Opinion
12-CV-3041 (LDH) (VMS)
03-31-2017
Yvonne SPAULDING, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
ORDER
On December 28, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon issued a report and recommendation (the "Report and Recommendation"), which recommended that this Court deny Plaintiff Yvonne Spaulding's motion to vacate the settlement agreement, entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant New York City Department of Education. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 66; Stipulation of Dismissal, ECF Nos. 63, 65.) Any written objections to the Report and Recommendation had to be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of the report; responses to any objections were due fourteen (14) days thereafter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Plaintiff has filed a letter, with exhibits, which was received by this Court on January 10, 2017. (Pl.'s Jan. 10, 2017 Letter, ECF No. 78.) Although not identified as an objection, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court, as it must, construes her letter as an objection to the Report and Recommendation, and interprets it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. See Burgos v. Hopkins , 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Mikinberg v. Baltic S.S. Co. , 988 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1993) ). The Court reviews the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects under a de novo standard of review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1),(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Even under the more liberal standard afforded to pro se litigants, however, Plaintiff has failed to raise any specific objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law that are set forth in the Report and Recommendation. Rather, Plaintiff has merely repeated arguments that were raised in her original motion to vacate the settlement agreement and subsequent correspondence to the Court. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Vacate; Pl.'s May 2, 2016 Letter, ECF No. 68; Pl.'s July 27, 2016 Letter, ECF No. 73.) Similarly, Plaintiff's "objection" seeks virtually the same relief that she sought in her motion to vacate, as well as throughout the course of this litigation. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Vacate; R. & R., at 5, 8-11, ECF No. 77 (explaining relief sought during litigation).) The Court finds Plaintiff's "objection" to be inadequate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (requiring "specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations"); see also Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc. , 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Merely referring the court to previously filed papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) or Local Civil Rule 72.3(a)(3)"); Rothenberger v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't , No. 06-cv-868, 2008 WL 2435563, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2008) (rejecting pro se plaintiff's basis for objection, in part, because it was "little more than a list of documents and facts that he believe[d] the court should have considered in arriving at its findings").
Finally, the Court agrees with the findings of the Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the standard for a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which permits a court to relieve a party from a judgment where there is evidence of "fraud ... misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). The Court finds there is no evidence that Plaintiff was induced into entering the settlement agreement by fraud, misrepresentation, or any other misconduct by Defendant.
No other objections have been filed to the Report and Recommendation. As to the remaining portions of the Report and Recommendation, "the district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record." Estate of Ellington ex rel. Ellington v. Harbrew Imports Ltd. , 812 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Urena v. New York , 160 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation, as well as the entire record, and determined there was no such error.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, having reviewed the record and the remaining portions of the Report and Recommendation for clear error and, finding none, the Court hereby adopts Magistrate Judge Scanlon's Report and Recommendation in its entirety as the opinion of this Court. Plaintiff's motion to vacate the settlement agreement is hereby denied in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
VERA M. SCANLON, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Yvonne Spaulding ("Plaintiff") claims that Defendant New York City Department of Education ("Defendant") discriminated and retaliated against her, including by creating a hostile work environment and constructively discharging her, in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. See 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 16. After summary judgment was largely granted in Defendant's favor, see Mem & Order, ECF No. 58, and settlement conferences were held, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a settlement agreement disposing of the matter. See ECF No. 63 & 65. On referral from the Honorable LaShann DeArcy Hall is Plaintiff's motion to vacate the settlement agreement. For the reasons stated herein, this Court respectfully recommends that the District Court deny Plaintiff's motion and dismiss this case.
Plaintiff presently proceeds pro se and does not explicitly identify her letters as a motion to vacate the settlement agreement. Based on a liberal construction of the relief she requests and the nature of her arguments, this is the most appropriate way to characterize the relief she seeks.
I. BACKGROUND
A description of Plaintiff's employment and alleged disability, and her disability-related claims are found in this Court's Report and Recommendation recommending granting in part and denying in part Defendant's summary judgment motion. See generally Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 45, adopted by Mem. & Order, ECF No. 58.
In brief, Plaintiff was a teacher employed by Defendant. Plaintiff claims that Defendant (1) interfered with her ability to exercise her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ; (2) discriminated against her on the basis of her disability; (3) retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave and for complaining of FMLA discrimination; (4) retaliated against her for complaining of disability discrimination; and (5) subjected her to a hostile work environment that culminated in her constructive discharge. Id. Although Plaintiff initially proceeded pro se, she later retained attorney Stewart Karlin ("Mr. Karlin").
After discovery, Defendant filed a summary judgment motion. See ECF Nos. 30-40. This Court recommended granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on all of Plaintiff's claims, except her claim for FMLA retaliation concerning her receipt of negative performance reviews and letters-to-file. See ECF No. 45. Following the filing of this Court's Report and Recommendation, on May 5, 2015 the parties and their counsel attended a two-and-a-half hour settlement conference with the Court. See Order, ECF No. 52. On September 21, 2015, District Judge Matsumoto adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. See ECF No. 58.
Following the narrowing of Plaintiff's claims, the parties and their counsel with the aid of the Court engaged in additional settlement discussions for two-and-a-half hours on December 17, 2015, see Order, ECF No. 61, and for one hour on January 21, 2016, when the parties settled on the record, see Order, ECF No. 62. Plaintiff was present during the settlement discussions and affirmatively stated to the Court that she agreed to the settlement terms. See Transcript, ECF No. 64 at 4-5. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal on February 24, 2016, see ECF No. 63, and the matter was discontinued with prejudice on February 26, 2016, see ECF No. 65. In the settlement, the parties agreed that Defendant would pay Plaintiff $80,000 in exchange for a general release of Plaintiff's claims. See ECF No. 69 App'x A; ECF No. 64. On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to District Judge DeArcy Hall, to whom the case had been transferred. See 1/19/2016 ECF Entry. In the letter, Plaintiff states that Defendant did not comply with the settlement terms, specifically the "condition of non-equitable relief." Letter, ECF No. 66 at 1. Plaintiff suggests that Mr. Karlin had assured her that as part of her relief under the settlement agreement, Defendant would expunge all annual evaluations grading her "unsatisfactory," rescind her dismissal, and dismiss all internal charges brought against her. See id. Plaintiff also states that Mr. Karlin is no longer her attorney. See id. This Court scheduled a conference to discuss the issues raised in her letter. See 6/21/2016 Order. After speaking with the parties, the Court directed them to file supplemental letters explaining their positions. See 7/27/2016 Order.
Docket entry 69's Appendix contains, inter alia, the executed stipulation of settlement and general release. Docket entry 64 is the transcript of the hearing during which the settlement terms were read into the record.
Plaintiff filed her supplemental letter on July 27, 2016. Supplemental Letter, ECF No. 74. Plaintiff's line of argument in this second letter is distinct from that in her letter of April 22nd. Compare Letter, ECF No. 66, with Supplemental Letter, ECF No. 74. In her first letter, Plaintiff suggests that she is asking the Court to enforce the non-equitable portions of the settlement agreement. See Letter, ECF No. 66 at 1. In her second letter, she suggests that she was induced to settle this matter because of fraud on the part of Defendant. Her allegations can be summarized as three claims. First, she claims that Defendant falsely represented to her that in her personal record she has three "problem codes" stemming from her resignation when she only has one code that notes three different problems: a) that she resigned in anticipation of being charged with pedagogical incompetence under New York Education Law § 3020-a ; b) that she resigned without sufficient notice; and c) that she resigned during a pending investigation. See Supplemental Letter, ECF No. 74 at 1. Second, she claims that when she settled the lawsuit, she did not believe her resignation from her teaching position was irrevocable. Id. Third, she claims that she did not believe when she settled that she had resigned while charges were pending against her based on her professional conduct. Id.
In support of her arguments, Plaintiff submits letters, emails and other documents. Of relevance here, she includes an email sent to her from Jonathan Trejo, who is identified as the Director of Human Resources for The Grapevine Children First Network. Trejo Letter, ECF. No 68, Attachment 1 at 3. The email, dated June 9, 2011, is in response to Plaintiff's request to learn about her employment status. Id. Mr. Trejo informs Plaintiff that her letter of resignation was processed, and that "per Chancellor's Regulation C-205 section (24) [Plaintiff] is not eligible for re-employment at the DOE. Pursuant to [Chancellor's Regulation C-205 section (26) ], once submitted, all resignations are final." Id. Plaintiff also submits a) letters from potential employers denying her employment because she resigned from the Department of Education while charges were pending against her, id. at 8-9; b) a letter from Ms. Zucal, the principal who had given Plaintiff an unsatisfactory rating, confirming that she forwarded Plaintiff's file to the Teacher's Performance Unit, and saying Plaintiff could be charged with incompetence, id. at 5; c) a letter from Plaintiff's doctor recommending that she remove herself from her hostile workplace situation, id. at 1-2; d) a letter from Lauria Cumbo of the New York City Council confirming that Plaintiff's resignation is irrevocable, id. at 10; e) a portion of a decision by an administrative law judge reopening her case for unemployment benefits, id. at 6-7; f) emails between her and Mr. Karlin, id. at 17; g) her retainer agreement with Mr. Karlin, id. at 18; and h) news articles discussing this case, id. at 11-13.
Plaintiff asks the Court because of Defendant's alleged fraud to provide her with relief similar to that which she sought in this action: removal from the Department of Education records of the problem codes and of the unsatisfactory rating, and a neutral reference. Id. at 4. She also asks that the Court seal the record of this action because the information is potentially damaging to her professional reputation. Letter, ECF No. 66 at 1. Plaintiff notes that she has been unable, and believes she will continue to be unable, to procure employment with the Department of Education. See id.
II. Discussion
Plaintiff's first submission asks that the Court enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. Settlement Letter, ECF No. 66 at 1. Her second and more developed submission instead suggests that the Court should vacate or alter the terms of the settlement because of the alleged fraud by Defendant that induced her into agreeing to the settlement. Supplemental Letter, ECF No. 74 at 1-3. The Court construes the papers of pro se litigants liberally. See Marmolejo v. United States, 196 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); McCloud v. Mayers, No. 03 Civ. 0236, 2005 WL 181649, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2005). In addition, papers and motions submitted by a pro se litigant are interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Ortiz v. McBride, 323 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The Court believes Plaintiff's second theory is stronger and will construe Plaintiff's papers as requesting relief from the District Judge's final Order dismissing the case, see Dismissal Order, ECF No. 65, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). Rule 60(b)(3) allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment or order when the opposing party commits fraud. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 176 (2d Cir. 2004) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff's first request for relief would fail as this Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. "[A] district court ‘does not automatically retain jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce a settlement agreement simply by virtue of having disposed of the original case.’ " Hendrickson v. U.S., 791 F.3d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) ). Instead, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is fundamentally "a claim for breach of a contract, part of the consideration of which was dismissal of an earlier federal suit," and therefore "requires its own basis for jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 & 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Plaintiff does not identify any ground for subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court in Kokkonen outlined exceptions to its rule, but none apply here. Second, the settlement agreement and release, which Plaintiff signed, as well as the transcript of the hearing during which the terms were agreed, make it clear that the only consideration Plaintiff would receive in exchange for the release of her claims was monetary. See ECF No. 69 App'x A; ECF No. 64. Removing the problem codes in Plaintiff's file and deeming her resignation revocable were not a part of the agreement. Even if this Court had retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, it could not grant the relief Plaintiff seeks.
The Court explained that "the parties' compliance with the terms of the settlement contract (or the court's ‘retention of jurisdiction’ over the settlement contract) may, in the court's discretion, be one of the terms set forth in the order." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673. In addition, "the court is authorized to embody the settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what has the same effect, retain jurisdiction over the settlement contract) if the parties agree." Id. at 381-82, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The parties' settlement agreement did not include such a provision, and they did not request separately that the Court retain jurisdiction.
A. Rule 60(b)(3) Standard
The Court in Kokkonen did note that even where a court has not retained jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, it may consider a motion for relief under Rule 60(b). See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673 ; Hendrickson, 791 F.3d at 360 ("When a district court issues a final decision, it ‘disassociates itself from a case,’ and its jurisdiction over that case comes to an end, except for certain collateral matters especially reserved by ... the Federal Rules, see, e.g., ... Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (motions for relief from judgment)." (citations omitted)).
Rule 60(b)(3) allows a district court to relieve a party from a final judgement or order where the adverse party has committed "fraud ... misconduct or misrepresentation." To succeed on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the moving party must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the non-moving party engaged in fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct, State St. Bank & Trust Co., 374 F.3d at 176, which prevented the moving party from "fully and fairly presenting" its case, Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). " Rule 60(b)(3) is typically invoked where material information has been withheld or incorrect or perjured evidence has been intentionally supplied." Playboy Enters. Int'l, Inc. v. On Line Entm't, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6618 (DGT), 2004 WL 626807, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004) (internal quotation marks removed), as amended (Apr. 1, 2004), aff'd, 135 Fed.Appx. 479 (2d Cir. 2005). "A motion for relief from judgment is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001). A party moving under Rule 60(3)(b) "cannot use the motion simply as an attempt to relitigate the merits of the case." Walther v. Maricopa Int'l Inv. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 4816 (HB), 2002 WL 31521078, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2002) (internal quotation marks removed). "In addition, the moving party's burden to obtain Rule 60(b) relief is greater ‘[w]hen the parties submit to an agreed-upon disposition instead of seeking a resolution on the merits ... than if one party proceeded to trial, lost, and failed to appeal.’ " Rivera v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 08 Civ. 5590 (SAS), 2013 WL 5052153, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2013) (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1986) ).
Although a pro se motion is read liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments suggested, "a pro se litigant is not excused from the requirement of producing highly convincing evidence to support a Rule 60(b) motion." Alvarado v. Manhattan Worker Career Center, 01 Civ. 9288 (CBM), 2003 WL 22462032, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2003). Rule 60 is not available in situations where a party has changed her mind about the terms of the settlement or is dissatisfied with the ramifications of her choice. "When a party makes a deliberate, strategic choice to settle, she cannot be relieved of such a choice merely because her assessment of the consequences was incorrect." United States v. Bank of New York, 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1994) ; see Andrulonis v. United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1235 (2d Cir. 1994) ( Rule 60(b) "does not allow district courts to ‘indulge a party's discontent over the effects of its bargain.’ ") (internal citation omitted).
B. Plaintiff Has Not Met Rule 60(b)(3)'s Standard
Plaintiff has not presented clear and convincing evidence that she was induced into settling by fraud on the part of Defendant.
As mentioned above, Plaintiff argues Defendant defrauded her into settling in several ways. Plaintiff first alleges that Defendant represented to her that she had three problem codes in her file when she had one code that encompassed three problems. She states that she would not have settled had she known that she only had one problem code. Plaintiff does not present clear and convincing evidence that Defendant suggested to her that she had three problem codes. None of the documents she attaches to her letters suggests that Defendant made this representation. Unsupported allegations without evidence are insufficient to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(3). See Rivera, 2013 WL 5052153, at *3 ("[Plaintiff] alleges that the Government fraudulently induced him to settle.... the allegations of fraud in [plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(3) motion] are conclusory, provide no material evidence, and fail to identify any misrepresentation that jeopardized the integrity of the court.... [plaintiff's] 60(b)(3) motion fails."); Jordan v. Verizon Corp., No. 02 Civ. 10144 (GBD), 2007 WL 4591924, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2007) (denying Rule 60(b)(3) motion to void settlement where plaintiff presented only "conclusory allegations of defendant's misconduct").
In addition, Plaintiff does not offer any explanation as to how there is a meaningful difference between three separate file flags and one file flag based on these aspects of her employment. Pursuant to Chancellor's Regulation C-205 (29), all of the problem codes contained in Plaintiff's employment records render her resignation irrevocable, and any flag along with the information attached to it could serve to trigger a review of a former employees' file when a reference is requested. Under any review—triggered by one flag or three flags—the substantive allegations in Plaintiff's file would be known to the reviewer. Thus, there is no evidentiary support for Plaintiff's claim that she would not have settled if she had known there was only one flag in her records, given that Plaintiff's concern is any review and reference relating to any of the three items in her file.
http://schools.nyc.gov/RulesPolicies/ChancellorsRegulations/VolumeC (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
Next, Plaintiff alleges that when she decided to settle she did not believe her resignation would be considered irrevocable by Defendant, and that she thought she would be able to apply for teaching jobs with Defendant. As with her other allegations, Plaintiff does not submit evidence that Defendant misrepresented this fact. Indeed, the evidence she submits demonstrates that Plaintiff knew Defendant considered that her resignation was irrevocable close to a year before she agreed to settle. Jonathan Trejo's June 2011 email response to her inquiry states that "all resignations are final" pursuant to Chancellor's Regulation C-205 (26). That regulation states that a "resignation by a member of the teaching and supervising staff shall be deemed to be a resignation from the pedagogical service of the public school system.... Resignations shall be submitted in writing and, once submitted by an employee, shall be considered final." The regulation includes inapplicable exceptions for when a teacher resigns to return to a former position with the Department of Education or rescinds the resignation before there has been a break in her service. Id. The email from Mr. Trejo as well as Defendant's publically available regulations could have dispelled any belief that Defendant considered Plaintiff's resignation revocable before she decided to settle her case, and Defendant does not commit fraud if Plaintiff fails to review materials available to her.
http://schools.nyc.gov/RulesPolicies/ChancellorsRegulations/VolumeC (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
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The course of the litigation before settlement also made Defendant's view on the irrevocability of Plaintiff's resignation clear. Part of the relief Plaintiff sought in her suit was to undo the resignation. Defendant argued in its summary judgment motion that its decision to deny Plaintiff's request to rescind her resignation was not unlawful, see Mot. for SJ, ECF No. 33 at 13-14, and this Court's Report and Recommendation on that motion noted that "Defendant repeatedly called Plaintiff's attention to [the resignation allegations] in Defendant's memorandum of law," see R&R, ECF No. 45 at 124-25. Evidence suggests that Defendant made it clear that it considered the resignation irrevocable.
Plaintiff also argues that when she resigned, she did not believe charges were pending against her under Education Law § 3020-a, and reasons that she would not have settled if she had been aware of the charges. In her letters, Plaintiff suggests that there is a distinction between her anticipating charges being served, which she believes is equivalent to no charges existing at all, and those charges actually pending, which she believes is when the potential charges would harm her employment record and employment opportunities. See Supplemental Letter, ECF No. 74 at 2. Whether one label is more appropriate is irrelevant to Plaintiff's motion. As with her other allegations, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendant affirmatively misrepresented to her any fact about her charges. That forecloses relief under Rule 60. See Rivera, 2013 WL 5052153, at *3 ; Jordan, 2007 WL 4591924, at *10.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's motion be denied, and the case closed.
III. OBJECTIONS
This report and recommendation will be filed electronically and a copy will be mailed by Chambers to Plaintiff.
Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within the required period and in accordance with the Individual Rules of the Honorable LaShann DeArcy Hall. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) ; see Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2015).