And courts also relied on § 343 to assess whether a defendant was not subject to liability because a business visitor should have "discover[ed] the condition or realize[d] the risk involved within," in other words, because the visitor was contributorily negligent. See, e.g., Spear v Wineman, 335 Mich. 287, 290; 55 N.W.2d 833 (1952); Goodman, 286 Mich. at 82-83.
SeeBertrand, 449 Mich. at 624 (applying Illustration 3). SeeGoodman v Theatre Parking, 286 Mich. 80, 82; 281 N.W. 545 (1938), quoting Restatement Torts, § 343; see alsoAckerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hosp, 366 Mich. 596, 600; 115 N.W.2d 290 (1962) (stating that § 343 set forth the applicable standard of care for business invitees); Zeglowski v. Polish Army Veterans Ass'n of Mich, Inc, 363 Mich. 583, 586; 110 N.W.2d 578 (1961) (noting that the Court had "adopted" § 343 in Nash v. Lewis, 352 Mich. 488, 492; 90 N.W.2d 480 (1958)); Spear v. Wineman, 335 Mich. 287, 290; 55 N.W.2d 833 (1952) (noting that the "law is well stated" by a comment to § 343).SeePerkoviq v. Delcor Homes-Lake Shore Pointe, Ltd, 466 Mich. 11, 16; 643 N.W.2d 212 (2002) (applying Bertrand and observing that in Bertrand we had incorporated § 343 and § 343A); Singerman, 455 Mich. at 139 (citing comment e to § 343A as part of the governing law); Bertrand, 449 Mich. at 609-614, 623-624 (describing and applying § 343 and § 343A, along with various accompanying comments to those sections, as the law of the state); Riddle, 440 Mich. at 92-93, 95 (noting that the Court had "adopted" the original § 343 in Ackerberg and the revised version in Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich. 244, 259-261; 235 N.W.2d 732 (1975), and that, together with § 343A, these sources "correctly define the law regarding a premises owner's duty of care to invitees"); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich. 495, 500; 418 N.W.2d 381 (1988) ("The duty a possessor of land owes his in
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. See, e.g., Spear v Wineman, 335 Mich. 287; 55 N.W.2d 833 (1952) (under 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343, it is for the jury to decide the question of contributory negligence where a plaintiff-customer is injured when hit by a wind-blown door of the store where she was shopping). In the instant case, there was evidence that workers commonly used the coil field as a shortcut to reach plant offices, and that a warning would likely have been ignored.
landowner is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which the landowner owes to the employee/invitee for his or her protection even though the dangerous condition is known and obvious to the employee."), and Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc. , 457 N.W.2d 614, 619 (Iowa, 1990) ("Certainly [the defendant] could anticipate that the [roofing subcontractor that employed the plaintiff] would probably proceed in the face of obvious dangers, knowing that if they failed to do so, they could lose their jobs."). See Goodman v. Theatre Parking , 286 Mich. 80, 82, 281 N.W. 545 (1938), quoting Restatement Torts, § 343 ; see also Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hosp. , 366 Mich. 596, 600, 115 N.W.2d 290 (1962) (stating that § 343 set forth the applicable standard of care for business invitees); Zeglowski v. Polish Army Veterans Ass'n of Mich., Inc. , 363 Mich. 583, 586, 110 N.W.2d 578 (1961) (noting that the Court had "adopted" § 343 in Nash v. Lewis , 352 Mich. 488, 492, 90 N.W.2d 480 (1958) ); Spear v. Wineman , 335 Mich. 287, 290, 55 N.W.2d 833 (1952) (noting that the "law is well stated" by a comment to § 343 ). See Perkoviq v. Delcor Homes–Lake Shore Pointe, Ltd. , 466 Mich. 11, 16, 643 N.W.2d 212 (2002) (applying Bertrand and observing that in Bertrand we had incorporated § 343 and § 343A ); Singerman , 455 Mich. at 139, 565 N.W.2d 383 (citing comment e to § 343A as part of the governing law); Bertrand , 449 Mich. at 609-614, 623-624, 537 N.W.2d 185 (describing and applying § 343 and § 343A, along with various accompanying comments to those sections, as the law of the state); Riddle , 440 Mich. at 92-93, 95, 485 N.W.2d 676 (noting that the Court had "adopted" the original § 343 in Ackerberg and the revised version in Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. , 395 Mich. 244, 259-261, 235 N.W.2d 732 (1975), and that, together with § 343A, these sources "correctly define the law regarding a premises owner's duty of care to invitees"); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc. , 429 Mich. 495, 500, 418 N.W.2d 381 (1988) ("
"So if contributory negligence appears, his [the one going on the property of another] status on the premises becomes immaterial except insofar as defendant's duty toward him may vary with his status and therefore may affect the vigilance required, since an invitee need not ordinarily be as vigilant as one of lesser status, for he may justifiably rely upon the landlord or proprietor to provide reasonably safe premises." See, also, Spear v. Wineman (1952), 335 Mich. 287. The question of contributory negligence is for the determiner of the facts, and the trial court's finding will not be set aside by this Court unless clearly erroneous.