because "there is a dispute in the evidence from which reasonable [people] could arrive at different conclusions as to the ultimate facts." Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 305 (1933). ¶15 "In medical malpractice actions, like all tort actions, a plaintiff must allege and prove the existence of a duty owed, a breach of that duty, and damages causally related to such breach."
We will only set aside a jury verdict "if there is no evidence in the record which would justify such conclusion by the triers of fact." Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 305 (1933); see Castro, 222 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 11. We will not reverse or vacate the ruling merely because "there is a dispute in the evidence from which reasonable [people] could arrive at different conclusions as to the ultimate facts."
Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez, 222 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 11 (App. 2009) (citation omitted). "We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our evaluation of the facts," id., nor will we reverse or vacate the court's ruling merely because "there is a dispute in the evidence from which reasonable [people] could arrive at different conclusions as to the ultimate facts," Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 305 (1933). ¶20 After hearing oral argument, the court explained it precluded evidence about the DE Policy coverage because it was not relevant to Symons' claims and there was a likelihood that the jurors may equate the DE Policy with potential alternative coverage for Symons' injury. However, the court also explained the DE Policy could not be excluded altogether because the existence of the policy was relevant to determining the standard of care and whether PJO breached the standard of care by not properly advising Black Stone that injuries to subcontractors were not covered by the Lloyd's Policy.
On the other hand, if there is no evidence in the record which would justify such a conclusion by the triers of fact, it is not only our right, but our duty, to set aside a verdict. Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 305, 25 P.2d 551, 551 (1933).
Cases abound enunciating the accepted doctrine that a judgment cannot be upheld on appeal if the essential findings are unsustained by substantial evidence. Gromm v. Fybush, 58 Colo. 145, 144 P. 551; Balkema v. Grolimund, 92 Wn. 326, 159 P. 127; Tuttle v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 121, 190 P. 993, 16 A.L.R. 601; J.R. Watkins Co. v. Waldo, 117 Kan. 250, 230 P. 1051; Cook v. Bedford, 42 Idaho 300, 245 P. 73; Smith v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 144 Or. 480, 23 P.2d 904, 25 P.2d 1119; Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 25 P.2d 551; Kansas, O. G. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 168 Okla. 190, 32 P.2d 302; Henry Wrape Co. v. Cox, 122 Ark. 445, 183 S.W. 955; First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis, 178 Iowa 1352, 161 N.W. 183, L.R.A. 1917C, 1005; Davis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Neb. 154, 258 N.W. 58; Arpas v. Mishawaka Rubber Woolen Co. (Ind.App.) 199 N.E. 167; Howe v. Watkins Bros., 107 Conn. 640, 142 A. 69. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
On the other hand, if there is no evidence in the record which would justify such a conclusion by the triers of fact, it is not only our right, but our duty, to set aside a verdict. Hutcherson, 188 Ariz. at 196, 933 P.2d at 1264 (quoting Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 305, 25 P.2d 551, 551 (1933)). APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT
We must sustain the verdict and judgment of the lower court if there is substantial evidence from which reasonable men could have found for defendant in the amount in question. Meyer v. Ricklick, 99 Ariz. 355, 409 P.2d 280 (1965); Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965); Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 25 P.2d 551 (1933). Though the combined total of damages claimed by defendant exceeded the amount awarded, the jury could very well have limited their verdict by doing either of the following: (1) accepted certain items of damages and rejected others, or (2) found that a certain number of pipe failures actually occurred and for each failure allowed so much in damages.
The proposition of law as just stated is undoubtedly correct. Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 25 P.2d 551." From the holding in the Pankey case, this defendant was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the verdict was grossly in excess of plaintiff's damages as disclosed by the evidence, and the trial court so ordered. The sole question here is whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial on all the issues raised by the pleadings or on the issue of damages alone.
We are at a loss to comprehend the reason why defendant seeks to apply that rule in this instance, since it could not redound in his favor. However, that statement is supported by the holding of this court in the case of Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 25 P.2d 551, and we reaffirm it. In his tenth proposition, defendant asserts that he had a legal right under his contract to assume control of the job and that consequently he is not liable for any damages sustained by plaintiff.
On the other hand, if there is no evidence in the record which would justify such a conclusion by the triers of fact, it is not only our right, but our duty, to set aside a verdict." Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 25 P.2d 551. See also Rouillier v. A. B. Schuster Co., 18 Ariz. 175, 157 P. 976; State Tax Comm. of Arizona v. Magma Copper Co., 41 Ariz. 97, 15 P.2d 961.