Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias

6 Citing cases

  1. Gibbs v. Detroit Trust Co.

    249 N.W. 862 (Mich. 1933)   Cited 2 times

    " Also, see Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256 ( 128 A. 66). Judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendant, which will recover costs.

  2. Miller Franklin Co. v. Gentry

    230 Mo. App. 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935)   Cited 6 times

    53 C.J. 158, sec. 199; 1 Clark on Receivers, sec. 789 (h), pp. 860-861; Standard v. Robert H. Reid Co., 195 N.Y. 530, 118 A.D. 504, 88 N.E. 1132, 103 N.Y.S. 521-527; Willett Olsen v. Janecke, 85 Wn. 654-657, 149 P. 17; Vanderbilt v. Central of Georgia, 43 N.J. Eq. 669, 12 A. 188. (2) The uncontradicted evidence discloses that appellant dealt with respondent only in the latter's official capacity as receiver and looked to respondent only as receiver for its compensation. Under these circumstances, there can be no recovery against respondent in his individual capacity. Greenough v. Safe Deposit Tr. Co. of Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 522, 95 A. 1053; Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256, 128 A. 66; Kansas National Bank v. Bay, 62 Kan. 692, 64 P. 596; In re Wilson's Estate, 252 Pa. 373, 374-5; Pa. Eng. Works v. New Castle Stamping Co., 259 Pa. 378, 103 A. 215. (3) There is no evidence in this record warranting admission of the documents purporting to show the amount of expenses incurred by appellant in executing the contract here involved for the reason that they were not shown to be correct and authentic. Bedwell v. Capital Mut. Assn., 66 S.W.2d 155, and cases cited. (4) The contract provides that the receiver shall pay the usual traveling and living expenses of appellant's employees incurred in connection with the performance of the contract involved herein.

  3. Emala v. Walter G. Coale, Inc.

    223 A.2d 177 (Md. 1966)   Cited 3 times
    In Emala, the testimony indicated that Coale began selling farm implements to Emala's corporation, known as Emala Associates. Several years later, Coale sought additional security and persuaded Emala to endorse the notes securing payment in an individual capacity.

    The matter usually turns on the intent and understanding of the parties. Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256; Johnson Milling Co. v. Brown, 173 Md. 366; Leahy, Executrix v. McManus, 237 Md. 450. In the case at bar the evidence leaves no doubt that Emala did not endorse the last two notes intending to be bound as an individual.

  4. Johnson v. Graff

    68 S.D. 562 (S.D. 1942)   Cited 6 times

    And it has been generally held, so far as we can determine, that where the note has not been negotiated and the payee knew at the time he obtained it that there was no authority in the agent or representative to make it, or where it was intended by both the maker and the payee at the time the note was given that there should be no personal liability upon the agent or representative, that the statute was not intended to and does not make the unauthorized agent or representative personally liable upon the note, when he signs either as agent or in a representative capacity. Annis v. Pfeiffer et al., 278 Mich. 692, 271 N.W. 568; Loveland et al. v. Hanson, 172 Wis. 627, 179 N.W. 782; Bank of Spruce Pines v. Vance et al., 205 N.C. 103, 170 S.E. 119; Eliason State Bank v. Montevideo Baseball Ass'n, 160 Minn. 341, 200 N.W. 300; Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256, 128 A. 66; Mobley, Superintendent, etc., v. Childs, 172 Ga. 723, 158 S.E. 579. Such a limitation as placed upon the application of the statute in the above cases appeals to us as sound. It cannot hamper negotiation since it does not apply to a holder in due course, and obviously it would be an unjust application to impose liability where none was intended or where the payee knew of the lack of authority.

  5. Johnson Milling Co. v. Brown

    173 Md. 366 (Md. 1938)   Cited 2 times

    In Salem First National Bank v. Jacobs, 85 W. Va. 653, 102 S.E. 491, it was held that an executor, in giving a renewal note of the testator, had avoided personal liability for the debt by signing the note in his representative character, if in so doing he disclosed by appropriate terms the name of the testator or estate for which he assumed to act. This court, in the late case of Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256, 128 A. 66, 67, held that section 39 of article 13 of the Code did not prevent persons with full knowledge of all the material facts, dealing with one in a representative capacity, from agreeing with him that he should not be personally bound by contracts executed by him in that capacity. In that case, Mathias had, by order of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, been appointed receiver for the Columbian Construction Company, which was indebted to Frock Brothers for installation of plumbing and heating apparatus for certain houses under construction.

  6. New Georgia Nat. Bank v. Lippmann

    249 N.Y. 307 (N.Y. 1928)   Cited 33 times
    In New Georgia Nat. Bank v. Lippmann (249 N.Y. 307) the court held that under section 39 of the Negotiable Instruments Law a person who signs an instrument containing or to which he adds words indicating that he signed for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, is liable on the instrument if he has signed without authority.

    rewster, and Mr. McKeehan, defending the rule against an assault upon its policy (Brannon's Negotiable Instruments Law [4th ed.], p. 163; Eaton, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 2 Mich. Law Rev. 260, 265, 272, 273; Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 Yale L.J. 84, 90; Brewster, The Negotiable Instr. L., 15 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 27, 28; McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 41 Am. Law Reg. [N.S.] 437, 462), and by commentators of great distinction dissenting in some instances as to policy, but concurring as to meaning (Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 247; 16 Harv. L. Rev. 255, 256; Williston, Contracts, vol. 2, p. 2122; Chafee, Brannon's Neg. Instr. Law, supra). There are decisions and dicta to the same effect ( Pain v. Holtcamp, 10 Fed. Rep. [2d] 443, 444; Ryan v. Hebert, 46 R.I. 47; Austin, Nichols Co. v. Gross, 98 Conn. 782; Schwab v. Getty, 145 Wn. 66; Jump v. Sparling, 218 Mass. 324, 326), though there are others to the contrary ( Southern Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256; Haupt v. Vint, 68 W. Va. 657). The subject has not before been considered in this court. We think the proviso that the agent or representative shall not be liable on the instrument "if he was duly authorized" to sign, carries with it a fair implication that he shall be so liable if not authorized. The proviso does not appear in the corresponding section of the British Bills of Exchange Act. It was inserted after debate and reflection (Eaton, Brewster, McKeehan, supra), and was meant to accomplish something.