From the foregoing resume of the evidence, it is clear that [1-3] the motor company at the time it purchased the car in question had neither actual nor constructive notice of plaintiff's mortgage. It was entitled to rely upon the record which showed that Hiebert was the owner of the car and that Douglas Swingley was a stranger to the title. While the facts are not exactly the same, the holding in the following cases support the conclusion that a mortgage by one not in the chain of title though recorded is not constructive notice to subsequent purchasers: Ohio Finance Co. v. McReynolds, 27 Ohio App. 42, 160 N.E. 727; Rhea Mortgage Co. v. Lemmerman, (Tex.Civ.App.) 294 S.W. 959; Id., (Tex.Com.App.) 10 S.W.2d 690; Southwest Securities Co. v. Jacques, (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 1098; Id., (Tex.Com.App.) 42 S.W.2d 232; People's Finance Thrift Co. v. Shirk, 181 Okla. 418, 74 P.2d 379; Fitzgerald v. People's Finance Thrift Co., 184 Okla. 44, 84 P.2d 625; Kurtz v. Adrian, 46 S.D. 125, 191 N.W. 188. And see 5 R.C.L. 415; 10 American Jurisprudence, Chattel Mortgages, sec. 116, p. 791; 14 C.J.S., Chattel Mortgages, sec. 164, page 772.
Nevertheless, the rule laid down is the statement of a broad principle which is applicable to the present case. The facts in Southwest Security Co. v. Jacques, supra ( 42 S.W.2d 233), are quite similar to the facts here. The mortgage sued on was made to the owner of the automobile.