In this appeal, we review a capital murder conviction and a death penalty imposed upon Timothy Wilson Spencer. Recently, we have affirmed three other such convictions and sentences imposed upon Spencer which involve unrelated but strikingly similar crimes, reported as Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1171 and 110 S.Ct. 759 (1990) (Spencer I); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1171 (1990) (Spencer II); and Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1171 (1990) (Spencer III). I. PROCEEDINGS

Dr. Hellams's attacker apparently gained access to the house by cutting out a large portion of a second-story bedroom window screen. Our recitation of the facts is condensed from the Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in this case, Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850, 851-53 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990). The medical examiner testified at trial that the cause of Dr. Hellams's death was ligature strangulation, apparently caused by two belts found around her neck.

As an appellate court, we must give deference to the trial court's decision whether to retain or exclude individual veniremen because the trial court "sees and hears the juror." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985); accord Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 572, 385 S.E.2d 850, 855 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. [1093], 110 S.Ct. 1171 (1990) (Spencer III); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 693, 364 S.E.2d 491, 503, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). For that reason, the trial court's decision in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of "manifest error."

B. The aggravating circumstance of "vileness" set forth in the capital murder statute is unconstitutionally vague. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 569, 385 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (Spencer III); Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 320-21, 356 S.E.2d 157, 161, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987). C. The verdict form was defective because it did not list the mitigating factors mentioned in the statute.

"Whether to qualify a witness as an expert rests largely within a trial court’s discretion." Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 573, 385 S.E.2d 850, 856 (1989). A trial court’s decision that a witness is qualified as an expert

In addition to the numerous treatises cited by the magistrate judge in her thorough report and recommendation outlining the use and availability of DNA evidence as of late 1986, our independent research reveals a number of reported appellate cases discussing DNA evidence that were decided prior to the time Charron filed his first habeas petition on November 21, 1990. See, e.g., White v. State, 301 Ark. 74, 781 S.W.2d 478 (1989); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990); Martinez v. State, 549 So.2d 694 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989). Because Charron has failed to establish "cause," we decline to conduct a prejudice inquiry.

We have additionally reviewed similar cases in which, after a finding of both aggravating factors of future dangerousness and vileness, a death sentence was imposed for a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing by means of ligature strangulation. See, e.g., Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400,cert. denied,528 U.S. 952, 120 S.Ct. 376, 145 L.Ed.2d 293 (1999); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990), cert. denied,498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 281, 112 L.Ed.2d 235 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 286 S.E.2d 172 (1982). Finally, we have reviewed capital murder cases in which life imprisonment was imposed rather than the death penalty.

In addition, state and federal courts have regularly rejected arguments that lethal injection as a method of execution is cruel and unusual. See e.g. LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F.Supp. 469 (D.Ariz.1995), affirmed 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.1998); Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2000); State v. Webb, supra; Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46 (Ind. 2002); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989). The lethal injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

In addition, state and federal courts have regularly rejected arguments that lethal injection as a method of execution is cruel and unusual. See e.g. LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F.Supp. 469 (D.Ariz. 1995), affirmed 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998); Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2000); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147 (Ct. 1996); Moore v. State, 771 N.Ed.2d 46 (Ind. 2002);Spencer v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989). The lethal injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

See, e.g., Cooper v. Rimmer, 358 F.3d at 657; v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998); Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (E.D. Ala. 1992); State v. Webb, 750 A.2d at 457-58; Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 n. 20 (Fla. 2000); Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d at 56 n. 4; Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d at 186; Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850, 853, 6 Va. Law Rep. 747 (Va. 1989). By the same token, twenty-eight of the states for which information is available as well as the United States Bureau of Prisons use Pavulon as one of the drugs in their lethal injection protocol.