We are not persuaded by Overstreet's argument, as relates to the length of an interruption, that an interruption of only four months is as a matter of law not a substantial interruption. The holding in South East Coal Company v. Caudill, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 62, was not that any interruption of less than six months was as a matter of law not a substantial interruption; the holding was that any interruption of as much as six months was as a matter of law a substantial interruption. And the decision in Young v. Jones, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 268, negatives the proposition that an interruption of less than six months cannot be a substantial one.
The law is and has been all along that a workman must qualify for benefits under KRS 342.316(4) before the Marsillett case comes into play. This court said in South East Coal Co. v. Caudill, 465 S.W.2d 62 at page 65: "If the result is harsh, it has been made so by legislative declaration that must be given some respect and by judicial interpretations that were made to benefit the employee in other aspects to assure that he would be compensated. . . ."
We reverse. KRS 342.316(4), as construed in Inland Steel Company v. Terry, Ky., 464 S.W.2d 284, and in Southeast Coal Company v. Caudell, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 62 (1971) and as applied in Carco Mining Company v. Ely, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 265 (1971), requires that the claimant prove that he was exposed to the hazards of the disease for at least two years immediately preceding disability as the term "disability" has been construed by this court in occupational disease cases. He must also show that the continuity of exposure during that time was without substantial interruption regardless of where the claimant was or what he was doing during the period or periods of such interruption.
For a full discussion of this question see Inland Steel Company v. Terry, Ky., 464 S.W.2d 284 (reh. den. March 26, 1971). Also, South East Coal Company v. Caudill, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 62, rendered March 26, 1971. Since Ely failed to prove that he suffered exposure in Kentucky for at least two years immediately preceding disability as the term disability has been construed by this court, we are of the opinion the claim should have been dismissed. The judgment is reversed with directions that the cause be remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Board for dismissal.
What constitutes substantial interruption of the required exposure is basically a factual question for the board unless, of course, the facts are so clear that it can be determined as a matter of law. See South East Coal Company v. Caudill, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 62 (decided March 26, 1971). Summing up this particular case, the dispositive shortcoming is that since there is no evidence of when the claimant became disabled it cannot be found that his injurious exposure subsisted over the period of two years next before that time.