The Andersons further argued there was reasonable evidence that Escabrosa's actions (or lack thereof) had caused their injuries and the rattlesnake was not an open and obvious condition—therefore entitling them to present the case to a jury. ¶8 After oral argument, the trial court granted Escabrosa's motion for summary judgment, relying in part on Spelbring v. Pinal County, 135 Ariz. 493 (App. 1983). Consistent with Spelbring, the court concluded that Escabrosa did not have actual or constructive notice of the snake in the rock formation based solely on its knowledge that the surrounding desert contained snakes.
" Id. (quotation omitted); see also Preuss v. Sambo's of Ariz., Inc., 130 Ariz. 288, 290, 635 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1981) ("[T]he notice requirement must be of the defect itself and not of the conditions producing the defect."); Koepke v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. , 140 Ariz. 420, 426, 682 P.2d 425, 431 (App. 1984) ("[Defendant] must have actual or constructive notice of the specific defect which caused the injury . . . and not merely knowledge of conditions naturally productive of that defect."); Spelbring v. Pinal County, 135 Ariz. 493, 495, 662 P.2d 458, 460 (App. 1983). ¶11 Mrs. Hill argues Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Cone, 2 Ariz. App. 151, 406 P.2d 869 (1965), supports her contention that the Greenwoods had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
" Id. (quotation omitted); see also Preuss v. Sambo's of Ariz., Inc., 130 Ariz. 288, 290, 635 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1981) ("[T]he notice requirement must be of the defect itself and not of the conditions producing the defect."); Koepke v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 140 Ariz. 420, 426, 682 P.2d 425, 431 (App. 1984) ("[Defendant] must have actual or constructive notice of the specific defect which caused the injury . . . and not merely knowledge of conditions naturally productive of that defect."); Spelbring v. Pinal County, 135 Ariz. 493, 495, 662 P.2d 458, 460 (App. 1983). ¶11 Mrs. Hill argues Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Cone, 2 Ariz. App. 151, 406 P.2d 869 (1965), supports her contention that the Greenwoods had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
This brings us to the question of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Reviewing a summary judgment we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant and give the appellant the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the record. Spelbring v. Pinal County, 135 Ariz. 493, 662 P.2d 458 (App. 1983). If there is the slightest doubt as to any material fact, we will reverse the judgment for trial on the merits. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. James, 118 Ariz. 116, 575 P.2d 315 (1978).
However, we will affirm if the record shows no disputed material fact issues and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Spelbring v. Pinal County, 135 Ariz. 493, 662 P.2d 458 (App. 1983). To maintain a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a duty or obligation to follow a certain standard of conduct in order to protect another against unreasonable risk. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983).
Further, no evidence shows the city had notice of that condition. See Spelbring v. Pinal County, 135 Ariz. 493, 662 P.2d 458 (App. 1983). Affirmed.