Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co.

14 Citing cases

  1. Collins v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2293 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2018)

    All he had the authority to do was direct Collins' work and issue reprimands if that work was determined to be deficient. Id. As the "[t]he ability to direct another employee's tasks is simply not sufficient," and as there is no summary judgment evidence in the record that Housley could hire, fire, promote, demote or reassign Collins, Housley was not Collins' supervisor within the meaning of Vance. Vance, 133 S.Ct. at 439; see also e.g. Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (foreman could not be considered a supervisor within the meaning of Vance where he did not have the authority to "take tangible employment actions"). Accordingly, Collins' prima facie case of hostile work environment requires a showing that Noble knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

  2. Graham v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13-CV-1410 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 17, 2015)   Cited 5 times

    Jackson v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., ___ Fed. Appx. ___, No. 13-20575, 2015 WL 585882, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2015), citing Hockman v. Westward Communications, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 Fed. Appx. 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2014)(To prevail on a hostile work environment claim a plaintiff must prove "(1) membership in a protected group; (2) harassment based on a factor rendered impermissible by Title VII; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment yet failed to address it promptly," i.e., failed to take prompt remedial action), citing Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 2012). To affect a term, condition or privilege of employment, the harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment" in the eyes of a reasonable person.

  3. Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ.

    870 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2017)   Cited 225 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that sexually-charged comments and physical grabbing satisfy the first four elements of a prima facie case for hostile work environment

    Other courts of appeals have likewise found supervisor status to be lacking when reviewing responsibilities similar to those assigned to Marshall. See Kim v. Coach, Inc. , No. 14-16248, 692 Fed.Appx. 478, 479, 2017 WL 2615457, at *1 (9th Cir. June 16, 2017) (finding no supervisor status for employee who could give instructions about work); Matherne v. Ruba Mgmt. , 624 Fed.Appx. 835, 840 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding no supervisor status for employee who had some leadership authority, including control over a book where managers would make comments if anything went wrong in the workplace, but could not hire, fire, promote, demote, transfer, or discipline); Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co. , 576 Fed.Appx. 442, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding no supervisor status for employee who could give other employees direction on how to do their jobs but could not fire anyone without permission, and noting that "evidence ... that a foreman was authorized to direct the employee's daily work activities ... is the definition of supervisor expressly rejected by the Supreme Court") (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, courts have found that an employee qualifies as a supervisor when empowered to take the sorts of actions that Marshall could not.

  4. Carr v. Sanderson Farms, Inc.

    665 F. App'x 335 (5th Cir. 2016)   Cited 16 times

    Sanderson's investigation showed that Carr had committed a gross safety violation, which, according to company policy, was grounds for immediate termination. See McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 561-62 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the city's concerns for an officer's safety and the safety of others was a legitimate basis to take the officer's gun); see also Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (noting that the violation of a "zero-tolerance" safety policy sufficed as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for termination); Morrison v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 119 F. App'x 581, 585 (5th Cir. 2004) (determining that four safety violations on the same day provided a sufficient, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's termination). Carr alleges only that African-American employees "would not tolerate" it if only Webb were fired, and that Carr's termination was undertaken "to keep peace in the plant."

  5. Lynch v. Fluor Fed. Petroleum Operation

    Civil Action 19-13200 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2022)

    Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original). Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co. 576 Fed. App'x 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)). Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).

  6. Bennings v. UT Sw. Med. Ctr.

    No. 3:18-cv-2599-L (N.D. Tex. May. 16, 2019)

    And, "[i]f the harasser is plaintiff's [Title VII] supervisor, though, and not a co-worker, liability depends on certain other factors." Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013)); see also Morrow v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I, 681 F. App'x 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). But the Court should not concern itself with those, other factors now, because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has cautioned that a plaintiff need not make a showing of each prong of the prima facie test at the pleading stage.

  7. Boudreaux v. Stranco Field Servs., LLC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-5569 SECTION M (3) (E.D. La. May. 16, 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Dismissing Equal Pay Act claim where plaintiff identified two potential male comparators but “allege[d] nothing about the skill, effort, or responsibility required by the performance of either's position - in fact, making no reference at all to what position” the comparators held “and ma[de] bare mention of that required by her own”

    "In determining whether an employer's actions constitute a constructive discharge, [a court] ask[s] whether 'working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.'" Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Suders, 542 U.S. at 141). Courts in the Fifth Circuit consider six factors in determining whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign:

  8. Johnson v. J P Morgan Chase Bank

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1632 (W.D. La. Feb. 14, 2018)

    Defendant's proffered reason for discharge is legitimate and non-discriminatory. See Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that an employee's violation of a zero-tolerance safety policy was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination). Plaintiff argues that certain evidence Defendant relies on is inadmissible.

  9. Johnson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

    293 F. Supp. 3d 600 (W.D. La. 2018)   Cited 13 times

    Defendant's proffered reason for discharge is legitimate and non-discriminatory. SeeSpencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co. , 576 Fed.Appx. 442, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that an employee's violation of a zero-tolerance safety policy was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination). Plaintiff argues that certain evidence Defendant relies on is inadmissible.

  10. Daniel v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-3628 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2016)   Cited 3 times

    But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.Equal Emp'mt Opportunity Comm'n v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013)); accord Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)). In order to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, the harassment complained of must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.