Appellant did not appear or answer prior to the date of the hearing; consequently, the trial court properly granted the writ of possession. OCGA § 44-14-233 (Code Ann. § 67-704); Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641 (3) ( 242 S.E.2d 308) (1978). Furthermore, OCGA § 44-14-233 (Code Ann. § 67-704) provides: "If the defendant fails to answer on or before the date of the hearing, the defendant may reopen the default as a matter of right by making an answer within seven days after the date of the default. . . ."

The proceeding authorized by OCGA § 44-14-231 (Code Ann. § 67-702) does not provide for recovery of a personal judgment. Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641 ( 242 S.E.2d 308) (1978). Therefore, this was not a "civil action" within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and venue was proper in Habersham County, where the secured property was located.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in relying upon Code Ann. § 67-717 in its analysis of the issues. Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641, 644 (5) ( 242 S.E.2d 308) (1978). The Court of Appeals also erred by holding that "Code Ann. § 67-703 did not provide the sole basis for jurisdiction" in the present action on the ground that the defendant did not assert that personal service was lacking.

Appellant contends that the original return of service establishes the lack of personal jurisdiction and that the trial court erred in ordering nunc pro tunc an amendment to the original return. In support of this contention, appellant cites Jones v. Bibb Brick Co., 120 Ga. 321 ( 48 S.E. 25) (1904), and Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641, 644 ( 242 S.E.2d 308) (1978). The original return of service states: "I have this day served the defendant Willie Montgomery with a true copy of the within petition and process by leaving same at wife residence.

Jones v. Bibb Brick Co., 120 Ga. 321, 324 ( 48 S.E. 25). See also Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641 (4) ( 242 S.E.2d 308). Olvey v. C. S. Bank of Clayton County, 146 Ga. App. 484, 485 ( 246 S.E.2d 485), citing Keys v. Keys, 86 Ga. App. 815 ( 72 S.E.2d 810), holds that "where a defendant has in no way submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, it is without jurisdiction to enter judgment against him until he is served and a legal return of service entered."

A literal reading of the Act requires the making of a contemporaneous record, and we will so enforce it because that is what it says; it "must be strictly construed and observed" ( Young v. Cowles, 128 Ga. App. 770, supra), and it behooves us to make that interpretation which best comports with due-process values sought to be served by its enactment, in this instance procedural safeguards protecting the exercise of the right to be heard. E.g., Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641, 644 (5) ( 242 S.E.2d 308) (1978) (default judgment for amount due "if otherwise permitted by this Chapter" (Code Ann. § 67-704)), not otherwise permitted by the Chapter. For purposes here the same as motion to set aside.

As "a claim for the indebtedness, whether filed in a separate action or ... a foreclosure proceeding under Code Ann. Ch. 67-7, must stand or fall upon the principles set forth in the Civil Practice Act..." ( Porter, supra, p. 2), this action insofar as it seeks a money judgment must fall. Accord, Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641 ( 242 S.E.2d 308), where this court held that although a writ of possession had properly issued under Ch. 67-7, a money judgment was not authorized. (The statement of facts shows that default judgment for the amount of the indebtedness could not properly have been entered prior to the expiration of the Civil Practice Act's 30-day time period for answering and the time for opening a default.)

SMITH, Judge. Contrary to appellant's contentions, the trial court was correct to order execution of the writ of possession which it previously issued and the issuance of which this court sustained ( Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641 ( 242 S.E.2d 308) (1978)), and the trial court did not fail to abide by the cited opinion by directing the execution. See Spencer v. Taylor, supra.