.Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 Fed.Appx. 442, 447 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vance, 133 S.Ct. at 2439). R. Doc. 104 at pp. 1-2 & 3.
All he had the authority to do was direct Collins' work and issue reprimands if that work was determined to be deficient. Id. As the "[t]he ability to direct another employee's tasks is simply not sufficient," and as there is no summary judgment evidence in the record that Housley could hire, fire, promote, demote or reassign Collins, Housley was not Collins' supervisor within the meaning of Vance. Vance, 133 S.Ct. at 439; see also e.g. Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (foreman could not be considered a supervisor within the meaning of Vance where he did not have the authority to "take tangible employment actions"). Accordingly, Collins' prima facie case of hostile work environment requires a showing that Noble knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Jackson v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., ___ Fed. Appx. ___, No. 13-20575, 2015 WL 585882, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2015), citing Hockman v. Westward Communications, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 Fed. Appx. 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2014)(To prevail on a hostile work environment claim a plaintiff must prove "(1) membership in a protected group; (2) harassment based on a factor rendered impermissible by Title VII; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment yet failed to address it promptly," i.e., failed to take prompt remedial action), citing Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 2012). To affect a term, condition or privilege of employment, the harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment" in the eyes of a reasonable person.
" '[A]n employee who proffers a fellow employee as a comparator [must] demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were taken 'under nearly identical circumstances.' " Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 450 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted)). The "nearly identical" standard is met when "the employees being compared held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation histories.
Therefore, notwithstanding Smith's failure to brief the potential impact of Hamilton, we consider it. C.f. Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 Fed.Appx. 442, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original). Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co. 576 Fed. App'x 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)). Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).
"In determining whether an employer's actions constitute a constructive discharge, [a court] ask[s] whether working conditions became 'so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign.'" Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Suders, 542 U.S. at 141). Courts in the Fifth Circuit consider seven factors in determining whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign:
"In determining whether an employer's actions constitute a constructive discharge, [a court] ask[s] whether 'working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.'" Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Suders, 542 U.S. at 141). Courts in the Fifth Circuit consider six factors in determining whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign:
Defendant's proffered reason for discharge is legitimate and non-discriminatory. See Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that an employee's violation of a zero-tolerance safety policy was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination). Plaintiff argues that certain evidence Defendant relies on is inadmissible.
Defendant's proffered reason for discharge is legitimate and non-discriminatory. SeeSpencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co. , 576 Fed.Appx. 442, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that an employee's violation of a zero-tolerance safety policy was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination). Plaintiff argues that certain evidence Defendant relies on is inadmissible.