Opinion
No. 639 C.D. 2013
09-25-2013
Alan Sparklin, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Heinz Frozen Food Company), Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY
Alan Sparklin (Claimant) challenges the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the workers' compensation judge's (WCJ) decision to grant Claimant's petition for benefits in part and award Claimant total compensation disability benefits for the period of August 12, 2003, through January 7, 2004, suspend Claimant's benefits from January 7, 2004, through January 24, 2005, reinstate benefits effective January 25, 2005, through November 2, 2005, and terminate benefits effective November 2, 2005.
Heinz Frozen Food Company (Employer) employed Claimant as a machine operator. Claimant operated a machine which made ravioli. On August 12, 2003, the dough was "stickier" than usual. Claimant pulled harder than he normally did to remove the dough from the machine over a period of approximately two hours when he developed pain in his hip which went down his right leg. Claimant informed his supervisor, Marge Hubbert, of the pain he experienced. Claimant saw Employer's nurse who gave him ibuprofen and told him to return to work. Claimant continued to work for the next several days, but he still had pain. One night that week, he went to the emergency room. The next week Claimant was seen by Employer's doctor who released him to return to work. Claimant did not believe he was capable of performing his job. He sought another opinion at Wilmington Hospital. Claimant became so distraught over the prospect of losing his job that he was admitted to Meadowwood, a psychiatric facility, for the treatment of anxiety. He also received treatment there for his physical complaints. Upon his release from Meadowwood, he sought treatment from a chiropractor and his family physician.
Claimant did not work from August 12, 2003, through January 6, 2004. He returned to work on January 7, 2004. Employer sold its facility to Hain Celestial Group (Hain) in June or July of 2004. Claimant worked for two weeks and then had two weeks off. On January 25, 2005, Claimant's treating physician at the time, Dr. Disantis, issued a note to Claimant to advise him to cease working. Claimant did not return to work.
August 12, 2003, was the date of injury. Though the record reflects that Claimant worked after that date, the WCJ awarded benefits from that date forward.
On May 31, 2005, Claimant petitioned for benefits and alleged that he suffered a work-related injury to his "[h]ip, low back radiating down right leg" on August 12, 2003, when he was "[b]ending, twisting, lifting to feed ravioli dough into machine." Claim Petition, May 31, 2005, at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at RR-000001. Claimant identified Hain as his employer. That same date, he filed another claim petition which listed the same injury and cause of injury but listed the date of injury as May 13, 2005. Claim Petition, May 31, 2005, at 1; R.R. at RR000006. On July 27, 2005, Claimant filed a third claim petition which listed the same injury and cause of injury but listed the injury date as May 13, 2004. This petition was subsequently amended to change the date of injury to January 25, 2005.
This claim petition was withdrawn.
Before the WCJ Claimant testified that, as part of his job "you would constantly bend down and pull the dough . . . and either cut a piece of dough or break it off and roll it up in your arms and make it smaller and throw into the hopper." Notes of Testimony, September 21, 2005, (N.T.) at 7; R.R. at RR-000137. Each piece of dough weighed approximately seven pounds. Claimant explained that on August 12, 2003, there was a problem with the filling:
The formulation wasn't right. So . . . what they had to do was take the filling out of the hopper -- the main hopper that was piped over to us.
They would put that in barrels. It was 2,000 pounds of filling. So we put that in tubs; put that on pallets.
And they were re-worked out back into the system, gradually . . . throughout the day. Add so much of that for each batch. I'd say we were down about two hours because of the problem with the filling - taking it out and making the new filling.
So, while we were down those two hours, the dough that was made for us sat there. It just sat there for two hours. And they pu8t [sic] a plastic bag over it and the dough gets sticky. And it just got stickier and stickier and
stickier with the plastic bag on it that, when we finally went back to work after . . . about two hours, the dough was the consistency of . . . taffy.N.T. at 10; R.R. at RR-000140.
Claimant explained that the dough was harder to pull and he felt a pain in his right hip. N.T. at 11; R.R. at RR000141. Claimant returned to work in January 2004. Hain purchased the plant in June or July 2004. N.T. at 27; R.R. at RR-000157. On January 25, 2005, Claimant's pain "re-intensfied [sic] so bad. The pain in the hip. The pain going down my leg to the foot. My lower back" as well as the right thigh. N.T. at 30; R.R. at RR-000160. Claimant continued to experience constant pain in his hip and down his leg to his big toe with some pain in this lower back. N.T. at 34; R.R. at RR-000164. Claimant did not believe that he could return to his time of injury job because he could not stand all day and could not handle the repetitious bending. N.T. at 35; R.R. at RR-000165. Hain terminated Claimant's employment on July 31, 2005, because he had not worked for six months. N.T. at 61; R.R. at RR-000191.
On cross-examination, Claimant admitted that he had pain in his right hip in June and July of 2003. N.T. at 37; R.R. at RR-000167.
Claimant presented the deposition testimony of Edward Stankiewicz, M.D. (Dr. Stankiewicz), a primary care physician and Claimant's treating physician since May 26, 2005. Initially, after examining Claimant, taking a history from him and reviewing his medical records, Dr. Stankiewicz made the following diagnosis of Claimant within a reasonable degree of medical certainty:
That the patient sustained a work injury on August 12, 2003 while working at Heinz Foods as a machine operator pulling dough. This work injury caused him to develop a trochanteric bursitis of the right hip as well as L3-L4 disc protrusion of the lumbar sacral spine, causing him to have chronic pain and eventually having neuralgia/radiculitis radiating down his right leg. These are present and ongoing.Deposition of Edward Stankiewicz, M.D., October 3, 2005, (Dr. Stankiewicz Deposition) at 20-21; R.R. at RR-000213-RR000214. After treating Claimant eight times, Dr. Stankiewicz observed "objective evidence of trochanteric bursitis, some nerve root irritation of his lumbosacral spine, time and conservative treatment such as rest and home therapy should improve his general condition." Dr. Stankiewicz Deposition at 25; R.R. at RR-000218.
Employer presented the deposition testimony of Gene D. Levin, M.D. (Dr. Levin), a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Levin examined Claimant on November 2, 2005, took a history, and reviewed medical records. Dr. Levin determined that Claimant's "physical findings on exam were unremarkable and that the objective diagnosis studies that had been done were unremarkable. So that his complaint of severe, persistent right leg pain was disproportionate or unexplained by these objective findings." Deposition of Gene D. Levin, M.D., February 1, 2006, (Dr. Levin Deposition) at 18; R.R. at RR-000368. With respect to his diagnosis of Claimant, Dr. Levin explained, "[s]o in terms of prognosis, I don't know that we have a diagnosis of any real objective medical problem. On the other hand, for his subjective symptomatology having persisted so long without an explanation, I think the prognosis is guarded for its improvement." Dr. Levin Deposition at 18; R.R. at RR-000368. Dr. Levin released Claimant to return to work. Dr. Levin Deposition at 19; R.R. at RR-000369. Dr. Levin did not agree with Dr. Stankiewicz's conclusion that Claimant suffered a work-related injury on August 12, 2003, which consisted of trochanter bursitis of the right hip as well as an L3-L4 protrusion of the lumbosacral spine. Based on his examination and review of the records, Dr. Levin found no objective basis to believe that Claimant suffered a work-related injury that caused the right leg pain he had. Dr. Levin Deposition at 24-25; R.R. at RR-000374-RR000375. Dr. Levin admitted that there was some possibility that Claimant had trochanteric bursitis. Dr. Levin Deposition at 31; R.R. at RR-000381. He did not believe that trochanteric bursitis would explain the symptoms of which Claimant complained. Dr. Levin Deposition at 33; R.R. at RR-000383. After reviewing Claimant's testimony, Dr. Levin believed that Claimant had trochanteric bursitis in June 2003, prior to the alleged work injury. Dr. Levin Deposition at 65; R.R. at RR-000414.
On cross-examination, Dr. Levin admitted that Claimant reported tenderness to palpation over the right greater trochanter which was a test for trochanteric bursitis. Dr. Levin Deposition at 38; R.R. at RR-000388.
Employer also presented the deposition testimony of Stuart L. Gordon, M.D. (Dr. Gordon), a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. On December 21, 2005, Dr. Gordon examined Claimant, took a history, and reviewed medical records. Upon physical examination, Claimant "had tenderness over the trochanteric ridge, but no pain down the leg . . . with piriformis testing." Deposition of Stuart L. Gordon, M.D., July 6, 2006, (Dr. Gordon Deposition) at 10; R.R. at RR-000444. Dr. Gordon opined that at the time of the examination Claimant had undiagnosed right trochanteric pain. Dr. Gordon Deposition at 12; R.R. at RR-000446. Dr. Gordon made the following diagnosis:
This gentleman has undiagnosed trochanteric pain for over two and a half years. His symptoms when I saw him in [sic] December the 21st, 2005 are no different when [sic] he had back in 2003. It's the same undiagnosed symptom complaint.Dr. Gordon Deposition at 15-16; R.R. at RR-000449-RR-000450. Dr. Gordon did not believe that Claimant experienced a material worsening of his condition as a result of his work injuries between January 2004 and January 2005. Dr. Gordon Deposition at 17; R.R. at RR-000451. He did not believe Claimant suffered a work-related injury during that time period. Dr. Gordon Deposition at 18; R.R. at RR-000452.
His presentation [is] no different in the past year as it was two and a half years ago. I know that he stopped working for several months after the initial incident; went back to work and I noted in Dr. Stankiewicz's deposition; he was two weeks on; two weeks off.
But I see him now as a gentleman who has the same undiagnosed pain complaints. They are subjectively driven but objectively deficient. He's no different now than he was several years ago.
The WCJ granted in part Claimant's petition which alleged a work-related injury on August 12, 2003. The WCJ awarded Claimant total disability benefits for the period of August 12, 2003, through January 7, 2004. The WCJ suspended benefits from January 7, 2004, through January 25, 2005. The WCJ reinstated total disability benefits, effective January 25, 2005, through November 2, 2005, the date of Claimant's examination with Dr. Levin. The WCJ terminated benefits effective November 2, 2005. The WCJ denied and dismissed Claimant's petition for benefits which alleged a date of injury of January 25, 2005. The WCJ made the following relevant findings of fact:
7. The testimony of Claimant is found credible that on August 12, 2003 he felt pain in his right hip as a result of pulling taffy-like dough. Claimant's testimony is found credible that he reported these symptoms to his supervisor and told her that as a result of tugging on the soft dough, he experienced pain in his right hip area. His testimony is found credible that he had minor pains prior to August 12, 2003, but the pain he felt after that was different than that felt prior to that date.
8. The testimony of Dr. Stankiewicz is found to be credible in part. His testimony is found credible that the incident that occurred on August 12, 2003 was the 'straw that broke the camel's back' that caused Claimant to be out of work until January of 2004 and again on January 25, 2005 due to his trochanteric pain. This Judge does not find his diagnosis of an L3-4 disc protrusion as a result of the incident of October 12, 2003 to be credible, as this diagnosis conflicts with the diagnostic studies as well as the testimonies of Dr. Levin and Dr. Gordon, whom this Judge finds to be more qualified than Dr. Stankiewicz since they are both board certified orthopedic surgeons.
9. The testimony of Dr. Levin is found credible that as of November 2, 2005 the physical findings on exam and the objective diagnostic studies on record were unremarkable, and that Claimant's complaint of severe, persistent right leg pain was disproportionate or unexplained by the objective findings. His testimony is found credible that there was no objective basis for excluding Claimant to return to work. His testimony is found credible that trochanteric bursitis would not cause pain that radiated down the leg in a sciatic distribution, but causes pain that is localized over the greater trochanter, and such a diagnosis would not explain the symptoms of which Claimant complained. His testimony
and opinions are supported by the numerous diagnostic studies performed on Claimant that were normal.WCJ's Decision, February 28, 2007, (Decision), Findings of Fact Nos. 7-10 at 8-9; R.R. at RR-000030-RR-000031.
10. The testimony of Dr. Gordon is found credible that he examined Claimant on December 21, 2005, at which time claimant had an undiagnosed right trochanteric pain. His testimony is found credible that there was no significant change or material worsening of Claimant's condition as a result of his work activities between January, 2004 and January, 2005. His testimony that Claimant does not suffer from a trochanteric bursitis is found credible and is supported by the diagnostic studies as well as by the testimony of Dr. Levin, which this Judge found credible. His testimony is found credible that there were no objective findings upon his examination of Claimant, and that with Claimant's negative diagnostic studies and two EMG studies, his complaints and perceived impairments are without objective substantiation and without orthopedic documentation.
Claimant appealed to the Board which affirmed.
Employer also appealed to the Board and asserted that the WCJ erred when he failed to allow a credit for short and long term disability benefits it paid to Claimant. The Board remanded for the WCJ to reopen the record and receive evidence concerning Employer's entitlement to a credit. Claimant petitioned for review with this Court. By order dated December 17, 2007, this Court dismissed the petition for review because the Board's order was interlocutory. On remand, the WCJ awarded Employer a credit for accident and sickness benefits and denied Employer's request for a credit for long term disability benefits. Both parties appealed to the Board. The Board remanded for the WCJ to reopen the record for the proper introduction into the record of evidence to establish whether Employer was entitled to a credit for the disability benefits it paid to Claimant and for the WCJ to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and to issue an order regarding Employer's right to a credit. Claimant again petitioned for review with this Court which quashed the petition for review as premature because the Board's order was interlocutory. On remand, Employer withdrew its request for a credit based on Claimant's receipt of long term disability benefits. Consequently, the WCJ dismissed the remand as moot and affirmed its earlier order. Claimant appealed to the Board and asserted that, on remand, he was denied the opportunity to argue issues related to the termination of his benefits and that the Board's original order did not address the issues raised in his appeal. The Board affirmed.
Claimant contends that the WCJ's findings and decisions to grant, then suspend, and then terminate benefits were internally inconsistent, that the WCJ's credibility determinations were inconsistent, not well-reasoned, and were without explanation, and that the termination of benefits was not supported by substantial, competent evidence, was inconsistent with the initial award granting benefits and was not based on well-reasoned credibility determinations.
This Court's review is limited to a determination of whether an error of law was committed, whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, or whether constitutional rights were violated. Vinglinsky v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Penn Installation), 589 A.2d 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
Initially, Claimant contends that the WCJ failed to present an accurate summary of the medical evidence presented. First, with respect to Dr. Stankiewicz's testimony, Claimant argues that the WCJ ignored Dr. Stankiewicz's diagnosis of multiple conditions: trochanteric bursitis and a disc protrusion of the lumbar spine at L3-L4.
A review of the WCJ's decision reveals that the WCJ did not ignore Dr. Stankiewicz's diagnosis. The WCJ accepted the diagnosis of trochanteric bursitis and rejected the diagnosis of a disc protrusion at L3-L4. The WCJ, as the ultimate finder of fact in workers' compensation cases, has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight, and is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including a medical witness, in whole or in part. General Electric Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Valsamaki), 593 A.2d 921 (Pa. Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 529 Pa. 626, 600 A.2d 541 (1991). This Court will not disturb a WCJ's findings when those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Nevin Trucking v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Murdock), 667 A.2d 262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
Even though Claimant acknowledges that the WCJ is the factfinder, Claimant argues that the WCJ erred when she issued inconsistent credibility determinations and did not issue a reasoned decision. Claimant argues that the WCJ gave two reasons why she failed to credit Dr. Stankiewicz on the issue of whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury to the lumbar spine: 1) Dr. Stankiewicz's testimony was inconsistent with objective diagnostic studies and 2) the testimony from both Dr. Levin and Dr. Gordon was more credible.
With respect to the objective diagnostic studies, Claimant asserts that these studies were attached to Dr. Stankiewicz's deposition transcript. However, a review of Dr. Levin's deposition reveals that the studies to which Claimant refers were conducted after the date of Dr. Stankiewicz's deposition so that the reports, while part of the record, were not attached to the deposition. The WCJ mentioned that Dr. Levin was shown an EMG report from December 13, 2005, which delineated a moderate right sciatic neuropathy and an MRI dated January 12, 2006, which indicated some flattening of the thecal sac. The WCJ also found that Dr. Levin reviewed a lumbar MRI which showed no evidence of nerve root impingement and two EMG reports which were normal and which were consistent with Dr. Levin's findings upon examination. Decision, Finding of Fact No. 5(e) at 5; R.R. at RR000027. Once again, the WCJ accepted Dr. Levin's interpretation of Claimant's condition. Again, when faced with conflicting medical evidence, the WCJ has complete authority over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight. Sherrod v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Thoroughgood, Inc.), 666 A.2d 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). The WCJ is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Lombardo v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Topps Construction), 698 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Cmwlth 1997). While there may have been medical evidence that supported Claimant's position, the WCJ was under no obligation to accept this evidence when faced with conflicting evidence.
With respect to Claimant's assertion that the WCJ rejected Dr. Stankiewicz's testimony because Dr. Levin and Dr. Gordon were more credible, Claimant misstates the WCJ's finding. The WCJ rejected Dr. Stankiewicz's diagnosis in part because the WCJ found Dr. Levin and Dr. Gordon to be more qualified than Dr. Stankiewicz because they were board-certified orthopedic surgeons. Further, this Court has held that a WCJ may rely upon the objective ground of an expert's area of expertise when reaching a credibility determination. Amandeo v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
Claimant also challenges the credibility of Dr. Levin. With respect to Dr. Levin's testimony, Claimant argues that the WCJ failed to account for contradictory testimony by Dr. Levin with respect to the diagnostic studies of Claimant's lower back. On direct examination, Dr. Levin testified that Claimant's nerve root tension signs were negative or normal, that his spinal range of motion was normal, and that there was no gross motor deficit in any of the major muscle groups of the lower extremities. Dr. Levin explained that these tests indicated no objective evidence of a sciatic nerve root irritation or a spinal problem. Dr. Levin Deposition at 16; R.R. at RR-000366. On cross-examination, Dr. Levin was presented with an EMG report which indicated a moderate right sciatic neuropathy and an MRI which indicated impingement on the thecal sac. Dr. Levin Deposition at 52-56; R.R. at RR-000401-RR-000405. However, Dr. Levin explained, "[t]he fact that it touches the thecal sac doesn't indicate that there's pressure on a nerve root. . . . And in all the MRI reports I saw there was never any evidence of nerve root compression." Dr. Levin Deposition at 56-57; R.R. at RR-000405-RR-000406. Dr. Levin also admitted that a more recent MRI indicated a flattening of the thecal sac which indicated the problem was getting worse. However, Dr. Levin opined that this flattening could be the result of degenerative changes. Dr. Levin Deposition at 57; R.R. at RR-000406. While Dr. Levin acknowledged these reports, he explained why his opinion that Claimant did not have a work-related disc injury did not waiver. The testimony by Dr. Levin was not contradictory.
Claimant also asserts that Dr. Levin failed to offer a diagnosis and to the extent Dr. Levin opined that there was no evidence that Claimant suffered a work-related injury then Dr. Levin's testimony is incompetent as a matter of law because he suggested that Claimant fully recovered from an injury that Dr. Levin did not believe ever occurred. First, Dr. Levin did make a diagnosis. He stated, "I don't know that we have a diagnosis of any real objective medical problem. On the other hand, for his subjective symptomatology having persisted so long without an explanation, I think the prognosis is guarded for its improvement." Dr. Levin Deposition at 18; R.R. at RR-000368. While Claimant may disagree with this assessment, it does not mean that Dr. Levin did not offer a diagnosis.
With respect to whether Dr. Levin's diagnosis was incompetent as a matter of law because he did not acknowledge that Claimant suffered a work-related injury, this Court disagrees with Claimant. Claimant petitioned for benefits. At issue was whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury. The WCJ accepted Dr. Stankiewicz's testimony that Claimant did suffer a work-related injury in the form of trochanteric bursitis. In a claim petition, the claimant must establish not only that he sustained a compensable injury but also that the injury continues to cause disability through the pendency of the claim petition. Innovative Spaces v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (DeAngelis), 646 A.2d 51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Unless a causal connection between an injury and disability is obvious, unequivocal medical evidence is needed to establish that connection. Mensah v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Norrell Temp Agency), 716 A.2d 707 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). When Dr. Levin testified, at issue was whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and the duration of the disability, if any. Although Dr. Levin's testimony regarding whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury at all was not accepted, this testimony did not render all of his testimony incompetent.
Claimant also asserts that Dr. Levin failed to offer any explanation to explain Claimant's low back injury. However, the WCJ did not find that Claimant suffered a low back injury. Claimant had the burden to establish that injury and failed to do so. Also, Dr. Levin admitted that he found tenderness to palpation when he checked for trochanteric bursitis and admitted that the bone scan was positive for this condition. However, Dr. Levin testified that he believed Claimant suffered from trochanteric bursitis prior to the work incident of August 12, 2005, so the fact that he admitted to finding some tenderness did not conflict with his diagnosis.
With respect to Dr. Gordon, Claimant argues that the WCJ capriciously disregarded this statement from Dr. Gordon: "If there was any work injury, it probably would have resolved" by the time of his examination in December 2005. Gordon Deposition at 16; R.R. at RR000450. Claimant argues that this statement rendered his testimony equivocal. Dr. Gordon opined that Claimant had no objective findings to support his complaints. Further, the WCJ failed to acknowledge Dr. Gordon's admission that a number of treating physicians diagnosed Claimant with trochanteric bursitis. Dr. Gordon Deposition at 28-31. As a result, Claimant argues that Dr. Gordon's comment that Claimant had undiagnosed trochanteric pain was incorrect. Once again, Claimant selectively highlights portions of Dr. Gordon's testimony that he believes support his position. However, taken as a whole, the WCJ found that Dr. Gordon's testimony did not support a continued work injury by Claimant. This Court finds no error on the part of the WCJ.
"In order for medical testimony to constitute competent medical evidence, such testimony must be unequivocal." Moore v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (American Sintered Technologies, Inc.), 759 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), appeal denied 566 Pa. 653, 781 A.2d 150 (2001). "Medical evidence is unequivocal if the medical expert, after providing a foundation, testifies that in his medical opinion he believes or thinks the facts exist." Frye v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Super Moche), 762 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). "Whether medical testimony is equivocal is a question of law, fully reviewable by this Court, and is to be determined by reviewing the entire testimony of the medical witness." Moore, 759 A.2d at 949.
Although Claimant asserts that Dr. Gordon did not offer any opinion concerning Claimant's alleged low back injury, Dr. Gordon reported that in his examination Claimant displayed excellent flexibility in his lumbar spine and "had no pain in his back whatsoever. He had no sciatica in any testing done, either sitting or supine fashion." Dr. Gordon Deposition at 10; R.R. at RR-000444.
To the extent Claimant argues that the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision because she failed to provide sufficient explanations for her credibility determinations, this Court does not agree.
Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834, provides:
Neither the board nor any of its members nor any workers' compensation judge shall be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation, but all findings of fact shall be based upon sufficient competent evidence to justify same. All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a reasoned decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why and how a particular result was reached. The workers' compensation judge shall specify the evidence upon which the workers' compensation judge relies and state the reasons for accepting it in conformity with this section. When faced with conflicting evidence, the workers' compensation judge must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an irrational reason; the workers' compensation judge must identify that evidence and explain adequately the reasons for its rejection. The adjudication shall provide the basis for meaningful appellate review. (emphasis added).
Finally, Claimant argues that the termination of benefits was improper as a matter of law and that the WCJ's award of benefits must be ongoing.
The Board succinctly addressed this issue:
Upon review, the Judge did not err in terminating Claimant's benefits as of November 2, 2005. Claimant bore the burden of proof in this proceeding to establish the continuation of a work-related injury resulting in a loss of earning power . . . and because the Judge did not accept Claimant's evidence of ongoing disability, but instead accepted Defendant's [Employer] medical evidence that as of November 2, 2005, Claimant no longer had a work-related impairment, Claimant was unable to meet his burden. While Claimant argues that Defendant's [Employer] medical experts were unable to establish Claimant's full recovery because they did not acknowledge Claimant's work injury, on the contrary, in the context of this Claim Petition, it was Claimant's burden to establish ongoing disability and Defendant Employer] had no burden to establish Claimant's full recovery. . . . Moreover, the opinions of Drs. Levin and Gordon were competent with respect to acknowledging the work injury because they both framed their opinions in terms generally similar to the formulation 'any injury Claimant may have sustained.' . . . We therefore reject Claimant's argument. (Citations omitted).Board Opinion, November 5, 2007, at 7; R.R. at RR-000061.
Accordingly, this Court affirms.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2013, the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
In Daniels v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Tristate Transport), 574 Pa. 61, 76, 828 A.2d 1043, 1053 (2003), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "a decision is 'reasoned' for the purpose of section 422(a) if it allows for adequate review by the WCAB without further elucidation and if it allows for adequate review by the appellate courts under applicable reviewable standards . . . [a] reasoned decision is no more, and no less." (emphasis added).
Here, the WCJ made detailed credibility determinations and explained her reasons for the determinations. This Court was able to review the WCJ's decision. The WCJ's decision complied with the reasoned decision requirement.