"It is apparent in the case at bar the State's Attorney offered the evidence for the purpose of showing a propensity to drink and therefore to show that Babb was probably drunk at the time of the traffic accident involved in these proceedings. It seems equally apparent, from the trial judge's comment that the evidence was admitted, and considered, for the purpose of showing propensity and therefore the error is reversible." 7 Md. App. 121. Actually, from a reading of the record it is difficult to determine just why this evidence was admitted.
Denied January 13, 1970Petition denied January 13, 1970. Opinion of Court of Special Appeals reported: 7 Md. App. 121.
The officer also admitted that he "could have" remarked that the victim "deserved to die." Quoting Spell v. State, 7 Md. App. 121, 129 (1969), appellant classifies this friendly atmosphere and suggestive remark as something proscribed by the statement that "[A confession] cannot be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises nor by the exertion of any improper influence. . . ."
Nor would the fact that the appellant had been in the hospital and may have still been in some pain vitiate an otherwise voluntary statement. Spell v. State, 7 Md. App. 121. In ruling on the admissibility of the statement, the trial judge found:
The determination of the admissibility of a confession is left largely to the trial court. From our review of the record we find no manifest abuse of discretion, absent which, such determination will not be disturbed. Spell v. State, 7 Md. App. 121, 130. That appellant refused to sign the confession after voluntarily making it did not render it inadmissible. Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 377; Cooper v. State, 1 Md. App. 190, 194-195.
It is essential to a crime that the defendant committed a voluntary act. Voluntariness in this context has a limited meaning. It is not as broad, for example, as the voluntariness which must be shown to render a confession admissible. See Spell v. State, 7 Md. App. 121, 129. The voluntary requirement of the criminal act relates directly to compulsion; it is a defense as to all crimes except taking the life of an innocent person that the defendant acted under a compelling force of coercion or duress.
We fully discussed the matter of waiver in the context of the Miranda requirements in Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 313, and further explained it in Anderson v. State, 6 Md. App. 688. And see Spell v. State, 7 Md. App. 121. In the light of those opinions we find a valid constitutional waiver here for we think that the totality of the circumstances — the attendant facts of the case — implicitly showed that the appellant voluntarily and intelligently relinquished his Miranda rights and made a statement.