Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-CV-1437.
September 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Cynthia Spence's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order granting Defendant Acosta Sales and Marketing Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 23.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania allow parties to file motions for reconsideration or amendment of a judgment. Courts should grant these motions sparingly, reserving them for instances when: (1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence has become available; or (3) there is a need to prevent manifest injustice or correct a clear error of law or fact. General Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek Elecs., 3 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff'd, 197 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1999). FACTS
Plaintiff has filed this Motion for Reconsideration requesting that we re-examine our Memorandum and Order of January 21, 2004, in which we granted Defendant Acosta Sales and Marketing Co.'s ("Acosta") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff submits the instant Motion asserting that this Court committed errors of fact and law in the Memorandum and Order. (Pl's Mot. For Recons. at unnumbered 1.) In the Memorandum, we concluded that Plaintiff had failed to cast doubt on Defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff. Spence v. Acosta Sales Mktg., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1269 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Background History
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against because of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination of Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiff is a fifty-five year old woman who, until she was terminated in May, 2002, worked for Defendant as a part-time merchandiser. (Spence Aff. ¶¶ 1,6; Spence Dep. at 71.) Plaintiff was first hired in 1999 by Weaver, Defendant's predecessor organization. Sometime after Plaintiff commenced her employment as a merchandiser, Weaver merged with Acosta. (Spence Aff. ¶ 2.) Beginning in September, 2001, and during the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiff was under the supervision of Senior Unit Manager Kathleen Wiblishauser. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff claims that Wiblishauser terminated her on May 20, 2002, because of her age. Defendant claims that Plaintiff was terminated because she submitted reimbursement requests for mileage on days that she did not work. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that Plaintiff submitted the reimbursement requests to Wiblishauser. Wiblishauser reviewed the requests and concluded that Plaintiff did not work on the days in question (the weeks of April 8th and 15th, 2002) because Plaintiff had requested those days off. (Spence Dep. at Exs. 3, 4.) When Wiblishauser subsequently received the mileage reimbursement request from Plaintiff, she checked the schedule and concluded that Plaintiff had submitted fraudulent reports. ( Id. at 3; Wiblihauser Dep. at 18.)
Plaintiff's original Complaint also included a Title VII claim for sex discrimination. However, Plaintiff abandoned the Title VII claim. (Pl.'s Brief in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. For Summ. J. at unnumbered 1.)
Plaintiff contends that she generally worked approximately twenty-four to thirty-two hours per week. (Spence Dep. at 74.)
Plaintiff admits that she initially requested not to work during the weeks of April 8th and 15th. (Spence Aff. ¶¶ 10, 23.) However, Plaintiff contends that she subsequently notified Wiblishauser that she was available to work. ( Id. ¶¶ 12, 24.) According to Plaintiff, Wiblishauser responded by providing Plaintiff with new assignments. ( Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff contends that she submitted mileage expense reports and time sheets to Wiblishauser that accurately reflected her mileage and hours. ( Id. ¶¶ 19-21.)
Plaintiff admits that she submitted two conflicting time sheets to Wiblishauser. ( Id.) On the first time sheet, Plaintiff wrote "Horsham-Acme" but did not write that she worked any hours on April 8th, 2002. On the second time sheet, Plaintiff claimed to have worked at the Giant store and the Acme in Horsham for eight hours on April 8th. Compare Spence Dep. at Ex. 5, with id. at Ex. 6. Plaintiff also admits that although she wrote "Horsham Acme" on one time sheet and her mileage expense report on April 8th, 2002, that she actually worked in a variety of stores performing a different assignment ("credits") on April 8th. ( Id. at 152.) In addition, Plaintiff admits that she submitted an inaccurate mileage expense report because she claimed that she performed the task of "reset" on April 8th, when she, in fact, performed the task of "credits." ( Id. at 155-156, Ex. 4.)
Unfortunately, this problem with expense reports was not the first problem between Plaintiff and Wiblishauser. On December 13, 2001, Wiblishauser issued a first and final warning to Plaintiff, detailing Plaintiff's unacceptable work performance. ( Id. at 104-106; Wiblishauser Dep. at 14-15.) The warning discussed the problem of Plaintiff's last minute cancellation of her weekly work schedule. It indicated that, despite an oral agreement that Plaintiff would have to accept shifts outside the Allentown area, Plaintiff had canceled multiple shifts and "taken it upon herself to contact other Supervisors asking for work for the following week in the Allentown area after she has told me she would not work the schedule I gave her." (Spence Dep., Ex. 1, at unnumbered 1.) The warning also cited incidents demonstrating that Plaintiff had problems getting along with her co-workers. The co-workers in question requested reassignment to locations away from Plaintiff. According to the warning, when Wiblishauser spoke with Plaintiff about the problem, Plaintiff "hung the phone up on [Wiblishauser] in the middle of [the] conversation." ( Id. at Ex. 1, unnumbered 1-2.) In addition, the warning referenced prior verbal reprimands and listed the weeks of September 24th, October 8th, October 29th, and November 27th, 2001, as occasions when Plaintiff "cancelled out on a Friday night." ( Id. at Ex. 1, unnumbered 2.) The warning stated that, "[i]mmediate improvement in Cynthia's attitude and performance must be noted. Cynthia will need to be more flexible with her schedule. I will need a week's advance notice prior to a schedule being written out that she cannot work on certain days." ( Id.) When Wiblishauser presented the warning to Plaintiff, Plaintiff refused to sign or accept a copy of the written warning ( id.), maintaining that she, like all part-time employees, was free to accept or decline the proposed work schedules. ( Id. at 110-111.)
Defendant claims that on multiple occasions, the schedule was sent out on a Wednesday and Plaintiff waited until Friday to cancel for the entire next week. In Wiblishauser's words these cancellations left Defendant subject to $500 fines, by its clients, for every employee who failed to report to a project. (Wiblishauser Dep. at 26-27.)
DISCUSSION
In granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, we found that while Plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of age discrimination, she did not establish that a reasonable jury could find that the Defendant's proffered reasons for firing her were a pretext for discrimination. Spence, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1269, at *13.
Plaintiff bore the "initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence." Sarullo, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25847, at *20 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)). A prima facie case of age discrimination is a question of law to be decided by the court and includes a showing that plaintiff: "(1) is over forty; (2) is qualified for the position in question; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to permit an inference of age discrimination." Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Sempier v. Johnson Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 1995)).
We noted in our decision that "the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis applies to . . . claims of discrimination under . . . the ADEA." Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ.A.01-4203, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25847, at *19-20 (3d Cir. Dec. 19, 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Accordingly, plaintiff "bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence." Sarullo, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25847, at *20 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. 509 U.S. at 506). If the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant to state a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 502.) "If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discriminatory action raised by the prima facie case is rebutted." Sarullo, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25847, at *20 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)). "The plaintiff then must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, and not the real motivation for the unfavorable job action." Id.
In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff does not contend that there has been an intervening change in controlling law or that new evidence has become available. General Instrument Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 606. Rather, Plaintiff contends that we committed a clear error of law and made incorrect factual determinations. (Pl's Mot. For Recons. at unnumbered 1, 8.) Plaintiff contends that because of the clear errors of law and fact, we should vacate our Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant. ( Id.)
Plaintiff argues that we made an error in law when we asserted that, "Plaintiff has also failed to cast doubt on Defendant's proffered reason because Plaintiff has provided no information whatsoever to indicate that age was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision." ( Id. at 8 (citing Spence, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1269, at *13).) Plaintiff argues that she does not need to produce direct evidence of discrimination in order to prove pretext. (Pl's Mot. For Recons. at unnumbered 8.) Plaintiff is correct that direct proof of discrimination is not necessary. However, in making her argument, Plaintiff has taken our words out of context. When we made the statement of which Plaintiff complains, we had already discussed the fact that Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext. See Spence, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1269, at *13 (pointing out that "we cannot expect Defendant to simply ignore the fact that Plaintiff submitted payroll information which did not accurately reflect the time worked or the miles traveled"). Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant's proffered reasons for firing her were a pretext for discrimination.
We pointed out that Plaintiff had provided no information to indicate that age was a motivating factor in order to further illustrate that this was a case where no rational factfinder could conclude that the Defendant's action was discriminatory. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000), is instructive:
Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred."530 U.S. at 148 (emphasis added) (citing Aka v. Washington Hospital Ctr, 156 F.3d 1284, 1291-1292 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Fisher v. Vasser Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1338 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[I]f the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent.")). Our statement that there was a lack of evidence of any discriminatory animus whatsoever in this lawsuit merely serves to put the case in the class of cases described in Reeves.
While the Supreme Court in Reeves discusses Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (judgment as a matter of law), the Court notes that the standard for "granting summary judgment `mirrors' the standard for judgement as a matter of law, such that the `inquiry under each is the same.'" 530 U.S. at 150 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-251 (1986)).
Plaintiff also contends that this Court erred by stating that, "Plaintiff admitted that she submitted one time sheet that incorrectly states that she worked on April 9th, 2002." (Pl's Mot. For Recons. at unnumbered 1 (quoting Spence, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1269, at *4).) Plaintiff also contends that this Court erred by stating, "Plaintiff has admitted that . . . she submitted incorrect information related to time sheets and reimbursement forms . . . Spence Dep. at 155-58 (admitting that she submitted an expense report that reflects miles that she did not actually travel)." ( Id. at unnumbered 2 (quoting Spence, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1269, at *13).) Plaintiff contends that she never admitted submitting an expense report for miles that she did not actually travel. ( Id.)
Even if accept Plaintiff's statement that she did not make such admissions, the result would be the same. Plaintiff admits that she submitted two inconsistent time sheets to Defendant (Spence Aff. ¶¶ 19-21), and the evidence reflects differing hours and differing locations on April 8th, 2001 on the two differing time sheets. (Spence Dep. at Exs. 5, 6.) Plaintiff also admits that she submitted a mileage expense report that describes the task of "reset" rather than "credit." ( Id. at 155-156, Ex. 4.) In addition, Plaintiff admits that she worked at many different stores on April 8th, but only wrote "Acme Horsham" on her mileage expense report. Compare id. at 152, with id. at Ex. 4. The problems with the reimbursement requests along with Plaintiff's problems with her supervisor and her co-employees and the lack of evidence of discriminatory animus convinces us that no rational fact finder would conclude that Defendant's action was discriminatory.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Spence has failed to establish an intervening change in controlling law, that new evidence is available, or that there is a need to prevent a manifest injustice or to correct a clear error of law or fact. Accordingly, Plaintiff Spence's Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff Cynthia Spence's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting Defendant Acosta's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 23, 03-cv-1437), and all papers filed in support thereof and opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that Spence's Motion is DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.