Opinion
No. CV-07-4034033
March 24, 2008
RULING ON OBJECTION TO REQUEST TO REVISE (MOTION 105)
In this case, the plaintiff, Southridge Capital Management, LLC, filed on November 15, 2007 an application to quash the investigative subpoena issued by the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Banking, Howard Pitkin, pursuant to General Statutes § 36b-26(b). The defendant, Commissioner, filed a request to revise the entire application to quash, claiming that the application may be a "special proceeding" but is still a civil action. As such, the application must comply with Practice Book § 10-1, which requires, in part, that "[e]ach pleading . . . contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies . . . [and that] such statement . . . be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively . . ." In addition, in his Memorandum in Response to the Plaintiff's Objection to the Request to Revise, the defendant attaches copies of applications to quash filed in other cases which were initiated with complaints being filed.
The plaintiff objects to the request to revise, asserting that as a "special proceeding," its application to quash is akin to motions to quash authorized under Practice Book § 13-28(e), which, for example, does not dictate the form or pleading procedures required in moving to quash subpoenas in cases pending in foreign courts.
Notwithstanding the arguments of counsel, this court is persuaded that the relevant starting point for analysis begins with General Statutes § 52-91 and the mesne process section of the Practice Book, specifically, § 8-1. General Statutes § 52-91 states, in relevant part, "[t]here shall be one form of civil action. The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and . . . a demand for the relief . . ." Practice Book § 8-1 describes the process of commencing a civil action as well as other civil proceedings, dictating in relevant part, "[m]esne process in civil actions shall be a writ of summons or attachment, describing the parties, the court to which it is returnable and the time and place of appearance, and shall be accompanied by the plaintiff's complaint."
Our courts, however, have long observed that certain statutory proceedings, which are commenced by application or other process, as opposed to the filing of a complaint, are not "civil actions" within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-91. See Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 407, 407 A.2d 1013 (1979) (in holding that proceedings to confirm, modify or vacate an arbitration award are not civil actions, the court recognized other special statutory proceedings, such as probate appeals and workmen's compensation appeals). See also Boltuch v. Rainaud, 137 Conn. 298, 77 A.2d 94 (1950). Indeed, in W. Horton K. Knox, 1 Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut Superior Court Civil Rules (2007) § 8-1, p. 380, the author's comments distinguish mesne process, which is "the ordinary method for invoking the jurisdiction of the court" from other categories of process, including special proceedings, the commencement of which are dictated by the relevant statutes. See also Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 652, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975) (workmen's compensation appeals "are neither commenced by service of process nor controlled by rules of pleading" and thus is a "procedure . . . distinct from the ordinary concept of a civil action").
In this case, the relevant statutory provision is General Statutes § 36b-26(c). As the enforcement provision for investigatory subpoenas issued by the Commissioner of Banking, § 36b-26(c) specifically authorizes the Commissioner to seek enforcement of said subpoenas "upon application" to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford.
By its application to quash an investigative subpoena issued pursuant to General Statutes § 36b-26(c), the plaintiff is asserting his right to be heard expeditiously on a matter that is limited in scope from an ordinary civil action. See, e.g. Boltuch v. Rainaud, supra, 137 Conn. 300 (noting the informal character of the service required in applications relating to arbitration awards in superior court was to allow for prompt hearing and disposition); Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., supra, 169 Conn. 653 (by not requiring such proceedings to be treated as civil actions, the legislature intended speedy, effective and inexpensive resolution of workers' compensation claims). As such, this court is not persuaded that the plaintiff is required to either file a complaint or revise his application to quash to conform with Practice Book § 10-1.
The Objection to the Plaintiff's Request to Revise is SUSTAINED.