Southwest Center for Biological Diver. v. F.E.R.C.

8 Citing cases

  1. Me. Council of the Atl. Salmon Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. of the Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.

    203 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D. Me. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    See e.g.,Cal. Save Our Streams Council v. Yeutter , 887 F.2d 908, 911–12 (9th Cir.1989) (dismissing plaintiff's argument for jurisdictional distinction between a claim against the U.S. Forest Service under the APA challenging a ESA section 4(e) letter and a claim against FERC under the FPA in a licensing proceed; "even if they attempt to style this as an independent claim against the Forest Service the practical effect of the action in district court is an assault on an important ingredient of the FERC license"); Southwest Ctr. for Biol. Div. v. FERC, 967 F.Supp. 1166, 1173 (D.Ariz.1997) (noting that "[t]he law is clear that any attempt to challenge a license issued by the FERC, however artfully pleaded, will fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Appeal under the FPA"); Idaho Rivers United v. Foss , 373 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1161 (D.Idaho 2005) (plaintiff's claims solely against USFWS for issuing an allegedly inadequate BiOp was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that jurisdiction existed exclusively in the Courts of Appeals under the FPA); Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Gutierrez , 606 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1215 (E.D.Cal.2008) ("Feather River operations covered by the FERC license are not within the jurisdiction of the district court"). The Yeutter Court rejected an argument similar to the one raised by the Plaintiffs. There, the appellants argued that the exclusive review provisions of the FPA were inapplicable "because their suit was filed against the Forest Service and arose under the provisions of [the National Envi

  2. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Keys III

    Civil No. 02-3080-CO (D. Or. May. 7, 2004)

    Therefore, plaintiffs have a procedural right to bring this suit. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. F.E.R.C., 967 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (D.Ariz. 1997). The declarations of Cindy Deacon Williams, Glen H. Spain, Wendel Wood, and Tim McKay submitted by plaintiffs allege a concrete interest in the continued existence of the suckers.

  3. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. El Paso Corp.

    213 Ariz. 400 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 19 times

    Therefore, a claim that in substance challenges a FERC decision, if filed in another court, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. F.E.R.C, 967 F.Supp. 1166, 1173-75 (D.Ariz.1997) (holding that an Arizona federal district court could not exercise jurisdiction over a claim that the FERC violated the Endangered Species Act). Collateral attacks on an agency decision, even when packaged as state law claims, are prohibited. See Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no jurisdiction for inverse condemnation and breach of contract claims).

  4. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior

    13 F. App'x 612 (9th Cir. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    Aug. 30, 2000) (Service ordered to issue a proposed critical habitat within 60 days); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 98-0180 (S.D.Cal. May 6, 1998) (150 days); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 96-2317 (D.Ariz. March 19, 1997) (120 days); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 967 F.Supp. 1166 (D. Ariz.1997) (120 days); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 98-1009 (S.D.Cal. Dec. 23, 1998) (35 days); Defenders of Wildlife v. Rogers, No. 96-2045 (D.Ariz. May 16, 1997) (60 days). The majority states that the dissent "fails to distinguish between court orders and regulatory or statutory deadlines" when evaluating whether a challenged action is too short to allow for full litigation.

  5. Berkley v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC

    Civil Action No. 7:17-cv-00357 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2017)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses

    But plaintiffs' own complaint—and their standing arguments—make clear that they are concerned not with some abstract constitutional violation, but with the fact that their land will be affected by MVP's proposed pipeline. See, e.g., Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 F. Supp. 1166, 1172-73 (D. Ariz. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they were not challenging FERC authority to issue a license under the Federal Power Act, but FERC's independent affirmative duty to consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act, and explaining that "[t]he law is clear that any attempt to challenge a license issued by the FERC, however artfully pleaded, will fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Appeal under the FPA."). Plaintiffs' assertion that this court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction would deprive them of an opportunity for judicial review over their constitutional claims in an Article III court is incorrect.

  6. City of Tacoma v. National Marine Fisheries Service

    383 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a challenge under the Endangered Species Act as a collateral attack on a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license

    For the following reasons, the Court disagrees. The City of Tacoma argues that its claim does not challenge FERC's authority "to affirm, modify, or set aside" a license under the FPA, but rather merely seeks to enforce the NMFS's independent affirmative duties under the ESA and APA as if the two actions were not in the least interrelated. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b); see Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. F.E.R.C., 967 F. Supp. 1166, 1172 (D. Ariz. 1997) (noting similarities in cases brought under ESA citizen suit provision and FPA review process). Accordingly, it contends that this Court should have jurisdiction to hear its claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

  7. Idaho Rivers United v. Foss

    373 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D. Idaho 2005)   Cited 5 times

    Id. Thus, SOS dictates that this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See also, Southwest Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 F.Supp. 1166 (D.Ariz. 1997) (relying on SOS in holding that FPA warranted dismissal of ESA claims against Forest Service). The Court will enter a separate Judgment as required by Rule 58. One difference between the cases is that SOS joined FERC as a defendant while IRU has not sued FERC.

  8. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Panda Brandywine, L.P.

    99 F. Supp. 2d 681 (D. Md. 2000)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that the Fourth Circuit did not limit the scope of the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc. and thus that there was no precedent to find that it should be used sparingly by district courts

    See 18 C.F.R. Part 292 (1999). Insofar as the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from this Court that the defendant's facility does not meet the criteria for certification as a QF prescribed in the cited Regulations, it is clear to this Court that it should, at the least, exercise its discretion to withhold such declaratory relief (and, at the most, might not even have the jurisdiction to grant relief at all) in light of the statute and its extensive regulatory implementation under the FERC's jurisdiction (with exclusive judicial review in the Courts of Appeal, see Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 F. Supp. 1166, 1172-73 (Ariz. 1997)), for the reasons stated in Independent Energy Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. California Public Utilities Com'n, 36 F.3d 848, 854 n. 11 and 857 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Ryder Services Corp. v. Savage, 945 F. Supp. 232, 235 (N.D.Ala. 1996) (role of discretion in declaratory judgment cases).