Opinion
4:01-CV-0195-E.
December 19, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Southstar Logistics, Inc. ("Southstar") and Defendant Teamsters Local 745 ("Teamsters") in the above-styled and numbered cause. Both parties have filed numerous briefs both in support and opposition of the respective motions. After considering the motions and arguments of the parties, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court makes the following determinations.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute arises out of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") entered into by the parties in 1998. Southstar has contracted with Kroger, Co., to manage warehouse and distribution functions at Kroger's distribution center in Keller, Texas. Southstar employs the truck drivers and warehousemen working at the Keller facility pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the CBA, which was negotiated by Southstar and the Teamsters (representing the Keller employees).
The truck drivers employed by Southstar deliver groceries from the Keller facility to Kroger grocery stores. Under the terms of the CBA, the drivers are compensated for their work in two major ways. First, their travel time from warehouse-to-store is paid based on defined distance and mileage rates. Second, upon reaching the destination store, the drivers are paid at contractual hourly rates of pay for a series of activities, including processing paperwork, unloading products, and loading salvage or store returns.
On June 15, 2000, Southstar driver Larry Gaston filed a grievance contending that he was not properly paid for a 33-minute delay he incurred while waiting for another truck to finish using the loading dock at a Kroger store in Bedford, Texas. On October 27, 2000, driver Frank Byrd submitted a similar grievance, alleging that he was not compensated for a 26-minute delay encountered while awaiting access to the loading dock at a Kroger store.
Both grievances were denied at the first two steps in the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA — a meeting between the employee, the union steward, and the supervisor, and a conference between representatives for the Teamsters and Southstar — and were consolidated for presentation to the Texas Conference Joint Transfer Cartage and Garage Grievance Committee ("Committee"). The Committee, staffed with an equal number of representatives from participating companies and unions, conducted a hearing on the grievances on December 7, 2000.
At the hearing, the Teamsters argued that drivers delayed in accessing the loading dock of a Kroger store because of the presence of third-party trucks should be compensated for the entire time of their delay, as drivers could not begin the series of activities specified in the CBA for which they were paid a contractual hourly rate of pay until they "bumped the dock" (i.e. positioned the trailer against the loading dock). The union contended that paid delay time was authorized by provision A.18 of Appendix A to the CBA, which states that drivers "shall be paid at their applicable straight time hourly rate" for all delays resulting from "break down or impassable highways."
In response, Southstar asserted that provision A.31(b) of the CBA governed the situation involved in the drivers' grievances. That section states that "[e]mployees will not be paid delays caused for any reason whatsoever until the total time at the stop exceeds the standard." According to Southstar, the "standard" — a term that was not defined in the CBA — begins to run when the driver arrives on store premises, and encompasses all of the activities specified in section A.33(a) of the CBA, including "in and out set up time" and unloading products. Thus, Southstar argued that it was not required to pay for delays resulting from inaccessible loading docks unless the entire delivery time exceeded the "standard" computed for the delivery pursuant to section A.33(a).
After completing the hearing, the Grievance Committee issued a ruling stating that "[t]he company will pay all delay time after the driver has exceeded ten (10) minutes allowed in the standard." On March 6, 2001, Southstar filed a Complaint in this Court to vacate the Committee's decision.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986); Hill v. London, Stetelman, Kirkwood, Inc., 906 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1990). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. In order to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.
In making its determination on the motion, the Court must look at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. See Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). Although all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
III. DISCUSSION
The United States Supreme Court's landmark Steelworkers trilogy established that a court reviewing an arbitration award may not address issues that go to the "intrinsic merits" of a dispute, and instead must limit its review to (1) whether the subject matter of the dispute is "arguably arbitrable"; and (2) whether the award draws its "essence" from the collective bargaining agreement. See International Chem. Workers Union v. Day Zimmerman, Inc., 791 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, Southstar contends that the decision of the Grievance Committee does not draw its "essence" from the CBA negotiated by the parties.
The Steelworkers trilogy consists of Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, S.Ct. 80 1343 (1960);Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (1960); and Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358 (1960).
When determining whether an arbitration award arises from the "essence" of a labor contract, the court should interpret the contract "expansively so as to uphold the award, rather than restrictively." International Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers, Dist. 776 v. Texas Steel Co., 538 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976). Provided that it is "rationally inferable" that in "some logical way" the award was "derived from . . . the contract," the court is bound to follow the arbitrator's decision. International Chem. Workers, 791 F.2d at 369 (citation omitted). The award may not be reversed when "the arbitrator misreads the contract, where there is room to do so. . . ." National Gypsum Co. v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 147 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Even if "a court is convinced [that the arbitrator] committed serious error[, that] does not suffice to overturn his decision." United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 371 (1987).
Southstar criticizes the decision of the Grievance Committee in this case for arriving at an interpretation of the CBA that neither party advocated, and "that is in fact contrary to the parties' own understanding and testimony." Pl.'s Br. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5. Moreover, the company asserts that the Committee's ruling that drivers should be paid for all delays that exceed the 10 minutes "allowed in the standard" would undermine the productivity-based compensation system in the CBA by rewarding drivers for inactivity.
Unfortunately for Southstar, the Committee's decision in this matter is "rationally inferable" from the language of the CBA, and thus the Court cannot reverse the award. Section A.31(b) of Appendix A to the CBA states that drivers shall not be compensated for delays for any reason "until the total delivery time at the delivery stop exceeds the standard." Ex. A to App. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 50. The term "standard" is not defined anywhere in the CBA, however, and a review of the transcript from the grievance hearing demonstrates that the parties seem to have conflicting interpretations of the term. Given this crucial ambiguity, the Grievance Committee did not commit reversible error by interpreting the use of the term "the standard" in the CBA as referring to the 10-minute "in and out set up time per stop" component of § A.33(a). This interpretation is certainly "rationally inferable" from the language of the CBA, and does not violate the "essence" of the labor agreement. Accordingly, the longstanding rule of deference to industrial arbitration dictates that the Court must respect the Committee's decision. As the Fifth Circuit has aptly noted:
For example, Teamsters Business Agent Randy Thorn testified that "anytime you're not actually rolling down the road, there's allotted amounts of standard times . . . to perform certain . . . responsibilities and duties," illustrating the union's position that "the standard" refers to each of the individual components of compensation listed in § A.33(a), such as unloading products and loading salvage. Ex. E to App. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 77. In contrast, Southstar took the position at the hearing that "the standard" was the total aggregate time for the store delivery activities enumerated in § A.33(a). See id. at 91-95.
While the Court agrees with Southstar that the Grievance Committee's one-sentence award does not explicitly define "the standard" as the 10-minute "in and out set up time per stop" component of § A.33(a), an examination of the transcript of the Grievance Committee hearing — including the large amount of time devoted to the question of whether the 10-minute "in and out set up time per stop" period begins before or after a delivery truck "bumps the dock" — makes it clear that this was the Committee's intention. See, e.g., Ex. E to App. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 109-111 (Committee member Larry Perkins equating the 10-minute "in and out set up time per stop" with "the standard").
If such a result is unpalatable to an employer or his law-trained counsel who feels he had a hands-down certainty in a law court, it must be remembered that just such a likelihood is the by-product of a consensually adopted contract arrangement. . . . The arbiter was chosen to be the Judge. That Judge has spoken. There it ends.Safeway Stores v. American Bakery Confectionary Workers Int'l Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1968).
The Court also rejects Southstar's assertion that the award should be vacated because the Grievance Committee exceeded the scope of its authority under the CBA. Although the Fifth Circuit has mandated that "arbitral action contrary to express contractual provisions will not be respected," Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1989), there is no evidence that the Grievance Committee acted in such a manner in this case. Section 5.03 of the CBA states that the Grievance Committee "shall not have jurisdiction to alter or modify any of the provisions of this Agreement, nor to substitute any new provisions in lieu thereof, nor to make any decision inconsistent with the terms and provisions of the Agreement." Ex. A to App. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 14. As previously noted, the Grievance Committee's interpretation of the ambiguous term "the standard" was "rationally inferable" from the language of the CBA, and thus it cannot be said that the Committee improperly altered, modified, or otherwise rendered a decision inconsistent with the labor contract. Although Southstar may disagree with the Committee's award, the company and the union bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA, not this Court's. The award must be enforced.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court determines that Defendant Teamsters Local 745 is entitled to summary judgment in this matter, and the award of the Grievance Committee in this matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Teamsters Local 745's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED as set forth previously herein. In addition, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Southstar's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.