Decided January 15, 2008. Appeal from the 4th Dept: 43 AD3d 1374. Motions for Leave to Appeal Denied.

Here, the issuance of a SEQRA findings statement did not inflict injury in the absence of an actual determination of the subject applications for a special use permit and site-plan approval and, thus, the challenge to the adoption of the findings statement is not ripe for adjudication ( see Matter of Wallkill Cemetery Assn., Inc. v. Town of Wallkill Planning Bd., 73 A.D.3d 1189, 1190, 905 N.Y.S.2d 609;see also Matter of Eadie v. Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 N.Y.3d 306, 317, 821 N.Y.S.2d 142, 854 N.E.2d 464;Matter of Guido v. Town of Ulster Town Bd., 74 A.D.3d 1536, 1537, 902 N.Y.S.2d 710;Matter of Southwest Ogden Neighborhood Assn. v. Town of Ogden Planning Bd., 43 A.D.3d 1374, 1374–1375, 844 N.Y.S.2d 530). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the respondents' separate motions which were to dismiss the petition on the ground that the matter is not ripe for adjudication.

The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) commenced this hybrid proceeding and action to challenge a findings statement adopted by the Planning Board of the Town of Wallkill on December 7, 2005, pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8; hereinafter SEQRA), which found that all negative impacts from a project proposed by E. Tetz and Sons, Inc. (hereinafter Tetz), to construct an asphalt plant were sufficiently mitigated. Although such a challenge would usually be dismissed for lack of ripeness since, under most circumstances, the issuance of a SEQRA findings statement does not inflict injury in the absence of an actual determination on an application for a land-use approval ( see generally Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d 306, 317; Matter of Young v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, 89 NY2d 846, 848-849; Matter of Southwest Ogden Neighborhood Assn. v Town of Ogden Planning Bd., 43 AD3d 1374, 1374-1375), here, we dismiss the appeal as academic. In the instant matter, the petitioners failed to move in the Supreme Court for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction of the asphalt plant and, after the petition was denied and the proceeding dismissed by the Supreme Court, they failed to seek a stay in this Court to preserve the status quo pending the determination of this appeal.

Petitioner met its burden of establishing "that at least one of its members would have standing to sue, that it is representative of the organizational purposes it asserts and that the case would not require the participation of individual members" ( New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211; see Society of Plastics Indus, v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 775; Matter of Citizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v Planning Bd. of Town of Irondequoit, 50 AD3d 1460, 1460-1461). We further conclude that, although the court properly determined that the owners of two parcels of property on which the project would be located should have been joined as necessary parties in these proceedings ( see CPLR 1001 [a]; Matter of Southwest Ogden Neighborhood Assn. v Town of Ogden Planning Bd., 43 AD3d 1374, lv denied 9 NY3d 818), the court erred in dismissing the petitions on that procedural ground without summoning the two property owners ( see CPLR 1001 [b]; Windy Ridge Farm v Assessor of Town of Shandaken, 11 NY3d 725, 726).

We agree with petitioners that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. At the time of the motion, the property owners were necessary parties pursuant to CPLR 1001 (a), and thus their joinder was required ( see generally Matter of Southwest Ogden Neighborhood Assn. v Town of Ogden Planning Bd., 43 AD3d 1374, lv denied 9 NY3d 818; Matter of Ferruggia v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Warwick, 5 AD3d 682; Matter of Artrip v Incorporated Vil. of Piermont, 267 AD2d 457). The expiration of the statute of limitations, however, is not the equivalent of a jurisdictional defect ( see Windy Ridge Farm v Assessor of Town of Shandaken, 11 NY3d 725, 726-727)

Where an agency's determination commits the agency to a definite course of future conduct, "such determination constitutes an 'action' within the meaning of SEQRA and, concomitantly, a 'final determination' for Statute of Limitations purposes" (Matter of Wing vCoyne, 129 AD2d 213, 217, 517 NYS2d 576 [3d Dept 1987] quoting Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 203, 518 NYS2d 943 [1987 ]; see 6 NYCRR 617.2 [b] [2]; Matter of Gordon vRush, 100 NY2d 236, 762 NYS2d 18 [2002]; Matter of Jones v Amicone, 27 AD3d 465, 468, 812 NYS2d 111 [2d Dept 2006]). Here, the Town Board's SEQRA determination is not yet ripe for judicial review (see Matter of Southwest Ogden Neighborhood Assn. v Town of Ogden Planning Bd., 43 AD3d 1374, 844 NYS2d 530 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 818, 852 NYS2d 14 [2008]; Matter of Young v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, 221 AD2d 975, 977, 634 NYS2d 605 [4th Dept 1995], aff'd 89 NY2d 846, 652 NYS2d 729 [1996]). A lead agency's SEQRA review obligations are not considered complete until it issues a SEQRA findings statement (see Matter of Chase Partners, LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., supraat 1053; Matter of Jones v Amicone, 27 AD3d at 467, citing Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy. v Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhaven, 78 NY2d 608, 578 NYS2d 466 [1991]).