Opinion
8806 8807
03-26-2019
IN RE KAYLIN P., and Another, Children Under Eighteen Years of Age, etc., Derval S., Respondent–Appellant, v. Administration for Child Services, Petitioner–Respondent.
Law Offices of Randall S. Carmel, Jericho (Randall S. Carmel of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Antonella Karlin of counsel), for respondent. Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Stern of counsel), attorney for the children.
Law Offices of Randall S. Carmel, Jericho (Randall S. Carmel of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Antonella Karlin of counsel), for respondent.
Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Stern of counsel), attorney for the children.
Manzanet–Daniels, J.P., Gische, Gesmer, Singh, Moulton, JJ.
Appeal from order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (David J. Kaplan, J.), entered on or about May 3, 2018, which released respondent's biological son, Mason S., to the custody of his mother with court-ordered supervision for six months, released Kaylin P., a child for whom he was legally responsible, to her biological father for six months with court-ordered supervision, and directed respondent to comply with certain terms and conditions including that he complete a sex offender program and abide by a final order of protection, also dated May 3, 2018, that prohibits him from having any contact with Kaylin P. until December 30 2019, her 18th birthday, unanimously dismissed, without costs. Appeal from a fact-finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about September 27, 2016, which, inter alia, found that respondent sexually abused and neglected Kaylin P., and from a fact-finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about April 19, 2018, which found Mason S., to be derivatively abused and neglected, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as abandoned.
The dispositional order was entered upon respondent's consent, after full and active participation at the proceeding, and thus he is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of CPLR 5511 ( Matter of Desmond S., 97 N.Y.2d 693, 693, 739 N.Y.S.2d 91, 765 N.E.2d 294 [2002] ; Matter of Nafees F., 162 A.D.3d 416, 74 N.Y.S.3d 739 [1st Dept. 2018] ).
We have considered appellant's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.