Although Arkansas case law supports the proposition that a § 23-79-208(a) demand may be amended after the filing of the lawsuit, to this Court's knowledge no court has ever accepted a purported demand that was made outside the context of a formal writing or otherwise made in open court. See Stamps, 363 S.W.3d at 5-6; S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker, 84 S.W.3d 846, 848-49 (Ark. 2002); McAlister v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 2:03-cv-02190-RTD, 2006 WL 6640380, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 26, 2006). Further, based on the record before the Court, the parties dispute whether Carlisle communicated its intent to abandon claims for lost profits against United.

The penalty and attorneys' fees is for the benefit of the one who is only seeking to recover, after demand, what is due him under the terms of his contract, and who is compelled to resort to the courts to obtain it. However, in Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker, 350 Ark. 15, 20, 84 S.W.3d 846, 848-49 (2002), the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished National Standard, which denied the penalty as outside the twenty-percent range holding that because the plaintiff had never amended its complaint to reflect the reduced amount owed by the insurance company, the plaintiff was tied to the amount asked for in the complaint. However, in Brinker, the insured sent a letter to the insurer demanding payment of the remaining $75,000.00.

" Ford Motor Co. v. Washington , 2013 Ark. 510, at 21, 431 S.W.3d 210, 222. "Public policy dictates that postjudgment interest is awarded by the courts in order ‘to compensate the judgment creditor for the fact that he has not had the use of a certain sum of money that has been adjudged to be his.’ " S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.Co. v. Brinker , 350 Ark. 15, 21, 84 S.W.3d 846, 849 (2002) (citing Equifax, Inc. v. Luster , 463 F.Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978) ).Daniel primarily relies on federal cases to support her argument that postjudgment interest accrues from the judgment that establishes the right to recover attorney's fees. Yet these cases involve the interpretation of a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

Because State Farm refused that demand, the case went to trial.          In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brinker, 350 Ark. 15, 84 S.W.3d 846 (2002), we held that although Brinker's complaint had sought one amount, she later filed an amended complaint and sent a demand letter reducing that amount and, therefore, was entitled to penalties and fees pursuant to the statute when the jury awarded her that reduced amount. State Farm cites this case to support that a later demand for judgment is controlling to determine whether a demand is within twenty percent of the amount awarded.

Whereas the policy behind prejudgment interest is to encourage prompt settlement and to impose a civil sanction against a party who holds money against the lawful claim of another, the policy behind postjudgment interest is "`to compensate the judgment creditor for the fact that he has not had the use of a certain sum of money that has been adjudged to be his.'" S. Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker (2002), 350 Ark. 15, 21, 84 S.W.3d 846, quoting Equifax, Inc. v. Luster (E.D.Ark. 1978) , 463 F. Supp. 352. Indeed, Ohio case law has consistently recognized that R.C. 1343.03(A) bestows a right to postjudgment interest "automatically * * * as a matter of law." Testa v. Roberts (1988), 44 Ohio App.3d 161, 542 N.E.2d 654, paragraph seven of the syllabus; see, also, Cafaro Northwest Partnership v. White (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 605, 608, 707 N.E.2d 4; Dayton Sec. Assoc. v. Avutu (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 559, 566, 664 N.E.2d 954.

{¶ 29} It is well-established that R.C. 1343.03(A) automatically bestows a right to postjudgment interest. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shimola v. Cleveland (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 110, 112; Judy v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 100 Ohio St.3d 122, 2003-Ohio-5277, at ¶ 32, quoting S. Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker (2002), 350 Ark. 15, 21, 84 S.W.3d 846; State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators' Labor Council v. Cleveland, 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-Ohio-3831, at ¶ 84. The fact that a judgment was based on a negotiated agreement does not diminish a party's entitlement to postjudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03.

State Farm claims that the holding in Edwards is that the application of section 23-79-208 is triggered by "the actual recovery which the insured seeks at trial, not a set sum in any pre-trial filing." We disagree with this characterization of the holding in Edwards as several Arkansas cases have held that a "pre-trial filing" triggered section 23-79-208. see Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker, 350 Ark. 15, 84 S.W.3d 846 (2002); Westbrooks, supra; See also R.J. "Bob" Jones Excavating Contractor, Inc., supra; Southern Pine Helicopters, Inc. v. Phoenix Aviation Mangers, Inc., 358 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Arkansas law). Furthermore, there are critical factual distinctions between Edwards and the instant case. In Edwards, prior to trial there was no specific amount of money that was demanded or sought in the pleadings or any other document.

The majority has thus elevated form over substance, a practice that our courts have routinely criticized and refused to countenance. See Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker, 350 Ark. 15, 84 S.W.3d 846 (2002); Glover v. Woodhaven Homes, Inc., 346 Ark. 397, 57 S.W.3d 211 (2001); Tapp v. Fowler, 291 Ark. 309, 724 S.W.2d 176 (1987). Because I believe it is quite clear that the trial court intended to and in fact did dismiss all pending claims in the lawsuit, I respectfully dissent from the majority's dismissal of this appeal. I am authorized to state that Judge Hart joins in this dissent.