Southworth v. Seattle

9 Citing cases

  1. Dickgieser v. State

    153 Wn. 2d 530 (Wash. 2005)   Cited 26 times
    Logging activities on adjacent land caused flooding that damaged private property

    found where the property taken was not open for use to the public. There are many examples of public use that do not involve physical use of land by members of the public including: public utilities and the production of hydroelectric power, City of Tacoma v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 57 Wn.2d 257, 258, 356 P.2d 586 (1960); State ex rel. Northwestern Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wn.2d 476, 183 P.2d 802 (1947); appropriation of water and facilities to generate electrical power to sell to the public, Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County v. Washington Water Power Co., 43 Wn.2d 639, 262 P.2d 976 (1953); operation of a gravel pit on state lands, Boitano, 11 Wn.2d at 668; operation and maintenance of a garbage incinerator, Jacobs v. City of Seattle, 93 Wash 171, 177, 160 P. 299 (1916); and construction and operation of sewage disposal plants, Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wn.2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941); Aliverti v. City of Walla Walla, 162 Wash. 487, 298 P. 698 (1931); Southworth v. City of Seattle, 145 Wash. 138, 259 P. 26 (1927). ¶13 In contrast to Manufactured Housing and In re City of Seattle, the logging activities in this case were taking place on public lands managed by the Department of Natural Resources.

  2. Cunningham v. Town of Tieton

    60 Wn. 2d 434 (Wash. 1962)   Cited 25 times
    Affirming a judgment wherein a town was held liable for "an unconstitutional damaging by nuisance" because it deposited sewage into a lagoon that contaminated private water wells located underneath the lagoon

    The court properly instructed the jury respecting the measure of damage. The assignment was completely disposed of adversely to the appellant's claim in Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 140, 259 P. 26, in which we said: Serious doubt is entertained as to whether the appellant is estopped to advance its claim of error because, in its requested instruction No. 42, it asked the court to advise the jury as follows:

  3. Goggin v. Seattle

    48 Wn. 2d 894 (Wash. 1956)   Cited 15 times

    [2] It is true that governmental immunity does not extend to the creation or maintenance of a nuisance, even though in creating or maintaining such nuisance, the city is exercising a governmental function. Taylor v. Spokane, 91 Wn. 629, 158 P. 478; Bales v. Tacoma, 172 Wn. 494, 20 P.2d 860; Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26; Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wn. 648, 200 P. 336, 203 P. 40; Kuhr v. Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 501, 131 P.2d 168. In all of these cases, the nuisance complained of was created in whole or in part by the city itself.

  4. Boitano v. Snohomish County

    11 Wn. 2d 664 (Wash. 1941)   Cited 27 times
    In Boitano, the county uncovered an underground spring while operating a gravel pit. Boitano, 11 Wash.2d at 671, 120 P.2d 490. Needing to remove the water from the pit, the county constructed a channel to divert the excess water onto the plaintiff's property, causing lasting damages to the property.

    In Jacobs v. Seattle, 93 Wn. 171, 160 P. 299, L.R.A. 1917B, 329, and 100 Wn. 524, 171 P. 662, L.R.A. 1918E, 131, this court upheld the right of a property owner to maintain an action under Art. I, § 16, of the Washington constitution to recover compensation for both the erection and the operation by the city of an incinerator in which garbage was burned on land adjacent to that of the private owner. In Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26, the plaintiffs were allowed to recover compensation, under the same constitutional provision, for damages resulting from the construction and operation of a sewage disposal plant near their property. Recovery was likewise permitted in Aliverti v. Walla Walla, 162 Wn. 487, 298 P. 698, which was also an action for compensation for damages resulting from the maintenance and operation of a sewage disposal plant in the vicinity of the plaintiffs' properties.

  5. Snavely v. Goldendale

    10 Wn. 2d 453 (Wash. 1941)   Cited 17 times

    Though not dealing with the pollution of streams, there are three of our own cases which hold that damages to private property, resulting from the maintenance of garbage and sewage disposal plants, are recoverable under the constitutional guaranty. Jacobs v. Seattle, 93 Wn. 171, 160 P. 299, L.R.A. 1917B, 329; Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26; Aliverti v. Walla Walla, 162 Wn. 487, 298 P. 698. In the Jacobs case, the court cited, and quoted with approval, the case of Platt Bros. Co. v. Waterbury, supra.

  6. Knapp Brick Tile Co. v. Skagit County

    4 Wn. 2d 152 (Wash. 1940)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, the case falls within the well settled rule that, under such circumstances, the filing of a claim is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action. Wong Kee Jun v. Seattle, 143 Wn. 479, 255 P. 645, 52 A.L.R. 625 (wherein all preceding cases are reviewed); Netherlands American Mtg. Bank v. Centralia, 144 Wn. 315, 257 P. 842; Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26; Clark v. Seattle, 156 Wn. 319, 287 P. 29; Litka v. Anacortes, 167 Wn. 259, 9 P.2d 88; Fix v. Tacoma, 171 Wn. 196, 17 P.2d 599; Armstrong v. Seattle, 180 Wn. 39, 38 P.2d 377, 97 A.L.R. 826; Decker v. State, 188 Wn. 222, 62 P.2d 35; Ulery v. Kitsap County, 188 Wn. 519, 63 P.2d 352. The Ulery case makes this very pertinent statement, which, in our opinion, is equally applicable here:

  7. Cook v. State

    192 Wn. 602 (Wash. 1937)   Cited 12 times
    In Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 611, 74 P.2d 199 (1937), the court addressed an inverse condemnation action by the operator of a commercial ice skating operation who claimed that the state Game Commission had destroyed its business by prohibiting it from trapping muskrats that burrowed through its dike and beavers that dammed the creek feeding its pond.

    ed of the property itself or even of a part of it; and to this effect a great number of cases are cited, as, for example, Burrows v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 44 Wn. 630, 87 P. 937, where the land of riparian proprietors was overflowed above the line of ordinary high water mark; Jacobs v. Seattle, 93 Wn. 171, 160 P. 299, L.R.A. 1917B, 329, where the value of land was depreciated by the fact that the city of Seattle maintained an incinerator adjacent thereto for the burning of garbage; Great Northern R. Co. v. State, 102 Wn. 348, 173 P. 40, L.R.A. 1918E, 987, where the state highway, in building a highway, blasted rock and other material upon a railroad track belonging to plaintiff, interrupting its use; Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wn. 27, 198 P. 377, 18 A.L.R. 393, where adjoining counties, under legislative authority, in improving a navigable stream for the purpose of preventing overflows, caused the erosion and washing away of plaintiffs' land, by deflecting the current of the stream; Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26, where plaintiff was permitted to recover for damage to his property from a sewage disposal plant adjacent to it; Spokane, P. S.R. Co.v. State, 159 Wn. 529, 294 P. 231, where the roadbed of the railway was rendered temporarily useless by blasting done in constructing the highway. Other Washington cases of the same general description are cited as follows: Aliverti v. Walla Walla, 162 Wn. 487, 298 P. 698; Litka v. Anacortes, 167 Wn. 259, 9 P.2d 88; State v. Superior Court for Walla Walla County, 167 Wn. 334, 9 P.2d 70. A number of other cases of the same type are cited from other jurisdictions.

  8. Aliverti v. Walla Walla

    162 Wn. 487 (Wash. 1931)   Cited 12 times
    In Aliverti v. Walla Walla, 162 Wn. 487, 298 P. 698, we held that a complaint, seeking damages which resulted from a city's maintenance of a sewage disposal plant in the proximity of residence property, correctly alleged that the damage was permanent in nature.

    "If you find from the evidence that there has been no depreciation of the market value of the lands and premises of the plaintiffs by reason of the matters alleged in their complaint, then such plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover any damages in any of these actions." [2] The second reason given by the city for limiting the damages, namely, that they are not within the provisions of Art. I, § 16, of the constitution, is met by our decisions in Jacobs v. Seattle, 93 Wn. 171, 160 P. 299, L.R.A. 1917B 329; and Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26. We held in the Jacobs case that the maintenance and operation by a city of an incinerator for the burning of garbage on land adjacent to that of a private owner, and its operation so as to depreciate the value of his land and render it a menace to the health of himself and family, constitutes a damaging of private property for a public use, for which he is entitled to compensation under Art. I, § 16, of the constitution.

  9. Clark v. Seattle

    287 P. 29 (Wash. 1930)   Cited 4 times

    [1] It is argued that, under the law of this state, appellants are entitled to recover without regard to the care exercised by respondent in doing the things charged in the complaint; in other words, that negligence is not involved in this kind of an action. Our cases, Wong Kee Jun v. Seattle, 143 Wn. 479, 255 P. 645; Marshall v. Whatcom County, 143 Wn. 506, 255 P. 654; Hamm v. Seattle, 143 Wn. 700, 255 P. 655; Netherlands American Mortgage Bank v. Centralia, 144 Wn. 315, 257 P. 842; and Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wn. 138, 259 P. 26, are relied upon to sustain this position. In all of those cases, it was held that a municipality would be liable for slides caused by impairing lateral support and for direct physical invasion of private property, without the necessity of filing claims for damages therefor; and that such actions were not to be considered as actions in tort, but were actions under the constitution (Art. I, § 16) for compensation for the taking or damaging of private property.