Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co.

34 Citing cases

  1. Schear v. Board of County Com'rs

    101 N.M. 671 (N.M. 1984)   Cited 146 times
    Holding that the NMTCA waived immunity where citizen was attacked after sheriff's officers negligently failed to respond to an emergency call because "law enforcement officers need not be the direct cause of injury (in the sense of having inflicted it) in order for liability to attach"

    Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts to decide. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958). Our statutes place a duty on law enforcement officers to investigate violations of the criminal law.

  2. Walker v. Gregory J. Spina, Valley Express, Inc.

    No. CIV 17-0991 JB\SCY (D.N.M. Nov. 19, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    "Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts to decide." Schear v. Bd. of Cty Comm'rs, 1984-NMSC-079, ¶ 4, 687 P.2d at 729 (citing S. Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust ProofingCo., 1958-NMSC-123, 331 P.2d 531). Once courts recognize that a duty exists, that duty triggers "a legal obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct to reduce the risk of harm to an individual or class of persons." Baxter v. Noce, 1988-NMSC-024, ¶ 11, 752 P.2d 240, 243.

  3. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Owen

    729 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 1999)   Cited 145 times
    Holding that superior knowledge of a fact is not dispositive because one party usually has greater knowledge than the other

    29 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Illinois law); Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories, 90 N.Y.2d 606, 665 N.Y.S.2d 17, 687 N.E.2d 1300 (1997); Mundy v. Department of Health Human Resources, 620 So.2d 811 (La. 1993); St. Francis Med. Center v. Superior Court, 194 Cal.App.3d 668, 239 Cal.Rptr. 765 (1987); Hayes v. Nagata, 68 Haw. 662, 730 P.2d 914 (1986); Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1980); Stabnick v. Williams Patrol Service, 151 Mich. App. 331, 390 N.W.2d 657 (1986); Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wn.2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982); Delair v. LaMoure County, 326 N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1982); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1982); Soike v. Evan Matthews Co., 302 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1981); McDonald v. Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 49 Or. App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654 (1980); Producers Grain Corp. v. Lindsay, 603 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980); Dill v. Gamble Asphalt Materials, 594 S.W.2d 719 (Tenn.App. 1979); Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 308 N.E.2d 701 (1974); Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958). In the case at bar, the jury was wrongly allowed to determine whether State Farm owed a duty to Katherine Owen. While in submitting the case of the jury, the trial judge referred to the duty, he did not state that the duty was imposed by law; he was merely summarizing Owen's allegation. He further instructed the jury:

  4. Koenig v. Perez

    104 N.M. 664 (N.M. 1986)   Cited 104 times
    Discussing a claim for negligence

    It is well established that whether a duty exists under the circumstances of a given case is a pure question of law for the court to determine. Schear v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984); Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958). Based upon the record in this case, we find that the Koenigs owed no duty to Perez concerning the alleged dangerous condition claimed to be the cause of injuries to Perez.

  5. Martinez v. Logsdon

    104 N.M. 479 (N.M. 1986)   Cited 10 times
    Refusing to apply forfeiture clause against subpurchasers without notice because a forfeiture under these circumstances would "shock the conscience"

    In our opinion, plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact; defendant, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, must submit more than a bare assertion that an issue of fact exists. See Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 40, 331 P.2d 531, 536 (1958). Under these circumstances, to permit defendant to terminate the contract, gain title to the property, and retain all payments made, would result in an "unfairness which shocks the conscience of the court."

  6. Akre v. Washburn

    92 N.M. 487 (N.M. 1979)   Cited 14 times
    In Akre v. Washburn, 590 P.2d 635 (N.M. 1979), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "where there is no specified time for the payment of loans, the action accrues upon the date of such loans."

    In a summary judgment proceeding, the burden is on the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact to submit to the fact finder, and an opposing party may not remain silent in the face of a meritorious showing by the moving party. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 40, 331 P.2d 531, 536 (1958). We have recently stated:

  7. Fidelity National Bank v. Tommy L. Goff, Inc.

    92 N.M. 106 (N.M. 1978)   Cited 24 times
    Referring to the “affirmative defense” of unconscionability

    Under this fundamental principle it has consistently been held that the burden rests upon the party moving for summary judgment to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact to submit to the court before summary judgment may properly be granted. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958). So long as one issue of material fact remains, summary judgment may not properly be granted.

  8. Air Engineering v. Corporacion de la Fonda

    91 N.M. 135 (N.M. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    In order to show that there existed no genuine issue as to any material fact, Air Engineering supported its motion for summary judgment with depositions and affidavits which stated that the air conditioning and heating system was properly designed and installed; the system was functioning properly for the first year of its operation; La Fonda failed to properly maintain the system; and that such failure caused the system to malfunction. As stated in Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 40, 331 P.2d 531, 536 (1958), In summary judgment proceedings the burden rests upon the movant to show there is no genuine issue or material fact to submit to a fact finder, be it a court or jury.

  9. Cessna Finance Corp. v. Mesilla Valley Flying Serv

    81 N.M. 10 (N.M. 1969)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that a foreign corporation in the business of financing aircraft purchases that provided credit to New Mexico clients from out-of-state did not transact business in New Mexico by enforcing liens on personal property in New Mexico

    Nevertheless, an opposing party may not remain silent in the face of a meritorious showing by a movant. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958); Srader v. Pecos Construction Company, Inc., 71 N.M. 320, 378 P.2d 364 (1963); Taylor v. Alston, 79 N.M. 643, 447 P.2d 523 (Ct.App. 1968). The rationale of summary judgment proceedings seems to be that the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; but that when he has made a prima facie showing to this effect, the opposing party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment and require a trial by a mere contention that an issue of fact exists.

  10. Shumate v. Hillis

    80 N.M. 308 (N.M. 1969)   Cited 11 times

    Federal Bldg. Serv. v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., 76 N.M. 524, 417 P.2d 24 (1966). Compare, Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958). It follows that the court erred in dismissing the complaint on motion for summary judgment, and that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, the cause remanded with instructions to set aside the order of dismissal, overrule the motion for summary judgment, and grant plaintiffs a trial on the merits.