Opinion
No. 86-864
Decided March 25, 1987.
Declaratory judgments — Court order does not affirmatively direct parties how to proceed — Uncertain judgment entry cannot be basis for finding of contempt, when.
O.Jur 3d Contempt § 43. O.Jur 3d Declaratory Judgments §§ 18, 42.
In a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of an ordinance, an entry granting judgment to plaintiffs without expressly directing the defendants to do, or refrain from doing, a particular thing or things, cannot be the basis of finding the defendants in contempt upon the enactment of subsequent legislation, allegedly containing the same or similar infirmities.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
Since 1973, the city of South Euclid, Ohio has passed several ordinances for the purpose of regulating the sick-leave benefits of the police and fire fighters employed by the municipality. Also since 1973, the instant appellants, the South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80, and the South Euclid Fire Fighters Association, Local 1065, have on several occasions judicially attacked these attempts by the city to limit their sick-leave benefits.
In 1981, the city passed Ordinance No. 49-80. Appellants' declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of that ordinance resulted in a judgment in favor of the appellees, the city of South Euclid and its mayor (hereinafter collectively termed "the city"). On appeal, the court of appeals on November 7, 1983 reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that Ordinance No. 49-80 was unconstitutional because the city could not abridge rights granted to the appellants by R.C. 124.38. The court of appeals remanded the cause to the trial court and directed it to enter final judgment in favor of appellants. South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police v. D'Amico (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 46, 13 OBR 49, 468 N.E.2d 735. The trial court entered judgment accordingly on May 4, 1984.
The principal provision that the appellate court found objectionable sought to prohibit sick-leave benefits for injuries incurred by police and fire fighters during outside employment.
R.C. 124.38 provides that county, municipal and other specified employees are entitled to certain amounts of paid sick leave, and sets forth the procedure for the use of sick leave.
The court of appeals' mandate failed to include a specific reference to appellant South Euclid Fire Fighters Association, Local 1065. However, pursuant to the appellate court's remand, the trial court's entry refers to the fire fighters association.
On December 26, 1984, the city passed Ordinance No. 29-84, again for the purpose of regulating the sick-leave benefits. The instant cause began with a motion filed by appellants in February 1985 wherein they requested that the trial court hold the city in contempt, arguing that the enactment of Ordinance No. 29-84 was in contravention of the previous entry of the trial court of May 4, 1984. On May 20, 1985, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the city had committed no act in violation of previous court orders. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, concluding that neither its order of November 7, 1983 nor the trial court's order of May 4, 1984 did anything other than to declare Ordinance No. 49-80 invalid, and thus there was no order that the city could have violated.
We note that William J. Brown, in his capacity as Attorney General of the state of Ohio, was a party to the original declaratory judgment action in the trial court, and that appellants' motion for contempt was filed under the same case number as that action. William J. Brown was succeeded as Attorney General by Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. However, the motion for contempt that generated the instant appeal was not directed to the Attorney General.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. and William F. Schmitz, for appellants.
Victor E. DeMarco and Robert P. DeMarco, for appellees.
The issue before this court is whether there was a court order in existence on December 26, 1984 that could form a basis for holding the city in contempt when it enacted Ordinance No. 29-84 on that date. We conclude that there was no such order and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
To begin our analysis, we observe that appellants' challenge to Ordinance No. 49-80 was in the form of a declaratory judgment action. Appellants were seeking a declaration from the trial court concerning their rights under that ordinance, as permitted by R.C. 2721.03. While the trial court found for the city, the court of appeals declared the ordinance unconstitutional and directed the trial court to enter judgment for appellants. We agree with the court below that there is no order of record that affirmatively directs the city to act or to refrain from taking any action concerning sick-leave benefit ordinances.
R.C. 2721.03 provides, inter alia, that any person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a municipal ordinance may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such ordinance and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
R.C. 2705.02 reads in pertinent part:
"A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for a contempt:
"(A) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or an officer[.]"
In Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 56 O.O. 2d 31, 271 N.E.2d 815, this court held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
"Contempt of court is defined as disobedience of an order of a court. It is conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions."
In the instant case, there was no court order of record affirmatively directing how the city was to proceed in regard to ordinances regulating the appellants' sick-leave benefits. Therefore, we hold that in a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of an ordinance, an entry granting judgment to plaintiffs without expressly directing the defendants to do, or refrain from doing, a particular thing or things, cannot be the basis of finding the defendants in contempt upon the enactment of subsequent legislation, allegedly containing the same or similar infirmities. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
In so holding, we do not address the question of whether the ordinance sub judice was enacted in contravention of R.C. 124.38.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
HILDEBRANDT, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for HOLMES, J.
I concur with today's holding that there can be no finding of contempt against a defendant for failure to comply with a court order where, as here, no order directing the defendant to act or refrain from acting has been issued.
I write separately to express my concerns with the city's course of conduct with regard to sick-leave benefits for its safety forces. The city's persistent efforts, in the face of repeated judicial remonstrance, to curtail such benefits or limit their availability in a manner contrary to state law strike me as unseemly at best. It is disconcerting to discover that a city, which we would naturally expect to abide by the spirit as well as the letter of the law, would engage in such a relentless campaign. One can only hope that the continuing specter of costly litigation will encourage the city to exercise more restraint in drafting future ordinances in this area.
WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring opinion.