v. McCotter, 793 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1986). As mentioned above, Spencer's direct appeal is still pending before the Fourth Court of Appeals. http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=04-19-00268-CR&coa=coa04 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). Therefore, Spencer cannot obtain release from confinement in this suit because he has not yet exhausted his available state remedies. To the extent Spencer seeks release from confinement, his claims must be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a habeas corpus action once he has exhausted his available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court finds Spencer has failed to state a non-frivolous claim upon which relief may be granted. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b). The Defendants are, for various reasons, entitled to immunity. Moreover, Heck precludes any recovery for damages, and Spencer cannot obtain release from confinement in this section 1983 action.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Spencer's section 1983 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9), to the extent he seeks monetary damages, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a non-frivolous claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Spencer's section 1983 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9), to the extent he seeks habeas corpus relief, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of a habeas corpus action after he has exhausted his available state court remedies.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Spencer's "Motion: Plaintiff's Request for Speedy Grand Jury Trial" (ECF No. 13) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
SIGNED this 13th day of February, 2020.
/s/_________
XAVIER RODRIGUEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE