Opinion
Case Number: 00-75306
July 10, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Steven Lee Spear, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the limitations period applicable to habeas corpus petitions. On June 11, 2001, petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, respondent's motion is granted and the petition is dismissed.
II. Procedural History
Following a jury trial in Oakland County Circuit Court, petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder. He then pleaded guilty to habitual offender, second offense. On June 27, 1985, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. People v. Spear, No. 87223 (Mich.Ct.App. May 21, 1987) Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Spear, No. 81067 (Mich. Oct. 30, 1987).
On July 30, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. People v. Spear, No. 85-65690 (Oakland County Circuit Court Oct. 6, 1998). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Spear, No. 215325 (Mich.Ct.App. May 3, 1999). Thereafter, petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which was also denied. People v. Spear, No. 114648 (Mich. Nov. 29, 1999)
Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus on November 3, 2000.
III. Analysis
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the pending habeas corpus petition is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA" or "the Act") applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24, 1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus relief, apply to petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997)
Among other amendments, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions challenging state court judgments must be filed. In most cases, a prisoner is required to file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of completing direct review of the habeas claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A). Where a prisoner's conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the prisoner is permitted one year from the AEDPA's effective date to file a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court. Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1999). However, the time during which a prisoner seeks collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitations period. Section 2244(d)(2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).
In the pending case, petitioner's conviction became final before the AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Therefore, absent state collateral review, petitioner would have been required to file his application for habeas corpus by April 24, 1997, to comply with the one-year limitations period. Petitioner sought state collateral review of his conviction. However, on April 24, 1996, the date the limitations period commenced, petitioner had no application for collateral review pending. He did not file his motion for relief from judgment until July 30, 1998. Thus, the limitations period commenced on April 24, 1996 and continued to run, uninterrupted, until it expired on April 24, 1997. Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment was not filed until over fifteen months after the limitations period expired and, consequently, did not serve to toll the limitations period.
Petitioner's claim that the limitations period was tolled during the time period he could have, but had not yet, filed a motion for relief from judgment is meritless. The limitations period begins to run from the date a conviction becomes final or where, as here, the conviction becomes final before the AEDPA's effective date, the limitations period begins to run on April 24, 1996. In addition, the statute provides that the limitations period is tolled during the time period when "a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2) (emphasis supplied). At the time that petitioner's one-year limitations period commenced, April 24, 1996, petitioner had not yet filed his motion for relief from judgment in state court. Therefore, no properly filed application for collateral review was pending in state court at that time. Thus, contrary to petitioner's argument, the limitations period was not tolled for the time period prior to petitioner's filing of his motion for relief from judgment.
Petitioner fails to allege that there existed any impediment to his filing a timely application, that his claim involves a newly-recognized constitutional right or newly-discovered facts, or that he is actually innocent. Therefore, petitioner has failed to present any exceptional circumstances which would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
IV. Conclusion
The court concludes that petitioner failed to file his application for a writ of habeas corpus within the one-year limitations period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d). The court further concludes that petitioner failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances which would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.