Opinion
A154126
06-13-2018
Amy S., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT, Respondent; HUMBOLDT COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. JV160224)
In this juvenile writ proceeding, Amy S. (mother) seeks extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code with respect to her young daughter, L.P. (born June 2015). Mother's petition is substantially deficient, failing to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 8.452(b) . Even when liberally construed as mandated by Rule 8.452(a)(1), however, we ascertain no meritorious issues for our review. We thus deny the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2016, the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) received a referral alleging general neglect of L.P. and her half-sister, B.P. Specifically, the reporting party stated that mother and alleged father Steven P. (father) had been homeless and abusing substances in Reno, Nevada. The parents were reported to be using L.P. and B.P. to beg for money and had been staying in their car when its windows were shot out. After child protective services in Reno intervened, mother agreed to place the girls with the maternal grandmother in Humboldt County. The girls were detained by the Department in September 2016 after the maternal grandmother stated that she could no longer care for them. Around this time, hair follicle testing for mother was positive for methamphetamine.
Jurisdiction was established on December 6, 2016, and the matter was continued for disposition, which was complicated by the fact that mother was now residing in Idaho. At the dispositional hearing on December 20, 2016, the court declared L.P. to be a juvenile court dependent, removed her from parental custody, ordered reunification services for mother, and authorized an expedited process pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). As of the six-month hearing in August 2017, the ICPC process was not complete and L.P. remained in foster care in Humboldt County. Reunification services were continued. L.P. was eventually placed in Idaho with a friend of mother's in October 2017. As of December 2017, mother was still disclosing recent marijuana and methamphetamine use. She had not followed through with recommended substance abuse treatment.
At the 12-month review hearing in February 2018, the juvenile court found that reasonable services had been provided by the Department and continued those services to the 18-month mark. Mother subsequently filed a notice of appeal, challenging the juvenile court's reasonable services finding, and her appeal is currently pending before this court. (In re L.P. (A153923, app. pending.) Given the dependency timelines generally limiting reunification efforts to 18 months from the initial removal of the minor (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1)), mother's 18-month review was held shortly thereafter, in April 2018. At that hearing, after argument from counsel, the court found that reasonable services had been provided, but that mother had made no progress towards reunification. It therefore terminated mother's reunification services and referred L.P. for permanency planning pursuant to section 366.26. Mother's timely notice of her intent to file a writ petition and the filing of the petition, itself, now bring the matter before this court. (Rules 8.450(e), 8.452.)
II. DISCUSSION
Mother's entire argument in her writ petition is as follows: "The court erred in making a finding of reasonable services at the 18-month review. (Reporter's Transcript, pages 12-17.) The mother has appealed reasonable services findings made at the 12-month date. Because it is the mother's position that she was not served adequately at the 12-month date, it became impossible for mother to catch up with services omitted by the department. Her efforts to comply were hindered by the 12-month ruling, and therefore she was prejudiced at the 18-month review. Reunification time should have been extended beyond the 18-month date to make up for the time the mother lost due to the department's prior failures."
A writ petition in this context must include a summary of the significant facts and identify contested legal points with citation to legal authority and argument. (Rule 8.452(b).) At a minimum, the writ petition must "adequately inform the court of the issues presented, point out the factual support for them in the record, and offer argument and authorities that will assist the court in resolving the contested issues." (Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 583.) None of these necessary elements were provided in this case, and, on this basis alone, we could reject the petition.
However, even ignoring these flagrant procedural failings and addressing mother's argument on the merits, we see no cause to intervene at this juncture. Mother argues here that the juvenile court's reasonable services finding at the 18-month review hearing was erroneous. At that hearing, mother's attorney reported that mother's challenge to the reasonable services finding from the 12-month hearing was on appeal and that "[s]he continues to object to any findings of reasonable services." However, mother's counsel went on to state: "That said, between the last hearing and the present hearing, I, on behalf of mother, have nothing additional to present in terms of that time period." Indeed, counsel later conceded: "I acknowledge that there's been a lot of attempt at services within the last reporting period and going into the previous one." Under such circumstances, mother has forfeited any challenge to the services offered between the 12-month and 18-month reviews. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 & fn. 2 (S.B.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339.) Moreover, we note that at an 18-month hearing—absent circumstances not present here—" 'the authority of the juvenile court to set a section 366.26 hearing is not conditioned on a reasonable services finding.' " (Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1500-1507; see also T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251-1257 & 1252, fn. 12 [limiting Earl L. to cases, like this one, where the requisite minimum period of reasonable services has been offered or provided].) Thus, even if the issue was not so obviously forfeited, it is hard to see how mother could possibly have been prejudiced by the reasonable services finding in this case. Mother's quarrel is clearly with the services provided in connection with the 12-month review in this matter. Her pending appeal is adequate to address those concerns. (Joe B. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 23, 27 [" 'Generally the availability of an appeal constitutes an adequate remedy at law precluding writ relief' "].)
III. DISPOSITION
The petition is denied on the merits. (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C), (4)(B).) Because the permanency planning hearing in this matter is set for July 25, 2018, this opinion is final as to this court immediately. (Rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) Mother's request for a stay pending resolution of this petition is denied as moot. Mother's request for a stay pending resolution of the related appeal in this case is also denied.
/s/_________
REARDON, J. We concur: /s/_________
STREETER, ACTING P. J. /s/_________
SCHULMAN, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, San Francisco City & County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.