When an insurance company seeks to invoke an exclusion contained within its policy, the insurer bears the burden of showing that the facts come within the exclusion. Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 564 (Ga. 1983); S. Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Prods. Co., 584 S.E.2d 34, 36 (Ga.Ct.App. 2003) (citing S. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 206 S.E.2d 672, 674 (Ga.Ct.App. 1974)). Exclusions in insurance contracts are to be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.

In construing an insurance contract, a court must consider it as a whole, giving effect to each provision and interpreting each provision to harmonize with the others. S. Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Prods. Co., 584 S.E.2d 34, 35-36 (Ga.Ct.App. 2003). Under Georgia law an insurance company is free to fix the terms of its policies as it sees fit as long as the terms are consistent with the law.

See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 188 Ga. App. 439, 441 (1) ( 373 SE2d 217) (1988) ("a limited or specific provision will prevail over one that is more broadly inclusive") (citation omitted). Compare Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Products Co., 261 Ga. App. 806, 809 (1) ( 584 SE2d 34) (2003) (where insurance contract may be construed two ways, the contract is construed in favor of the insured). In view of the foregoing, we find that Exclusion 7.A is unambiguous. It excludes coverage for the loss of the log books. It follows that the $1,000,000 coverage provided by Coverage A is excluded by the terms of the policy, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Amerieast and failing to grant summary judgment to ANPAC as to this issue.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Products Co., 261 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 584 SE2d 34) (2003). Owners bore the burden of proof and persuasion to show that the exclusion applied.

Connell v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 246 Ga.App. 467, 470 (1) ( 541 SE2d 403) (2000). See also Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Products Co., 261 Ga.App. 806, 807 (1) ( 584 SE2d 34) (2003) ("`The risk of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in an insurance contract must be borne by the insurer.'"). Moreover, when a term or phrase used in an insurance policy is undefined, courts look to the commonly accepted meaning of the term:

Finally, Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Products Co., 261 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 584 SE2d 34) (2003). See also OCGA § 13-2-2 (4) ("the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part").

Further, the trial court never concluded that any terms in the policy were ambiguous. Instead, the trial court noted that the term "rent" was not defined in the policy and accordingly used the widely accepted definition of the word. See Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Products Co., 261 Ga. App. 806, 808 ( 584 SE2d 34) (2003) (Absent a definition of a term in the policy, we look to the commonly accepted meaning of the term.). See also Cunningham v. Middle Ga. Mut, Ins. Co., 268 Ga. App. 181, 183 ( 601 SE2d 382) (2004) ("[I]n determining the meaning of [words used in the insurance policy], dictionaries supply the plain, ordinary, and popular sense.").

(Citation omitted.) Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Products Co., 261 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 584 SE2d 34) (2003). In the present case, coverage of "landslides" arises in the context of a policy covering "agricultural implements, combines, and tractors and equipment which is attached to or forms a part of any of these" — which clearly includes heavy, earth-moving equipment like the excavator.

That means we give effect to each provision in a way that harmonizes it with each other. S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Prods. Co., 584 S.E.2d 34, 35-36 (Ga.Ct.App. 2003).

We read the word "all" into the first clause of the definition because the plan drafters used the limiting word "some" in the second clause but not in the first. See Mountain Aire Realty, Inc. v. Birdie White Enters., Inc., 265 Ga.App. 366, 593 S.E.2d 900, 902-03 (Ga.Ct.App. 2004) ("In ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court should ascertain the parties' intent after considering the whole agreement and interpret each of the provisions so as to harmonize with the others."); see also Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Dr. T's Nature Prods. Co., 261 Ga.App. 806, 584 S.E.2d 34, 35-36 (Ga.Ct.App. 2003); cf. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2412, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) ("We normally presume that, where words differ as they differ here, Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (internal quotation marks omitted); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen Congress uses different language in similar sections, it intends different meanings.") (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have said, reading the non-equivalence clause with the definition of partial disability tells us what total disability is not. If an insured can perform all of the duties of the occupation for a substantial fraction of the work day, but not all day long, he can do them only on a part-time basis, which puts his condition within the definition of partial disability.