Opinion
C.A. No. KC-2014-1498
08-06-2020
SHANNON SPEARS v. GARY A. CARTER, TALON AMADO, LEONARD J. HARRIS, HOLLY K. HARRIS, and HAYLEY HARRIS
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Joseph R. Daigle, Esq. For Defendant: Peter A. Clarkin, Esq.
DECISION LANPHEAR , J. This matter came on for hearing on July 9, 2020 before Mr. Justice Lanphear on Plaintiff's motion for a new trial or in the alternative, for an additur.
Facts and Travel
This case was tried before a jury in February 2020. Mr. Spears alleged that he was assaulted by Gary Carter and Talon Amado while at a family party in December 2011 at the home of Leonard and Holly Harris. He alleges that the Harrises' negligence allowed the assaultive behavior and that, once the fighting began, Hayley Harris ushered the three men outside to continue their conflict. Mr. Carter and Mr. Amado were defaulted and did not appear at trial. The trial proceeded against the Harrises.
Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the Plaintiff's case. After a jury verdict for Plaintiff and denial of the motion for judgment, Mr. Spears moved for an additur or in the alternative, for a new trial.
The Court will not discuss liability at length. The jury had appropriate grounds, based on the evidence presented at trial, to determine that Leonard Harris and Hayley Harris were negligent, and that Mr. Spears suffered damages as a proximate cause of their negligence. Mr. Harris and Hayley Harris acknowledged at trial that on December 11, 2011, they went to bed leaving guests in the home. Holly Harris, now deceased, testified at her deposition that she went to bed as well. Holly and Leonard woke when there was a heated argument at their home involving Gary Carter, Talon Amado and Shannon Spears. A dining room table was overturned. Hayley Harris went into the room where the argument was ongoing, yelled at the men, found Mr. Amado and Mr. Spears were drinking, and told them all to leave the home. The three men fought as soon as they were outside. Mr. Spears received substantial injuries and was left lying in the street. It was reasonable to find each of the defendants liable and that the trial defendants' actions were a proximate cause of Mr. Spears' harm. There was no inconsistency in the evidence concerning these facts.
See the Order of March 23, 2020 regarding Judgment as a Matter of Law. Neither of the parties questioned the jury's finding of liability in their memoranda for this motion. At trial six witnesses testified, and Holly Harris' deposition transcript was read into evidence.
The Verdict
The jury found the Harris defendants to be liable, but the verdict form reflected that the three Harrises were 50% at fault, Mr. Spears was 40% at fault, and others were 10% at fault. In light of the evidence presented, these percentages are reasonable and within the jury's prerogative. No party questioned the percentages awarded. Mr. Spears was an active participant in the conflict, and Defendants Talon and Amado clearly beat Mr. Spears. Mr. Spears was left in a roadway near the Harris house, lying in the road, bleeding and barely conscious. The oddity in the verdict is the value of total damages for Mr. Spears' injuries totaled $10,000. (In an interrogatory placed after the apportionment of damages, the jury was asked to calculate the damages to Mr. Spears without making an adjustment for percentage liability.) Mr. Spears presented medicals bills for a far greater amount for treatment immediately after the assault. The only evidence that the jury possessed (the testimony of Mr. Spears and others) was that those bills were the proximate result of the assault. There was no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Spears was in Rhode Island Hospital for five days and was intubated. He left with a wired jaw. The medical records in evidence describe the full extent of his injuries. Obviously, he also suffered and was in pain.
The Law of Additur
In Cotrona v. Johnson & Wales College, 501 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1985) our high court labelled remittiturs and additurs as "mainstays in the arsenal of Rhode Island trial judges," and
"Traditionally, remittitur and additur have been used to correct jury awards in cases in which the jury's determination of damages fails to properly respond to the merits of the controversy or fails to administer substantial justice." Id.Nevertheless, this Court is reluctant to use this escape valve, is well aware of the dedication and competence of jurors, confident of our civil justice system built on the principles of impartial jury trials and hoping to afford juries with reasonable discretion in the exercise of their important tasks. Indeed, America takes great pride in its expansive use of jury trials for criminal and civil trials and should do so. Second guessing a jury must be a serious task. The Court should undertake such a request cautiously and thoughtfully.
The verdict in the case at bar, however, is inconsistent with itself. The jury found liability and proximate cause. It found the total amount of damages incurred by Mr. Spears to be $10,000, when his medical bills alone were at least $25,873. More appropriate are the words of Hayhurst v LaFlamme, 441 A.2d 544, 546-47 (R.I. 1982):
"When ruling on plaintiff's request for an additur, the trial justice correctly considered the legal standard by which such a request must be evaluated: a jury award for pain and suffering may not be disturbed unless the court determines that such demonstrable disparity exists between the amount assigned by the jury and the actual damages sustained that the verdict is unresponsive to the controversy and fails to render substantial justice between the parties. Stated otherwise, a damage award may be disregarded by the trial justice and a new trial granted only if the award shocks the conscience or indicates that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice or if the award demonstrates that the jury proceeded from a clearly erroneous basis in assessing the fair amount of compensation to which a party is entitled." (citations omitted.)
Here, the Court finds that such demonstrable disparity exists between the amount assigned by the jury and the actual damages sustained that the verdict is unresponsive to the controversy and fails to render substantial justice between the parties. While the issue of liability was in question, there was no dispute concerning the resultant medical bills and that those bills were proximately caused by the events of December 11 and 12, 2011. The damage award was clearly erroneous.
The Oral Proof of Claim
After the jury verdict, Plaintiff presented his proof of claim against the defaulted Defendants, Gary Carter and Talon Amado. No defendant or defense counsel appeared. The Court, based on evidence on hand, awarded a judgment of $102,708. In his memorandum for this motion, Mr. Spears suggests that the additur should be modified to the same amount. However, each of the procedures are different and, indeed, independent of one another.
In an oral proof of claim against defaulted parties, the Court acts as an independent factfinder, applying the facts to the law to forge an impartial and appropriate judgment. Such proceedings normally occur early in the case when defendants are first defaulted and before the trial of other defendants. The Court is not bound or contingent upon what a jury in a separate proceeding may award. See, e.g., Carlson v. Plouffe, 593 A.2d 74 (R.I. 1993).
On a motion for trial, or for an additur, the Court has a jury verdict in hand, and its first task is to determine if a disparity exists which fails to address the merits of the controversy. Even where the jury was merely advisory, our high court has held that deference should be given to jury findings. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 630 (R.I. 2003). On a motion for a new trial, the court's function is
"to make an independent appraisal of the evidence in light of his or her charge to the jury. If, after conducting this analysis, the trial justice concludes that the evidence is evenly balanced or that reasonable minds could differ on the verdict, she or he should not disturb the jury's decision." Dominguez v. Otero, 229 A.3d 405, 408 (R.I. 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).Hence, each of the proceedings are separate and independent of one another.
Analysis of Damages
The Court recomputes the damages, as follows:
Mr. Spears is awarded medical bills of $25,873. Mr. Spears established that medical bills in the three weeks following his injuries totaled $25,873. The Court is not awarding medical bills incurred after December 31, 2011, as the Court finds Mr. Spears was acting inconsistently with medical advice at that time. In computing pain and suffering, the Court awards:
Trial Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
• For five days at Rhode Island Hospital, $1000 per day, $5000;
• For the two weeks following with a wired jaw, $3000 per week, $6000;
• Pain and suffering through May 31, 2012, substantiated by the NeuroHealth records, $1500 per month, $9000.
The Court found insufficient proof of permanency, as it could not conclude, from evidence submitted to the jury, that Mr. Spears did not cause or contribute to his damages significantly. Rather, he failed to follow medical instructions.
Exhibit A is instructive. It reveals that on December 31, 2011, Mr. Spears removed the bands from his wired jaw and, while driving, became involved in a motor vehicle collision. He received treatment at another hospital. The arch bars in his mouth were replaced and he was placed on a liquid diet for another six weeks. The physician expressed concern with Mr. Spears' adherence to past instructions, and whether he would comply in the future. At trial, Mr. Spears admitted failing to attend follow-up visits as instructed in his original discharge from Rhode Island Hospital. He acknowledged that he was instructed to go to NeuroHealth and to follow up but does not recall doing so (nor did he present records of ongoing treatment). He acknowledged that he could get treatment at the Narragansett Health Center, though he refused to state that he knew such treatment was free for him as a Native American. The testimony of Hayley Harris, who works at the Center, was more credible on the issue that his ongoing medical treatment at the Center or referrals from the Center would be free to Mr. Spears.
This evidence resulted in questioning Mr. Spear's ongoing damages and permanency. Frankly, the jury was within their province to question his credibility on this issue, and to find he had not met his burden even though Exhibit 12 finds sleeplessness, migraines, imbalance and memory impairment, all post-concussion. The Court cannot conclude that these defendants were the proximate cause of all the damages Mr. Spear may have suffered after December 31, 2011, and therefore, its award is limited. Accordingly, the amounts for medical bills after December 2011, pain and suffering and permanency were narrowed.
Conclusion
These damages awarded herein total $45,873. As the trial defendants were found to be 50% negligent (per the comparative negligence question on the verdict form), the Court conditionally grants a judgment for Mr. Spears and against Leonard Harris and Haley Harris, jointly and severally, via an additur for $22,836.50 to Mr. Spears, plus prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest and costs. As the Court is awarded an additur, it also affords the trial defendants with the option of a new trial on the issue of damages, and to that extent, the motion for new trial is granted. Trial defendants shall have twenty days after the date of this Order to elect a new trial on the issue of damages. If they fail to do so, a final judgment shall enter forthwith without further application to the Court. This Order shall not affect the Orders or Judgments against Defendants Gary Carter and Talon Amado.
Our Supreme Court has instructed that, where a remitter is granted, "plaintiff should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to accept the reduced judgment." Lennon v Dacomed Corp., 901 A.2d 582, 590 (R.I. 2006). Logically then, when granting an additur, defendants should have an opportunity to accept the additur, or a new trial would result. --------
Counsel for Plaintiff shall submit appropriate orders. ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Joseph R. Daigle, Esq. For Defendant: Peter A. Clarkin, Esq.