E. g. Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 1935, 51 Ga. App. 781, 181 S.E. 498. Thus, the issue here is whether the trial court properly held that the evidence conclusively established that Teasley had not resumed the discharge of his duties at the time of the accident. In Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 1954, 89 Ga. App. 810, 81 S.E.2d 488, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that facts substantially similar to those of the case at bar authorized a jury finding that an employee-driver was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of an automobile accident. Bowman, a salesman and serviceman for Southern Gas, collided with the plaintiff while driving home in a company-owned car roughly two hours after his last call of the day.

Id. at 709-710 (1). See, e.g., Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810, 811-813 (1) ( 81 SE2d 488) (1954) (evidence that employer provided employee with company vehicle and authorized him to use it for personal needs coupled with fact that employee was on call at all hours of the night and day sustained finding that employee was acting within scope of employment at time of accident). 2.

All we decide in the instant case is that, under the evidence presented here, the presumption does not arise as the result of appellant's payment of the $75.00 per month oil and gas allowance to Mr. Reeves. "In Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810 ( 81 S.E.2d 488) (1954) and other cases relied upon by [appellee] to assert that [Mr. Reeves] was acting within the scope of his employment, the employees in question were operating vehicles owned by their employers. In such cases, a presumption arises that an employee involved in a collision while operating his employer's vehicle is acting within the scope of his employment.

Evidence was undisputed that Miller took no calls and performed no service for his employer on the weekend of the accident. In Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810 ( 81 S.E.2d 488) (1954) and other cases relied upon by appellant to assert that Miller was acting within the scope of this employment, the employees in question were operating vehicles owned by their employers. In such cases, a presumption arises that an employee involved in a collision while operating his employer's vehicle is acting within the scope of his employment.

Thus, the appellant received the benefit in this case of about 4 hours overtime in exchange for an evening meal. Clearly under the facts peculiar to this case the jury was entitled to find that Mr. Herfurth's dining out and journey home were within the scope of his employment. See Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810 ( 81 S.E.2d 488) and Bailey v. Murray, 88 Ga. App. 491 ( 77 S.E.2d 103). The evidence in this case did not demand a verdict for the appellant and the trial judge did not err in denying the motions for a directed verdict. As has been repeatedly held by this court, "[W]hether or not the servant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the injury is usually a jury question.

Although there had been a deviation by the servant from his usual route home, he had returned to it before the accident occurred. Likewise, the case of Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810 ( 81 S.E.2d 488) is distinguishable. The rationale of these cases is apparent from the assertion of the court in Cowan at page 812: "We do not mean to say that, after Bowman [the servant] once arrived at his home then on any subsequent trip and return home for his personal convenience or pleasure he would be within the scope of his employment.

Evidence must relate to the issues made by the pleadings, and unless it bears some reasonable relation to these issues, it ought not to be admitted. Bower v. Douglass, 25 Ga. 714 (2); Peagler v. Davis, 143 Ga. 11, 16 (5) ( 84 S.E. 59); Hawkins v. Hodges, 213 Ga. 837, 841 (3) ( 102 S.E.2d 16); Kelly v. Malone, 5 Ga. App. 618 (2) ( 63 S.E. 639); Chattahoochee Valley Ry. Co. v. Bass, 9 Ga. App. 83 (8) ( 70 S.E. 683); Davenport v. Whittier Mills Co., 74 Ga. App. 495, 497 ( 40 S.E.2d 148); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Sellars, 89 Ga. App. 293 (2), 297 ( 79 S.E.2d 35); Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810 (2), 813 ( 81 S.E.2d 488). The evidence rejected did not reasonably tend to prove the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, and, not being otherwise admissible, it was not error for the court to reject it. 4. The fourth special ground of the motion for a new trial complains of the following portion of the charge: "Now, gentlemen, I charge you in this case that if you find that both of the defendants are not liable you would go no further in your investigation but would return a verdict in favor of both of the defendants. If you find that one of the defendants is not liable then that same rule would apply and you would go no further but would return a verdict in favor of that defendant."

CARLISLE, Judge. 1. It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the allegations of count 2 of the petition and specifically of paragraph 10 and paragraph 22 thereof brought the case, insofar as that count is concerned, within the rules announced in such cases as Bailey v. Murray, 88 Ga. App. 491 ( 77 S.E.2d 103), and Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810 ( 81 S.E.2d 488), and Harris v. Price, 95 Ga. App. 521, 523 ( 98 S.E.2d 118), in which cases it was held in effect that where an employer furnishes an employee an automobile for the employee's use in performing a part or all of his duties as incident to his employment with the employer, and also permits the employee to use the automobile, when not performing his duties, for his own personal pleasure and convenience, and when the employee is engaged in an activity incidental to his employment, even though there may be some element of such activity involving the employee's own personal pleasure or convenience, that the employer will be liable for injury negligently inflicted by the employee while so using the automobile. Count 2 of the petition in the instant case, however, does not allege such a case against the defendants here.