Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-02016-RM-NYW
09-03-2021
CHRISTIAN E. SPARKS, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, DENVER CAMPUS, OFFICE OF EQUITY, ANSCHUTZ CAMPUS, through its Board, THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, a Body Corporate, Defendant.
ORDER
Nina Y. Wang, Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Christian E. Sparks' (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel (“Motion”), filed September 1, 2021. [#10]. The undersigned considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Order Referring Motion dated March 10, 2021. See [#11]. Having reviewed the Motion, the case file, and the applicable law, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED without prejudice as premature.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is a disabled veteran, initiated this action by filing his pro se Employment Discrimination Complaint form (“Complaint”) on July 26, 2021. See [#1]. Therein, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to hire Plaintiff for a Civil Rights Investigator position in Defendant's Office of Equity, thereby violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e, et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. See [id.].
ANALYSIS
The determination of whether to seek pro bono counsel in a civil case is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995). But the court cannot appoint counsel; instead, the court can only ask an attorney to take the case. Moaz v. Denver Int'l Airport, 747 Fed.Appx. 708, 711 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 396-97 (10th Cir. 2016)). In deciding whether to request counsel for a civil litigant, the district court should evaluate “the merits of a [litigant's] claims, the nature and complexity of the factual issues, and the [litigant's] ability to investigate the facts and present his claims.” Hill v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); accord D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iv) (providing factors that the court should consider in determining whether to appoint pro bono counsel). “The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.” Hill, 393 F.3d at 1115 (citation omitted). “Only in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness will the district court's decision be overturned.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff argues that his circumstances favor appointment because (a) Plaintiff is not “fully or adequately trained” to represent himself in this matter; (b) his case is “complex[]”; (c) it would generally “benefit” the court and “likely lead to a more just adjudication of law”; (d) Plaintiff has contacted “numerous employment attorneys, ” all of whom “have declined to represent Plaintiff”; (e) “Defendant possesses a large legal team with over 100 years of experience”; and (f) Plaintiff is “permanently disabled, medically retired, and works part-time for $13.32 per hour.” See [#10].
Upon review of the docket and Plaintiff's filings, this court concludes that appointment of counsel is unwarranted presently, and denies the instant Motion as premature. While this court understands Plaintiff's concerns with self-representation, the challenges posed by Plaintiff are not uncommon, his claims do not appear overly complex, and Plaintiff fails to articulate specific factors that warrant the appointment of counsel in his particular circumstances. See Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 916 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining appointment of counsel is appropriate in “extreme case[s] where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness.”). Additionally, the allegations in the Complaint demonstrate Plaintiff's acuity at navigating this litigation. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated various employment anti-discrimination laws by failing to consider Plaintiff's application for employment as a Civil Rights Investigator - a position Plaintiff claims he was qualified to hold because of his degrees in political science and criminal justice, “training in Title VII investigations, ” and two decades of experience conducting criminal, administrative, and “Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Title VII investigations, ” among Plaintiff's other alleged qualifications. See [#1 at 5]; Bertolo v. Benezee, 601 Fed.Appx. 636, 64041 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff appointed counsel, because the plaintiff did not indicate how his medical condition would affect his ability to present his case); cf. McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding as an abuse of discretion the district court's denial of appointed counsel when the record evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff's medical condition affected his eyesight, hearing, ability to communicate, and comprehend the proceedings).
Ultimately, this court does not find extraordinary circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. See McCullon v. Parry, No. 18-CV-00469-NYW, 2019 WL 4645436, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2019) (appointing pro bono counsel under the factors of D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iv) “given that this matter is now moving to trial.” (emphasis added)). To the extent that Mr. Sparks has no specialized legal training, the court will “review his pleadings and other papers liberally and hold[s] [him] to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1979) (holding allegations of a pro se complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Further, should circumstances change, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting counsel at that time. See McCullon v. Parry, No. 18-CV-00469-NYW, 2019 WL 4645436, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2019) (“Based on the court's conclusion above, I find it appropriate under the factors of D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iv) to seek appointment of pro bono counsel given that this matter is now moving to trial.” (emphasis added)).
Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to avail himself of the services provided by the Federal Pro Se Clinic located on the first floor of the Alfred A. Arraj Courthouse. Plaintiff may make an appointment by phone (303-380-8786) or online at www.cobar.org/cofederalproseclinic, and walk-in appointments are available on a space-available basis. Further, Plaintiff will not be charged for his appointment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Motion [#10] is DENIED without prejudice; and
(2) A copy of this Order shall be sent to:
Christian E. Sparks
27375 Plainview Drive
Kiowa, CO 80117