Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan

4 Citing cases

  1. Hogan v. Woodward Iron Company

    263 Ala. 513 (Ala. 1955)   Cited 6 times
    In Hogan v. Woodward Iron Co., 263 Ala. 513, 83 So.2d 248 (1955), the court held that "[i]n the event of damage to the grave of a deceased person, the right of action, if any, accrues first to the surviving spouse, unless, of course, there are special circumstances If there is no surviving spouse the right is in the next of kin in the order of their relation to the deceased."

    In event of damage to grave of deceased person, right of action, if any, is first in surviving husband or wife, and if there is no surviving husband or wife then the right is in the next of kin in order of their relation to decedent. Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161, 168; Ex parte Southern Life Health Ins. Co., 213 Ala. 413, 105 So. 168; Jefferson County Burial Soc. v. Scott, 218 Ala. 354, 118 So. 644; Jordan Undertaking Co. v. Asberry, 230 Ala. 97, 159 So. 683; Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798; Johnson v. Kentucky-Virginia Stone Co., 286 Ky. 1, 149 S.W.2d 496; North East Coal Co. v. Wells, 253 Ky. 11, 68 S.W.2d 760; Smith Gaston Funeral Directors v. Wilson, 262 Ala. 401, 79 So.2d 48; Smith Gaston Funeral Directors v. Dean, 262 Ala. 600, 80 So.2d 227. In trespass for injury to common property all tenants in common must join as plaintiffs.

  2. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc.

    174 W. Va. 458 (W. Va. 1985)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that " cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss"

    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868 (1979); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 240, 245 (1973); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 261, 264 (1973); see Dumouchelle v. Duke University, 69 N.C. App. 471, 317 S.E.2d 100 (1984); Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 200 S.C. 288, 20 S.E.2d 733 (1942). This is usually the surviving spouse, Steagall v. Doctors Hospital, 171 F.2d 352 (D.C. 1948); Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161 (1925); Edwards v. Franke, 364 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1961); Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102 (1937); Finn v. City of New York, 70 Misc.2d 947, 335 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 76 Misc.2d 388, 350 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973); Apostle v. Pappas, 154 Misc. 497, 277 N.Y.S. 400 (1935); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 240, 243 (1973), provided that he or she was living with the decedent at the time of death, Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, supra; Steagall v. Doctors Hospital, supra; Teasley v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 165 S.W.2d 940 (1942), and has not waived his or her right. Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, supra; Teasley v. Thompson, supra; Apostle v. Pappas, supra; Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, supra. If the spouse is deceased, the cause of action passes to the next of kin, in order of relation established by the statute governing intestate succession. Teasley v. Thompson

  3. Payne v. Alabama Cemetery Ass'n, Inc.

    413 So. 2d 1067 (Ala. 1982)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that where “the act complained of does not itself inflict a legal injury at the time it is done, but plaintiff's injury only follows as a result and a subsequent development of the defendant's act . . . the cause of action ‘accrues,' and the statute of limitation begins to run, when and only when, the damages are sustained.”

    The plaintiff, being the nearest relative present, is a proper party to bring the action in tort, irrespective of any other possible theory of recovery. Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So.2d 161, cert. denied, 213 Ala. 413, 105 So. 168 (1925). Appellees allege, as another ground for affirmance, however, that appellant's non-trespass claim is barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations.

  4. Chaney v. Ala West-AL, LLC

    22 So. 3d 488 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    Recognizing that a two year statute of limitation applies to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and tort of outrage

    The plaintiff, being the nearest relative present, is a proper party to bring the action in tort, irrespective of any other possible theory of recovery. Southern Life Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala.App. 5, 105 So. 161, cert. denied, 213 Ala. 413, 105 So. 168 (1925). Appellees allege, as another ground for affirmance, however, that [the plaintiff]'s non-trespass claim is barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations. . . .