Spaulding v. Peoples State Bk. of Bloomington

5 Citing cases

  1. St. Paul Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Avant

    481 N.E.2d 1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 8 times
    In St. Paul Federal Savings Loan Association v. Avant (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 568, 481 N.E.2d 1050, this court adopted the reasoning of Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W. v. Towne (1917), 136 Minn. 72, 161 N.W. 403.

    Finally, Tollway argues that even if it had been unjustly enriched at St. Paul's expense, it would be inequitable to require Tollway to pay over the monies it received because it suffered a prejudicial change of position by cancelling the note from Anderson and discharging liability thereon, and because St. Paul's loss was caused by its own negligence in its loan transaction with Avant. Tollway cites several cases in which courts have rejected the contentions of third parties that because of failure of consideration, mistake of fact or unjust enrichment, monies received by creditors should be returned. ( Gaffner v. American Finance Co. (1923), 120 Wn. 76, 206 P. 916; Hilliard v. Bank of America National Trust Savings Association (1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 730, 228 P.2d 327; Spaulding v. Peoples State Bank (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143; Strubbe v. Sonnenschein (2d Cir. 1962), 299 F.2d 185; Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Glasscock (1937), 270 Ky. 750, 110 S.W.2d 681; Associates Discount Corp. v. Clements (Okla. 1958), 321 P.2d 673.) In each of these situations, innocent parties extended credit or parted with funds in order to discharge purported liens on stolen property or based on false documents.

  2. Allin v. City of Springfield

    845 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2017)   Cited 49 times

    Baskett produced a certificate of title. Under Illinois law, the certificate of title "provide[s] the public with a readily available means of identifying the owners ... to the vehicle described in the certificate of title." Spaulding v. Peoples State Bank of Bloomington , 25 Ill.App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143, 144 (1975) (citation omitted). Thus, under Illinois law, there was a rebuttable presumption that Baskett was the owner of the motorcycle.

  3. Pardo v. Mecum Auction Inc.

    No. 12 C 08410 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017)

    A certificate of title issued by the Illinois Secretary of State is prima facie good. See 625 ILCS 5/3-107(c) ("A certificate of title issued by the Secretary of State is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it."); see also id. § 5/3-107(a) (listing the facts required to appear on a title certificate); Allin v. City of Springfield, 845 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2017); Spaulding v. Peoples State Bank of Bloomington, 25 Ill. App. 3d 118, 120, 323 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1975). Pardo does not address this argument, and he did not challenge the title with the Illinois Secretary of State, even though he believed that in light of expert inspections the presumption of truth could be rebutted as to the listed "year-model," see § 3-107(a)(5), on the certificate.

  4. In re Lortz

    344 B.R. 579 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that a creditor's unperfected purchase-money security interest was avoidable by the chapter 7 trustee's strong-arm powers

    625 ILCS 5/3-107(b). It further provides that a certificate of title issued by the Secretary of State is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. 625 ILCS 5/3-107(c). The purpose of this provision is to provide the public with a readily available means of identifying the owners and lienholders of the vehicle and parties dealing with the vehicle are entitled to rely upon the information that appears on the face of the certificate of title. Spaulding v. Peoples State Bank of Bloomington, 25 Ill.App.3d 118, 120, 323 N.E.2d 143, 144-145 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1975); In re German, 285 F.2d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 1961) (provision of Illinois Motor Vehicle Act dealing with perfection of security interests, like other Illinois recording statutes, should be construed as primarily a constructive notice statute). There is no allegation that the release was obtained by fraud or that the employee that signed the release was acting outside of the authorized scope of employment.

  5. Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Wells

    375 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that car dealership could not maintain replevin action where defendant no longer possessed vehicle in question

    It is undisputed that on that date Wells had a certificate of title in his name with no lien appearing thereon. Section 3-107(c) of the Vehicle Code makes such a certificate prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it and this court so held in Spaulding v. Peoples State Bank (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143. Huston was entirely justified in relying on the certificate. An automobile is not a peck of potatoes in the corner grocery store, title to which passes by possession.