Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC351986, Elizabeth Allen White, Judge.
Hill, Farrer & Burrill and Dean E. Dennis for Defendant and Appellant.
Hershorin & Henry, Lori C. Hershorin, Patrick Reider; Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, Deborah M. Rosenthal, Gregory W. Woodard; and Douglas P. Ditonto for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
In 1971, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) was planning to build the Interstate 210 freeway (210 freeway). It needed land being used by respondent Southern California Edison (Edison) for electrical transmission lines. To facilitate the relocation of the electrical transmission lines, Caltrans condemned various parcels of adjacent land. As to parcel 47195-1, Caltrans condemned a right of way for electrical transmission lines. At the same time, Caltrans condemned a temporary grading easement across parcel 47195-3. The two parcels overlap. In 2000, Caltrans deeded parcel 47195-1 to Edison. In a cross-complaint below, appellant Tatt Corporation (Tatt) alleged that Caltrans’s interest in the overlap area was temporary, the interest expired in the 1970’s, and that Tatt was current owner of the overlap area instead of Edison. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Edison and the lessee of parcel 47195-1, respondent RHC Communities, Inc. (RHC). On appeal, Tatt contends that the trial court erred. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
Background
In 1925, Elsie Bosbyshell Adams and E. Bennett Adams owned Block 56 of the Maclay Rancho Ex Mission De San Fernando (Maclay Rancho), a 40-acre parcel of land. They granted a 150 foot wide right-of-way across the middle of their property to Edison in fee simple.
“Mcclay” in Maclay Rancho is sometimes spelled “McClay” in the record.
In the 1970s, Caltrans acquired the southwest portion of the Maclay Rancho and part of Edison’s right of way for the 210 Freeway. As a result, Edison needed a new right of way. To accommodate Edison, Caltrans condemned certain parts of the northeast portion of the Maclay Rancho.
The final order of condemnation was recorded on October 7, 1971. It provided that “the following described real property... be condemned for State highway purposes, in fee simple absolute unless a lesser estate is described.” The following property was described by the final order of condemnation: as to parcel 47194, “[a]n electrical transmission line right of way in fee for State highway purposes”; as to parcel 47195-1, “[a]n electrical transmission line right of way in fee for State highway purposes”; parcel 47195-2 “[f]or State highway purposes”; and, as to parcel 47195-3, “[a] temporary grading easement for State highway purposes.” Parcel 47195-3 overlays a portion of parcel 47195-1 (overlap area). The rights acquired as to parcel 47195-3 were to terminate upon the earlier of the opening of the highway to public travel or March 1, 1973.
In 1977, Caltrans deeded a narrow strip of parcel 47195-1 along Lopez Canyon Channel (Lopez Canyon strip) to Edison. That narrow strip stretched from Van Nuys Boulevard to the northernmost triangular piece of parcel 47195-1 (Lopez Canyon triangle). The Lopez Canyon strip and the Lopez Canyon Triangle do not overlap parcel 47195-3. In 2000, Caltrans deeded several parcels to Edison. Parcel 3 in the Caltrans deed was the land described as parcel 47194 in the final order of condemnation. It is an obtuse angled and triangular piece of land northeast of the Lopez Canyon Channel. Parcel 4 in the Caltrans deed included the Lopez Canyon triangle and the overlap area—that portion of parcel 47195-1 that was overlaid by parcel 47195-3.
According to Tatt, Lopez Canyon Channel is a flood control channel.
In 2001, Tatt obtained a deed (Tatt deed) from Blue Star Park, the successor in interest to the Maclay Rancho lands. The Tatt deed was described as the portion of Block 56 of the Maclay Rancho lying northeasterly of Edison’s original right-of-way but excepting, among other pieces of land, “that portion of said land lying Easterly of the Westerly line and its Northerly prolongation[] of that certain parcel of land designated as Parcel 47195-1 in the Final Order of Condemnation [e]ntered... [on] October 7, 1971.”
Edison and RHC’s quite title action
Edison entered into an agreement for RHC to develop parcel 4 in the Caltrans deed as a self-storage facility. Tatt tried to block the development on the theory that it interfered with Tatt’s irrigation easement and floating road easement. Edison and RHC sued Tatt for declaratory relief and quiet title. Tatt filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief and quiet title on the theory that it, not Edison, owned the overlap area.
Edison and RHC filed a joint motion for summary judgment as to their complaint. Edison filed a separate motion for summary judgment to address the cross-complaint. As part of its opposition, Tatt submitted a declaration from David E. Woolley (Woolley). He assumed that the final order of condemnation granted Caltrans the land described as parcel 47195-1 except the overlap area, i.e., it only received the Lopez Channel triangle and the Lopez Channel strip. Woolley opined that the Tatt deed included the overlap area. Edison and RHC objected to those portions of Woolley’s declaration. The objections were sustained.
The motions were granted and judgment was entered.
Tatt challenges the summary judgment ruling regarding its cross-complaint. It does not challenge the other rulings. Tatt requested that we take judicial notice of the March 15, 2007, opinion of the California Public Utilities Commission granting approval of Edison’s lease to RHC. We hereby grant Tatt’s request under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is subject to independent review. (San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gallagher (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 501, 503.) The following strictures apply: “We first identify the issues framed by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond. Secondly, we determine whether the moving party has established facts which negate the opponents’ claim and justify a judgment in the movant’s favor. Finally, if the summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, we determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.]” (Torres v. Reardon (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 831, 836.)
DISCUSSION
1. The Tatt deed.
Unless the Tatt deed included the overlap area, Tatt’s claim of ownership must fail. According to Tatt, the Tatt deed did include the overlap area. Edison and RHC argue that because all of parcel 47195-1 was excluded from the Tatt deed, the overlap area was necessarily excluded.
We agree with Edison and RHC.
Deeds are interpreted under the same rules that govern other contracts. (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238; Civ. Code, § 1066.) If possible, we must give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (§ 1636.) The language of a contract governs its interpretation as long as the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity. (§ 1638.) Subject to the other rules in the Civil Codes, the intent of parties to a written contract should be ascertained from the contract alone. (§ 1639.)
All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
When a contract’s interpretation is in dispute, “‘the first question to be decided is whether the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged by the party. If it is not, the case is over. [Citation.] If the court decides the language is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged, the court moves to the second question: what did the parties intend the language to mean?’” (Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fidelity Federal Bank (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448.)
The Tatt deed is clear and explicit. It excludes all portions of the parcel of land designated as parcel 47195-1 in the final order of condemnation. Specifically, it excludes all land east of the westerly boundary and the northerly prolongation of parcel 47195-1. In our view, Tatt has no claim to the overlap area. The Tatt deed is not reasonably susceptible to any other interpretation.
Where we find clarity, Tatt finds ambiguity. It queries: “Is the ‘Westerly line and Northerly prolongation’ of land designated as Parcel 47195-1 the original westerly line, including the ‘overlap area’? Or is the westerly line referred to in 2001 the westerly line excluding the overlap area?”
Tatt does not provide any legal analysis. Nor does Tatt argue that an ambiguity, if there is one, requires a reversal. All Tatt argues is that the trial court should not have sustained the objections to Woolley’s declaration. Thus, the argument is insufficiently developed. (Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11.) Nonetheless, we wish to be complete. The problem for Tatt is that the Tatt deed is not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that the referenced westerly line is only that of the Lopez Canyon strip. This is for the simple reason that the Lopez Canyon strip is only a part of parcel 47195-1. The Tatt deed unambiguously excludes the entirety of the land described as parcel 47195-1 in the final order of condemnation. That legal description is frozen in time.
Tatt seems to suggest that if the final order of condemnation only gave Caltrans a temporary easement as to the overlap area, then the Tatt deed should be interpreted as covering the overlap area. But even assuming for the sake of argument that Caltrans did not condemn the overlap area in fee in 1971 and it was legally unable to transfer the overlap area to Edison in 2000, Tatt would have no claim to it. The Tatt deed still excludes the land described as parcel 47195-1 in the final order of condemnation recorded in 1971.
Woolley declared that it is a common practice in the survey industry to describe “as one parcel except another parcel, i.e., the property described as Parcel A except the property described as Parcel B.” He then assumed that the final order of condemnation granted property “described as parcel 47195-1 except the Overlapping Parcel” and that, as a result, the westerly line referred to in the Tatt deed was the westerly portion of parcel 47195-1 that did not overlap parcel 47195-3. We need not determine whether this portion of his declaration was objectionable. Even if it had been admitted, it would not have carried the day. The final order of condemnation did not describe parcel 47195-1 as excepting the property described as parcel 47195-3. Thus, Woolley’s assumption was erroneous.
2. The final order of condemnation.
Even if we ignored the foregoing analysis, Tatt’s appeal would still fail. Tatt questions whether the final order of condemnation created a fee interest or a grading easement with respect to the overlap area. We conclude that it created a fee interest and the overlap area is owned by Edison.
A court order is interpreted under the same rules for interpreting writings in general. (Herman Feil, Inc. v. Design Center of Los Angeles (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1414; Verdier v. Verdier (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 190, 193.) The language of a writing governs if it is clear and explicit. But when it is susceptible “to two interpretations, the court should give the construction that will make the [writing] lawful, operative, definite, reasonable and capable of being carried into effect and avoid an interpretation that will make the [writing] extraordinary, harsh, unjust, inequitable or which would result in absurdity.” (Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 726, 730.)
The final order of condemnation is susceptible to two interpretations. On the one hand, it could be interpreted as providing a fee interest as to parcel 47195-1 and extinguishing the temporary grading easement in the overlap area pursuant to section 811. On the other hand, it could be interpreted as granting a temporary grading easement in the overlap area because that is the lesser described estate for that land. Our task is to resolve this ambiguity.
A servitude is extinguished by “the vesting of the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same person.” (§ 811, subd. (1).)
The prelude to the description of the parcels decrees that the property described “be condemned to plaintiff for State highway purposes[] in fee simple absolute unless a lesser estate is described.” Parcel 47194 and parcel 47195-1 are specifically described as fee interests. The prelude and parcel descriptions thereby indicate that parcel 47194, parcel 47195-1, and parcel 47195-2 were condemned in fee. Certain rights were excluded from these parcels. For example, as to parcel 47195-1, mineral rights below 100 feet were excluded. But the description did not exclude an area from parcel 47195-1, nor did the description exclude any easements. In particular, parcel 47195-1 did not exclude the land described as parcel 47195-3. If parcel 47195-3 is removed from the equation, the interpretation is simple: the entirety of parcel 47195-1 was condemned in fee for Caltrans’s benefit.
The question remains, however, whether the description of parcel 47195-3 qualifies the description of parcel 47195-1. We think not. The final order of condemnation does not indicate that the description of each parcel is anything but self-contained. If they were supposed to cross-reference each other, the final order of condemnation presumably would have said so. Moreover, the description of parcel 47195-1 would have excluded the overlap area. Under this interpretation, the overlap area is settled by Civil Code section 811. In other words, the law automatically merged the temporary grading easement into the fee simple interest. This makes the final order of condemnation reasonable and capable of being carried into effect, and it avoids an extraordinary interpretation. Further, our analysis recognizes that the condemnation action worked to replace Edison’s original electrical transmission corridor with one that was aligned a little further east. If Tatt’s interpretation were accepted, Edison would no longer have a commensurate corridor, and it would no longer have access to the land beneath its high tension wires.
The opposite interpretation would be unreasonable because it would render the description of parcel 47195-1 as a fee interest a fiction as it relates to the overlap area. And, contrary, to section 811, it would suggest that the greater estate was absorbed into the lesser estate. Based on our independent analysis, we conclude that Tatt cannot assert a valid claim to the overlap area.
According to Tatt, a plaintiff must provide “a sufficient description of [the property] it proposes... to acquire.... And the judgment, which cannot include what is not in the pleadings, constitutes its muniment of title.” (Aliso Water Company v. Baker (1892) 95 Cal. 268, 270 (Aliso); Sacramento Etc. Municipal Dist. v. Pac. G. & E. Co. (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 638, 650 [the description in the judgment must follow the description in the complaint or award].) Further, before a public entity can condemn property, it “must adopt a resolution of necessity that includes a description of the general location and extent of the property taken. [Citations.] The resolution of necessity conclusively establishes the extent of the taking. [Citation.] If the judgment and resolution are in conflict[,] the wording of the resolution controls. [Citations.]” (County of San Diego v. Bressi (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 112, 122.)
A muniment is a document by which rights are created.
Based on Aliso, Tatt argues that in 1971 Caltrans bore the burden of describing the property it was taking “with exactness.” But Tatt did not cite any law establishing when a description is sufficiently exact or why Caltrans’s description did not meet that standard. Unmade arguments are deemed forfeited. (Tan v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 800, 811.) Also, Tatt does not provide a cite to Caltrans’s description. If Tatt is referring to the description in the final order of condemnation, we conclude that it is sufficient.
Next, Tatt argues that by overlaying parcel 47195-1 with the temporary grading easement, Caltrans necessarily condemned only the lesser estate. To bolster its position, Tatt asks us to consider the following: (1) if Caltrans condemned all of parcel 47195-1 in fee, it had no reason to condemn a temporary grading easement for the overlap area; (2) Edison did not need a fee interest in the overlap area; and (3) Caltrans drew the temporary grading easement to exclude an access road and the land where the transmission tower would be located.
We have a multi-pronged response. To start, Tatt did not cite any law regarding the interpretation of a court order. An argument unsupported by law or analysis may be deemed waived. (Associated Builders & Contractors Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 366.) Whether Caltrans had a reason to condemn two overlapping parcels and allow the overlap area to be merged into the greater estate is moot. What matters is the final order of condemnation. And, in any event, Tatt did not cite any evidence regarding Caltrans’s reasoning or the contents of its resolution of necessity. Absent case authority requiring us to consider Edison’s particular needs, we will not consider them. Why Caltrans drew the temporary grading easement to exclude the Lopez Canyon strip is not relevant.
Moving on, Tatt complains that there is no explanation for why it took nearly 30 years for Caltrans to deed parcel 47195-1 to Edison. Tatt suggests that Caltrans’s 1991 conveyance of the Lopez Canyon strip confirms that Caltrans did not have a fee interest in the overlap area to convey. In its reply brief, Tatt argues that Caltrans’s course of performance demonstrates that Caltrans did not believe that it owned a fee interest. These arguments are unavailing. Caltrans eventually deeded the overlap area to Edison. This demonstrates that Caltrans believed it was the owner. That Caltrans delayed making this transfer does not alter our conclusion.
All other arguments are moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Edison and RHC shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., DOI TODD, J.