ee Cornett v. Agee, 143 Ga.App. 55, 57–58, 237 S.E.2d 522 (1977) (on motion for rehearing) (structure totally destroyed and removal of debris would cost more than salvage worth); Mercer v. J & M Transp. Co., 103 Ga.App. 141, 143(2), 118 S.E.2d 716 (1961) (destroyed house was old and in poor condition prior to destruction); Ga. Power Co. v. Maxwell, 52 Ga.App. 430, 432–33(4), 183 S.E. 654 (1936) (building completely destroyed by fire). Cf. Revis v. State, 223 Ga.App. 470, 470–71(2), 477 S.E.2d 880 (1996) (testimony lacked probative value when victim failed to account for depreciation in home destroyed by arson when home had tax value of $600, sat vacant for years, brought low amount of rent ($25 per month), was of unknown age, and would cost in excess of $31,000 to replace); State Highway Dep't v. Murray, 102 Ga.App. 210, 213–14, 115 S.E.2d 711 (1960) (in condemnation case, replacement costs were inappropriate when five houses, which ranged in age from 2 to 20 years old, were damaged); Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga.App. 362, 364(1), 103 S.E.2d 154 (1958) (trial court erred by disallowing testimony as to value of home prior to damage when repair of home would be impracticable). Compare NEDA Constr. Co. v. Jenkins, 137 Ga.App. 344, 349–50(4), 223 S.E.2d 732 (1976) (despite suggestion that fair market value was less than repair cost, repair costs were appropriate when notable and valuable historic home was damaged and there was no evidence that the home was dilapidated). And here, as noted supra, the victim sought restitution only for damage to her home.
Small v. Lee Bros., supra. See also Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362, 364 (1) ( 103 S.E.2d 154) (1958). This rule as to "another measure of damages" which is stated in Small v. Lee Brothers, supra, "is correct whether the [structure] is `substantially adapted' to its purpose and the owner is getting the benefit of it ... or whether it is allegedly `worthless.' It has some value, if only for scrap ([cit.]), and that value may obviously be whatever it is worth as a result of the irremediable defects.
As to the appellee's failure to mitigate his damages, the appellant concedes that the measure of damages in cases of this sort is the difference in value of the house as finished and the value of the house as it should have been finished. Windsor Forest v. Rocker, 115 Ga. App. 317 ( 154 S.E.2d 627); Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362 ( 103 S.E.2d 154); Small v. Lee Bros., 4 Ga. App. 395 ( 61 S.E. 831); Kuniansky v. Overmyer Warehouse Co., 406 F.2d 818, appeal after remand, 419 F.2d 1280, cert den., 398 U.S. 905 ( 90 SC 1697, 26 L.Ed.2d 64). The plaintiff is thus compensated for the difference in value between what the builder built and what he should have built, and whether the plaintiff mitigated his damages is not only irrelevant to, but is inconsistent with, the calculation of damages in such cases. The jury's verdict for Fullerton was in effect $406.50 more than the highest monetary estimate which could form the basis for valuing the difference between what the builder built and what he should have built.
taining whether a portion of the charge excepted to is error it must be read in its context, that is, in connection with what had been charged before and what was charged thereafter, and while a portion of the charge when read alone may seem to be error, if upon examination of the whole charge, it does not appear that the jury could have been misled or confused, the charge will not be cause for the grant of a new trial merely because it was, in some small particular, inaccurate or incomplete. Nor was it prior to the decision rendered by the majority in this case ". . . incumbent upon the judge, in instructing the jury with respect to different legal propositions that they are to consider, [in rendering their verdict] to repeat, in connection with the instruction on each proposition, all of the other qualifications and elements that they are to consider in reaching their verdict. It is sufficient if all of the essential qualifications and elements are covered in the charge as a whole." Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362, 365 ( 103 S.E.2d 154). See also in this connection, Sims v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 486, 487 ( 126 S.E. 872); Neville v. National Life c. Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 8 (1) ( 135 S.E. 315); General Oil Co. v. Crowe, 54 Ga. App. 139, 147 ( 187 S.E. 221); Southern R. Co. v. Gale, 103 Ga. App. 87, 90 ( 118 S.E.2d 742); Terry v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337, 343; Livingston v. Taylor, 132 Ga. 1 (1) ( 63 S.E. 694); Ellis v. Britt, 181 Ga. 442, 447 ( 182 S.E. 596).
Davis v. Whitcomb, 30 Ga. App. 497 (15b) ( 118 S.E. 488); Thomas v. State, 18 Ga. App. 21 (1) ( 88 S.E. 718); Hennemier v. Morris, 51 Ga. App. 760 (4) ( 181 S.E. 602); Essig v. Cheves, 75 Ga. App. 870, 878 ( 44 S.E.2d 712)." Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362, 365 ( 103 S.E.2d 154). See also, City of Waycross v. Howard, 42 Ga. App. 635 (3) ( 157 S.E. 247); and, Pollard v. Boatwright, 57 Ga. App. 565, 572 (4) ( 196 S.E. 215). None of the contentions contained in grounds 5, 6, and 7 is meritorious.
Error is assigned both on the failure of plaintiff to prove the damages to his car by showing the market value before and after the collision or the details as to the repairs made and the cost thereof, and to the failure of the court to give the jury in its charge a rule for fixing the amount of the damages. While it has been held that the plaintiff is entitled to submit proof in accordance with the allegations of his petition ( Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362 (1), 103 S.E.2d 154), we think that he must, to support a recovery, offer sufficient proof to authorize a finding in accordance with the rules of law fixing the measure of his damages. There should be enough evidence by which the jury could make some determination as to the value of the vehicle before and after the collision, or to enable them to determine what repairs were made necessary because of the negligent act of the defendant and the reasonable cost of the labor and materials for effecting the repairs, and if he relies on the cost of repairs as a measure it must further appear that these do not exceed the value of the vehicle before the collision.
A charge which is disjointed and torn to pieces may, when the disconnected segments are considered standing alone, seem to be erroneous." Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362, 365 ( 103 S.E.2d 154); Essig v. Cheves, 75 Ga. App. 870, 879 ( 44 S.E.2d 712). The charges complained of were not calculated to mislead the jury to the harm of the defendants and were not erroneous.
Davis v. Whitcomb, 30 Ga. App. 497 (15b) ( 118 S.E. 488); Thomas v. State, 18 Ga. App. 21 (1) ( 88 S.E. 718); Hennemier v. Morris, 51 Ga. App. 760 (4) ( 181 S.E. 602); Essig v. Cheves, 75 Ga. App. 870, 878 ( 44 S.E.2d 712)." Spainhour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362, 365 (2) ( 103 S.E.2d 154; West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck, 85 Ga. App. 385, 390 (9) ( 69 S.E.2d 577). The trial judge did not err in overruling the first special ground of the motion for a new trial. 2.
See United States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., supra. A measure of damages based upon the cost of repairs alone may be used in cases where the damaged goods can be entirely repaired, bringing the value up to its pre-damage level, Kirkhof Electric Company v. Wolverine Express, Inc., supra; Merchant Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express Dray. Co., 28 Cal.2d 594, 170 P.2d 923 (1946); Spain-hour v. Nolind, 97 Ga. App. 362, 103 S.E.2d 154 (1958); however, we believe that this measure should also be subject to the rule that it is to be used where it results in a lower amount which fully compensates. Considering the fact that, in the instant case, the cost of repairs amounted to less than the difference between the value of the goods before and after injury but before repair, the question presented to us is that of whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the view that appellee's belongings, besides the two pianos, had less value after being repaired than they had before being damaged.