Opinion
Case No. 5:19-cv-00962-HNJ
2020-02-20
S.C., as parent/guardian of P.C., a minor, Plaintiff v. HUNTSVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, Defendant
James D. Sears, Sears & Sears PC, Hoover, AL, Shane T. Sears, Sears & Sears PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff. Christopher M. Pape, Rodney C. Lewis, LaNier Ford Shaver & Payne PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant.
James D. Sears, Sears & Sears PC, Hoover, AL, Shane T. Sears, Sears & Sears PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.
Christopher M. Pape, Rodney C. Lewis, LaNier Ford Shaver & Payne PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HERMAN N. JOHNSON, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, S.C., who proceeds in her capacity as parent/guardian of P.C., a minor student, filed a Complaint for Attorney's Fees against Defendant Huntsville City Schools (or rather, Huntsville City Board of Education) pursuant to § 615 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a)(1)(i), and Alabama Administrative Code § 290-8-9.08(9)(c)(17). (Doc. 1). This memorandum opinion addresses the Board's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). As discussed below, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Plaintiff's settlement agreement under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) and 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii), and jurisdiction also fails as to a breach-of-contract claim due to lack of diversity jurisdiction. However, the court possesses federal question subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cause of action seeking attorney's fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) because the administrative hearing officer incorporated the parties' settlement agreement into his final order, thus rendering Plaintiff a prevailing party. Therefore, the court will deny the Board's motion to dismiss. Upon contact with the parties, the court will convene a hearing to discuss the most efficient path to proceed with this action.
S.C. received the court's permission to proceed anonymously. (Doc. 5).
S.C.'s Complaint named "Huntsville City Schools" as the Defendant. (Doc. 1). However, the Settlement Agreement at issue bore the names of P.C. and "Huntsville City Board of Education." (Doc. 8-1). In its Motion to Dismiss and Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss, Defendant refers to itself as "the Board," but it does not request to substitute the Huntsville Board of Education for the Huntsville City Schools. (See Doc. 8; Doc. 13). This court, like Defendant, will treat the Huntsville City Schools and the Huntsville City Board of Education as interchangeable entities.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and, as such, possess the power to hear cases only as authorized by the Constitution or United States' laws. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). "[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case." Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a district court to dismiss a case for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction. OSI, Inc. v. United States , 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Thomson v. Gaskill , 315 U.S. 442, 446, 62 S.Ct. 673, 86 L.Ed. 951 (1942) ; Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp. , 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) ).
The Eleventh Circuit establishes particular modes of review for Rule 12(b)(1) challenges to subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) can be based upon either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. If the challenge is facial, the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised ... Accordingly, the court must consider the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true ...
A facial attack on the complaint requires the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion ... Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered. Furthermore, ... the district court has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.
McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty. , 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing, inter alia , Williamson v. Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981) ; Lawrence v. Dunbar , 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) ) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Therefore, a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction typically permits a "trial court ... to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Williamson , 645 F.2d at 413. No presumptive truthfulness would attach to a plaintiff's claims, and "the existence of disputed material facts [would] not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Id. ; see also Lawrence , 919 F.2d at 1529.
When "a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena , 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) ); Harris v. Board of Trustees Univ. of Ala. , 846 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229-30 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (court considered Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge before addressing Rule 12(b)(6) arguments).
All decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981, constitute binding precedent on this Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits a court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Court revisited the applicable standard governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. First, courts must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state the applicable claims at issue. Id. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
After establishing the elements of the claim at issue, the court identifies all well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and assumes their veracity. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Well-pleaded factual allegations do not encompass mere "labels and conclusions," legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or formulaic recitations and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings, the court may draw reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc. , 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005).
Third, a court assesses the complaint's well-pleaded allegations to determine if they state a plausible cause of action based upon the identified claim's elements. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Plausibility ensues "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," and the analysis involves a context-specific task requiring a court "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 678, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations omitted). The plausibility standard does not equate to a "probability requirement," yet it requires more than a "mere possibility of misconduct" or factual statements that are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability." Id. at 678, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations omitted).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The IDEA requires any "State educational agency, Stage agency, or local educational agency" that receives federal funding to "establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this section to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.500 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9). Those procedures include the opportunity to present an administrative due process complaint "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(a)(1)(i).
The state or local educational agency must establish procedures for the optional mediation of due process complaints. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(a) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(b). The mediation process must be voluntary and must protect the parties' rights, and a qualified, impartial mediator with appropriate training must conduct the proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b)(1) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(b)(2).
In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the complaint through the mediation process, the parties shall execute a legally binding agreement that sets forth such resolution and that –
(i) states that all discussions that occurred during the mediation process shall be confidential and may not be used as evidence in any subsequent due process hearing or civil proceeding;
(ii) is signed by both the parent and a representative of the agency who has the authority to bind such agency; and
(iii) is enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F) ; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506(a), (b)(6) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(b)(6).
The statute entitles each disabled child who files an administrative complaint to an "impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) ; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.511(a), (b) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c).
Prior to the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing under subparagraph (A), the local educational agency shall convene a meeting with the parents and the relevant member or members of the IEP Team who have specific knowledge of the facts identified in the complaint—
(I) within 15 days of receiving notice of the parents' complaint;
(II) which shall include a representative of the agency who has decisionmaking authority on behalf of such agency;
(III) which may not include an attorney of the local educational agency unless the parent is accompanied by an attorney; and
(IV) where the parents of the child discuss their complaint, and the facts that form the basis of the complaint, and the local educational agency is provided the opportunity to resolve the complaint,
unless the parents and the local educational agency agree in writing to waive such meeting, or agree to use the mediation process described in subsection (e).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) ; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(a), (b)(3) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(3)(i). A parent's failure to participate in the meeting will delay resolution of the due process complaint, and, after 30 days, it can result in dismissal of the complaint. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(3)-(4) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(3)(iii). If the local education agency fails to hold the resolution meeting within 15 days after it receives notice of the administrative complaint, the complaining parent may ask a hearing officer to proceed with scheduling a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(5) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(3)(iv).
If the parties resolve the complaint "at a meeting" described in § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i), they "shall execute a legally binding agreement that is (I) signed by both the parent and a representative of the agency who has the authority to bind such agency; and (II) enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(d) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(3)(vi). If the parties do not resolve the administrative complaint within 30 days of the local education agency's receipt of it (or within 45 days after the local education agency receives notice of the complaint), "the due process hearing may occur, and all of the applicable timelines for a due process hearing under [the statute] shall commence." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(1) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(3)(iv).
"Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of a hearing officer may bring a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(15). Additionally, "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under [ § 1415 ], the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs -- (I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) ; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a)(1)(i) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 29-8-9.08(9)(c)(17).
FACTS
S.C.'s minor child, P.C., attends a school within the Huntsville City Schools system. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2-3). On February 19, 2019, P.C. filed an administrative complaint requesting a due process hearing with the State of Alabama Department of Education's Special Education Division because Huntsville City Schools (hereafter "the Board") allegedly failed to provide P.C. with a free, appropriate public education under IDEA. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4; Doc. 8-3). In the administrative due process complaint, P.C. waived the right to mediation and a resolution meeting, yet she acknowledged that the Board retained the right to independently request a resolution meeting. (Doc. 8-3, ¶¶ 13-15). The record does not state the date on which the Board received notice of P.C.'s administrative complaint.
The Hearing Officer stated that she issued an initial letter to the Superintendent of the Huntsville City Board of Education on February 20, 2019, but she did not state when the Superintendent received the letter, or whether the Board had received any previous notice of S.C.'s administrative complaint. (See Doc. 8-1, at 2).
On March 9, 2019, Shane Sears, the attorney who represented P.C. during the administrative proceedings and who now represents S.C. in this lawsuit, emailed the Hearing Officer the State assigned to P.C.'s administrative Complaint to inform her of the case's status: "The parties in this case met for a resolution hearing yesterday. It is my understanding that [the Board's attorney] will be forwarding a draft settlement agreement to my office this coming week." (Doc. 12-1, at 19). The same day, Sears also emailed the Board's attorney regarding the same meeting and anticipated agreement: "Thank you for meeting with us yesterday concerning the resolution of this matter. It is my understanding that your office will be forwarding my office a proposed settlement agreement. With that in mind, I am attaching my firm's invoice and W-9 for your review." (Doc. 12-1, at 2).
The record does not contain any further communications between the parties until April 18, 2019, when Sears forwarded a proposed settlement agreement to the Board's attorney and requested he advance an executed copy to the Hearing Officer "for incorporation into a final agreement." (Doc. 12-1, at 23). The Board did not execute the settlement agreement, and Sears sent three subsequent inquiries regarding the status of the matter. Therefore, on April 26, 2019, Sears emailed the Hearing Officer to request dates for an administrative hearing because "the school board [did] not want to provide the executed settlement agreement." (Doc. 12-1, at 20-23).
Subsequently, the Board executed the settlement agreement on April 29, 2019, and P.C.'s parents executed it on May 1, 2019, rendering it final as of that date. The Board agreed to provide certain educational accommodations for P.C., and to pay S.C.'s "reasonable attorney fees and costs in the amount of $6900.00 within twenty-one (21) days following the dismissal of this complaint. However, the [Board] will make a good faith effort to expedite the payment more quickly." (Doc. 1, at 8-9; Doc. 8-1, at 4-5; Doc. 12-1, at 14-15). On May 6, 2019, the Hearing Officer entered a Final Order and Judgment of Dismissal providing as follows:
This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to a due process request filed on February 19, 2019, by the Honorable Shane Sears, on behalf of PC ("Petitioner"), a student in the Huntsville City Board of Education. The Huntsville City Board was represented by the Honorable Rod Lewis.
Thereafter, pursuant to a letter dated February 19, 2019, issued by the State Superintendent of Education, the undersigned was asked to serve as the impartial Hearing Officer in this proceeding. An Initial Hearing Officer letter was issued to Petitioner's attorney and to the Huntsville City Board of Education, through its Superintendent, on February 20, 2019.
On March 8, 2019, the parties held a Resolution meeting, which resulted in progress being made toward settlement of the issues. On April 29, 2019, settlement was reached which resolved the issues. On May 1, 2019, a fully executed Settlement Agreement was forwarded to the undersigned with a request that same be included in the Final Order dismissing the Due Process Request. Upon due and careful consideration,
It is therefore hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed by this Hearing Officer that the Due Process Hearing Request in this matter is DISMISSED, and that the Settlement Agreement reached by the parties is attached hereto and fully incorporated herein, with appropriate redactions. (Doc. 8-1, at 2-3) (emphasis in original).
On May 16, 2019, Sears began contacting the Board for payment of the attorney's fee portion of the settlement. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 12-1, at 4). He sent follow-up email requests on May 24, May 28, May 29, and May 30. (Doc. 1, at 12-18; Doc. 12-1, at 5-8). On May 30, 2019, the Board requested a revised invoice, which Sears provided. (Doc. 1, at 21-22; Doc. 12-1, at 9). The Board still did not pay, and on June 5, 2019, Sears expressed his intention to file "a federal court complaint to collect my firm's attorney's fees this afternoon and demanding additional attorney's fees and damages." (Doc. 1, at 21; Doc. 12-1, at 9).
On June 6, 2019, the Board's attorney responded that he had forwarded the invoice to the CFO, who would mail a check directly to Sears. On June 12, 2019, Sears had not received the check, so he emailed the Board's attorney to ostensibly provide "one last chance" to resolve the issue before he filed a federal court complaint. (Doc. 1, at 19; Doc. 12-1, at 10). On June 14, 2019, Sears again threatened to file suit, but opposing counsel represented upon information that the Board had issued payment earlier that day. (Doc. 1, at 23-24; Doc. 12-1, at 11).
S.C. filed her Complaint for Attorney's Fees in this court on June 24, 2019, and represented that, as of that date, "the Defendant has not paid Plaintiff's attorneys' fees." (Doc. 1, at 4, ¶7(h)). S.C. also requested an award of additional attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing the agreed-upon fee. (Id. ¶ 13). Apparently, after the filing of the Complaint, Sears received a check bearing the date June 20, 2019. (Doc. 8-2, at 1-2; Doc. 12-1, at 18). A copy of the check bears a handwritten notation, apparently by Plaintiff's counsel, asserting: "Re: Accepted as Partial Payment on 6/24." (Doc. 12-1, at 18).
DISCUSSION
The Board describes S.C.'s Complaint as presenting either a motion to enforce the May 1, 2019, settlement agreement pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e) and (f), or a breach of contract claim, or possibly both. (See Doc. 8, at 3 ("Plaintiff's Complaint is nothing more than a breach of contract claim wherein she seeks to enforce the terms of an agreement previously entered into by the parties....")). The court agrees with the Board that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over both of those claims. However, Plaintiff's Complaint also presents a claim for attorney's fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). As the following analyses portray, the court possesses federal question subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.
S.C. captioned her initial pleading as a "Complaint for Attorney's Fees," and she claimed 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) as the jurisdictional basis for the Complaint. (Doc. 1). She also referred to the document as an "attorneys' fee Complaint" and a "Complaint to recover the fees accrued as necessary to recover the fees under the aforementioned statutes." (Id. at 1). She states that she "seeks this Court's action in resolving the issue of attorneys' fees" and claims that her "attorneys are entitled as a prevailing party to fees and costs." (Id. ¶¶ 9, 12). The final sentence of her Complaint requests "an entry of judgment awarding [her] the foregoing amounts as attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B)." (Id. at 7).
I. Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e) and (f)
This court possesses jurisdiction over a motion to enforce the May 1, 2019, settlement agreement pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e) and (f) only if the parties reached the settlement as part of a formal IDEA mediation or at a statutorily-defined resolution meeting. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) (providing that courts may enforce settlement agreements reached during the IDEA mediation process); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that courts may enforce settlements reached during an IDEA resolution meeting). The parties did not engage in formal mediation, but they conferenced in an effort to resolve the claim. The Board argues the meeting did not constitute an IDEA resolution meeting because: (1) it did not convene within the 15-day period following the Board's receipt of notice regarding P.C.'s administrative complaint, as 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) requires; and (2) the parties did not execute the settlement agreement during the 30-day resolution period § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) allows before the compulsory scheduling of a due process hearing.
The Board's first contention cannot be resolved as a matter of law. P.C. filed the administrative complaint on February 19, 2019, and the parties met 17 days later, on March 8, 2019. However, the 17-day gap does not necessarily prevent the meeting from qualifying as an IDEA resolution meeting pursuant to § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i), because the 15-day period commences when the school system receives notice of the administrative complaint, not when the student files it. The record does not contain any information regarding when the Board received notice of P.C.'s administrative complaint. Therefore, the court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the parties' initial meeting occurred outside the 15-day statutory resolution period.
However, even if the parties convened a meeting during the 15-day resolution period, they did not reach a final settlement until May 1, 2019, or 71 days after P.C. filed the administrative complaint. Thus, the parties undisputedly finalized the settlement outside the 15-day period, not "at" an IDEA resolution meeting, as a literal reading of the statute would require. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). They also finalized the settlement outside the 30-day period the statute prescribes for resolving administrative complaints before the non-consensual scheduling of a due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). Given those circumstances, a concern arises whether federal jurisdiction under § 1415(f)(1) extends to a settlement agreement consummated after expiration of both the 15-day resolution meeting deadline and the 30-day pre-hearing resolution period.
Most courts have answered that question negatively. See, e.g. , T.L. by & through Latisha G. v. Pennsylvania Leadership Charter Sch. , 224 F. Supp. 3d 421, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("Every federal court that has interpreted 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) has found that the precisely worded grant of jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements reached "at" resolution meetings simultaneously deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements reached outside the context of these meetings.") (citing H.C. ex rel. L.C. v. Colton–Pierrepont Cent. Sch. Dist. , 341 F. App'x 687, 689 (2d Cir. 2009) ; T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102 , 349 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2003) ; Hernandez v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist. , No. 7:15-CV-397, 2016 WL 159953, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2016) ; L.M. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , No. CIV.A. 10-4855, 2011 WL 71442, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2011) ; J.M.C. v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ. , 584 F. Supp. 2d 894, 897 (M.D. La. 2008) ; Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ. , No. 5:06CV139, 2007 WL 2219352, at *6-7 (W.D. Mich. July 27, 2007), aff'd , 615 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2010) ).
In particular, T.L. explained the rationale for its ruling that § 1415(f)(1) does not accord subject matter jurisdiction over settlement agreements that parties do not consummate "at" the resolution meeting, or at any other point during the 30-day pre-hearing resolution period. 224 F. Supp. 3d at 429-31. As the court discerned, "[u]nless the resolution period is nothing more than an optional and utterly pointless detour on the route to a due process hearing, it is necessary to read the IDEA as conferring federal jurisdiction over settlements reached at the resolution meeting and then finalized later during the resolution period." Id. at 430. Such interpretation "takes into account the practical realities of finalizing an agreement, while simultaneously imposing an outside time limit to remain consistent with the statutory goal of prompt dispute resolution." Id. (footnote omitted); see also H.C., supra , 341 F. App'x at 690 (questioning whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the IDEA to enforce a settlement agreement when neither party asserted the agreement "emerged ‘through the mediation process’ or ‘at’ a ‘resolution meeting’ "); J.M.C. , 584 F. Supp.2d at 897 ("Under the plain language of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), a district court only has jurisdiction over settlement agreements reached during the preliminary meeting or mediation.") (emphasis in original); Justin R. ex rel. Jennifer R. v. Matayoshi , No. CIV. 10-00657 LEK, 2011 WL 2470624, at *10 (D. Haw. June 17, 2011) ("The Settlement Agreement ... did not arise from either a resolution session or a mediation. Plaintiffs therefore would not be able to bring an action alleging breach of the Settlement Agreement in federal court, absent some other basis for federal jurisdiction.") (citing L.M., supra , 2011 WL 71442, at *3 (noting many courts have held IDEA settlement agreements are not enforceable in federal court, except for settlement agreements reached during the mediation process or in a resolution session) (citing H.C., supra , 2009 WL 2144016, at *2 ; T.D. , 349 F.3d at 479 ; J.M.C., supra , 584 F.Supp.2d at 897 ; Traverse Bay Area, supra , 2007 WL 2219352, at **6-7 ; Bowman v. District of Columbia , No. 05-01933, 2006 WL 2221703, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006) )); S. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S. , No. CA 13-127 ML, 2014 WL 197859, at *10 (D.R.I. Jan. 14, 2014) ("Federal subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an IDEA settlement exists when the settlement was reached either in connection with a ‘mediation,’ pursuant to ... § 1415(e), ..., or in connection with a ‘resolution process’ pursuant to ... § 1415(f)(1)(B) ...."), aff'd and remanded , 773 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2014) ; D.R. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. , No. 4:10CV312/MCR/WCS, 2011 WL 2837877, at *4 (N.D. Fla. July 18, 2011) ("The IDEA expressly provides that settlements reached in mediation or at the resolution meeting are judicially enforceable.... But the IDEA is silent regarding settlements reached outside these parameters.").
The reasoning of the T.L. opinion, buttressed by the holdings in other court decisions, persuades the court that it does not have jurisdiction over the parties' settlement agreement under § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). Therefore, the court declines to expand the IDEA's statutory language to allow judicial enforcement of settlement agreements parties reach after the statutory resolution period expires, even if the parties' settlement negotiations commence during the resolution period. Because the parties to this case did not finalize their settlement agreement at an IDEA resolution meeting, or at any time during the 30-day pre-hearing resolution period, the court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). C.f. , M.R. v. D.C. , 841 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (D.D.C. 2012) ("The IDEA does not provide for attorney's fees when the parties enter into a private settlement agreement, and the parties cannot create a right to recover fees under the statute by including a provision for attorney's fees in a settlement agreement.").
II. State Law Breach of Contract
This court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a state law breach of contract claim because S.C. cannot satisfy the requirements of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. S.C. and the Board both are citizens of Alabama, and S.C. does not seek more than $75,000 in damages. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between – (1) citizens of different States....").
A state or an arm of the state does not constitute a "citizen" of the state for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction. Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir. 1999). Even though the Eleventh Circuit considers the questions of diversity jurisdiction and immunity distinctly, it holds "that the Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis is applicable to determinations of citizenship for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 412 (citing Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chems., 695 F.2d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 1983) ; Alabama State Univ. v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ). For the purpose of applying Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Eleventh Circuit does not consider local school boards as arms of the state. Walker v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 771 F.3d 748, 751-757 (11th Cir. 2014) ; see also The Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Bryan M., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1362 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (holding that the Jefferson County Board of Education did not constitute an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity in an IDEA claim). Accordingly, the Board is a "citizen" of Alabama for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction. That conclusion applies even though, as discussed below, a local board does constitute a local agency of the state for the purpose of state sovereign immunity. Walker, 771 F.3d at 753-55.
Notably, the doctrine of sovereign immunity also would bar any state law breach of contract claim against the Board in state court. The Alabama Constitution provides that the State "shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." Ala. Const. art. I, § 14. That immunity extends to all legal claims, including those for breach of contract, against all State agencies and local agencies of the State, including local boards of education. Ex parte Jackson Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 164 So. 3d 532, 534 (Ala. 2014) (citing Ex parte Hale Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 14 So.3d 844, 848 (Ala. 2009) ); see also Ex parte Phenix City Bd. of Educ., 67 So. 3d 56, 60 (Ala. 2011) ("City boards of education are local agencies of the State.").
Exceptions to sovereign immunity exist for certain claims against State officials when the suit effectively operates as a suit against the State. For example, a plaintiff may sue to compel a State official to perform her legal duties or to perform ministerial acts. Alabama State Univ. v. Danley , 212 So. 3d 112, 123-24 (Ala. 2016) (citations omitted). However, those exceptions "apply only to actions brought against State officials; they do not apply to actions against the State or against State agencies." Danley, 212, So. 3d at 123 (citations omitted). Here, because S.C. sued only the Board as an entity, and not any individual school official, the exceptions do not apply.
Claimants who cannot pursue a state law breach of contract claim against state entities in a judicial forum could seek relief from the Alabama Board of Adjustment. Alabama created the Board of Adjustment
to provide a method of payment by the State of Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards, institutions or departments to persons for injuries to person or property or for death occasioned by the State of Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards, institutions or departments where in law, justice or good morals the same should be paid.
Ala. Code § 41-9-60. The Board of Adjustment possesses jurisdiction over
All claims against the State of Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards, institutions or departments arising out of any contract, express or implied, to which the State of Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards, institutions or departments are parties, where there is claimed a legal or moral obligation resting on the state.
Ala. Code § 41-9-62(a)(4). It also possesses jurisdiction over "[a]ll claims for underpayment by the State of Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards, institutions or departments to parties having dealings with the State of Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards, institutions or departments." Ala. Code § 41-9-62(a)(7) ; see also Vaughan v. Sibley , 709 So. 2d 482, 486 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) ("The Board of Adjustment has jurisdiction over claims against the state that are not justiciable in the courts because of the state's constitutional immunity from being made a defendant.") (citing Lee v. Cunningham, 234 Ala. 639, 641, 176 So. 477 (1937) ).
III. Petition for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)
Although S.C. faltered on the prior bases for the court's jurisdiction, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) presents a cause of action over which the court retains jurisdiction. In the Eleventh Circuit, a petition for attorney's fees pursuant to § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) constitutes an independent cause of action, separate from a civil action challenging the "findings and decision" of a hearing officer pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Zipperer By & Through Zipperer v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla. , 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997) ("We agree that the IDEA provides two distinguishable causes of action under sections 1415 [ (i)(2) ] and 1415[ (i)(3) ]."); see also Georgia State Dep't of Educ. v. Derrick C. , 314 F.3d 545, 550 (11th Cir. 2002) (A " § 1415(e)(4) claim for attorney's fees is distinct from an IDEA substantive appeal under § 1415(e)(2), and [thus] § 1415(e)(4) provides for an independent claim for attorney's fees...."); D.G. ex rel. LaNisha T. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist. , 806 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2015) (" Sections 1415(i)(2) and 1415(i)(3) contain separate jurisdictional grants, and the weight of authority holds that they create two distinct causes of action.") (citations omitted). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides the jurisdictional authority over a § 1415(i)(3)(B) attorney's fees cause of action. See Robert v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist. , 279 F. App'x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). That is sufficient to vest the district court with [federal question] jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.") (citing Newton v. Capital Assurance Co., Inc. , 245 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) ).
Zipperer cited the previous iteration of § 1415, which included the private right of action at § 1415(e)(2), and the attorney's fees provision at § 1415(e)(4), but those provisions equate to the current §§ 1415(i)(2) and (i)(3). See Georgia State Dep't of Educ. v. Derrick C. , 314 F.3d 545, 550 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2002) ("We note that when the IDEA was amended in 1997, the attorney's fees provision of § 1415(e)(4)(B) was renumbered and is now § 1415(i)(3)(B).") (citing John T. ex rel. Robert T. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ. , 258 F.3d 860, 864 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2001) ).
To plead a viable claim for attorney's fees pursuant to § 1415(i)(3)(B), S.C. must allege that she "initiated an action or proceeding under the IDEA, and that [she was] the ‘prevailing party’ in the proceeding." Robert K. v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist. , No. 1:05-CV-2456-JTC, 2007 WL 9701267, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2007), aff'd sub nom. Robert v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist. , 279 F. App'x 798 (11th Cir. 2008) ; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). As for the first requirement, P.C. (on whose behalf S.C. brought this civil action), initiated a "proceeding" under the IDEA by filing an administrative due process complaint after the Board "refuse[d] to implement appropriate special education aides and related services pursuant to the IDEA and [P.C.'s] individualized education plain ("IEP")." (Doc. 8-3, ¶ 5). See Barlow-Gresham Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1991) (The IDEA "allows the prevailing parents to recover attorneys' fees when settlement is reached prior to the due process hearing."); Shelly C. by Shelbie C. v. Venus Indep. Sch. Dist., 878 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the IDEA allows attorney's fees for work conducted at the administrative level, but prior to the convening of a due process hearing); Mitten By & Through Mitten v. Muscogee Cty. Sch. Dist. , 877 F.2d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The term ‘action or proceeding’ under the Act includes administrative hearings and appeals.") (citations omitted); cf. Doucet ex rel. Doucet v. Chilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 1999) ("The IDEA provides for the award of attorneys' fees only ‘if an action or proceeding,’ and not just a preliminary or preparatory measure, is brought under the Act. A request for a due process hearing creates a ‘dispute’ for these purposes only if such request is warranted by the defendant school board's action or inaction in response to plaintiff's demands.") (citing W.L.G. v. Houston Cty. Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp. 1317, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1997) ("The IDEA provides for the award of attorneys' fees only ‘if an action or proceeding’ is brought under the Act; the Act does not provide for fees for actions preliminary, but necessary, to such an action or proceeding.... [T]he school system cannot have done something to warrant the ‘action or proceeding’ unless and until the complainant has presented to it a claim which it has rejected or otherwise inadequately addressed.)).
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), governs whether S.C. emerged as a "prevailing party" from the administrative proceeding. Buckhannon rejected the "catalyst theory," which would allow an award of "prevailing party" attorney's fees to a plaintiff whose lawsuit caused a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. Id. at 601, 610, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Rather, a "prevailing party" must receive some judicial (or, in the IDEA context, administrative) relief on the merits of her claim, and the legal relationship of the parties must materially change. Id. at 603-04, 121 S.Ct. 1835.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), also informs the "prevailing party" determination. In Kokkonen , the parties reached a settlement during trial, and they orally recited the terms of their settlement on the record before the district judge. Id. at 376, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The parties later filed a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, which the district judge signed, stating, "It is so ordered." Id. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The Stipulation and Order of Dismissal did not mention the settlement agreement or state that the district judge reserved jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Id. When one party later moved to enforce the settlement agreement, the question of the district court's jurisdiction over the motion ensued. Id.
The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement because the parties had reached a purely private agreement. Id. at 380, 114 S.Ct. 1673. Most pertinently, the Court observed:
The situation would be quite different if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal — either by separate provision (such as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist. That, however, was not the case here. The judge's mere awareness and approval of the terms of the settlement agreement do not suffice to make them part of his order.
Kokkonen , 511 U.S. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673. Thus, the parties' dispute constituted a state law breach of contract issue, and thus, the federal court lacked jurisdiction in the absence of any other basis for authority. Id. at 381-82, 114 S.Ct. 1673.
In Am. Disability Ass'n, Inc. v. Chmielarz , 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2002), the Eleventh Circuit considered the circumstances under which a party alleging breach of a settlement agreement can constitute a "prevailing party" in light of Buckhannon and Kokkonen . The parties in Chmielarz settled an ADA claim by agreeing the defendant would make modifications to his property for enhanced disabled accessibility. Id. at 1317. The parties also agreed that plaintiff would receive attorney's fees, but they could not agree on the amount of fees, so they left the amount for the court's determination. Id. at 1317-18. After the parties submitted a stipulated dismissal, the district court "entered a Final Order of Dismissal in which it specifically ‘approved, adopted and ratified’ the Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, dismissed the case with prejudice, and expressly ‘retain[ed] jurisdiction solely for the purpose of enforcing the Settlement Agreement.’ " Id. at 1318 (alteration in original).
The plaintiff later filed a motion for fees and costs pursuant to the settlement agreement, but the district court denied the motion because the plaintiff was not a "prevailing party" under the ADA. Id. Relying upon the Supreme Court's Buckhannon and Kokkonen decisions, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, because "even absent the entry of a formal consent decree, if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties' agreement." Id. at 1320 (emphasis in original). In such circumstances, the lower court's authority over the settlement establishes the "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties" required to establish "prevailing party" status under Buckhannon . Id. Thus, the district court's adoption of the parties' settlement and express retention of jurisdiction to enforce its terms operated with the same finality and legal significance of a consent decree, and the plaintiff warranted "prevailing party" status for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees. Id. at 1321 ; see also Sanford v. Sylvania City Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 380 F. Supp. 2d 903, 908-09 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (IDEA "settlement agreements can be used to determine prevailing party status, as long as those agreements are judicially sanctioned.") (emphasis in original); D.M. ex rel. G.M. v. Bd. of Educ., Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. , 296 F. Supp. 2d 400, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[O]ther courts ... have held that an award of IDEA fees is appropriate under Buckhannon , where, as here, the hearing officer has so ordered the parties agreement.") (citing, inter alia , M.S. o/b/o I.O. v. New York City Bd. of Educ. , Nos. 01 Civ. 10871(CBM), 01 Civ. 10872(CBM), 2002 WL 31556385, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2002) (prevailing party fees were appropriate in an IDEA case where the hearing officer so ordered the parties' agreement); Brandon K. v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. , No. 01 C 4625, 2001 WL 1491499, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2001) (awarding IDEA fees where parties' agreement was transcribed and entered as a formal agreed order of the hearing officer); T.D., supra , 349 F.3d at 478-79 (recognizing that a so-ordered settlement can support an IDEA attorneys' fee award but declining to award fees in case where court did not so order or exercise continuing jurisdiction over settlement); J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Central Sch. Dist. , 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying an award of fees because the settlement was not ordered by the hearing officer)).
In the present case, the Hearing Officer assigned to P.C.'s administrative complaint did not expressly retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, but she did incorporate the terms of the settlement into her order of dismissal. (See Doc. 8-1, at 2 (" It is therefore hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed by this Hearing Officer that the Due Process Hearing Request in this matter is DISMISSED, and that the Settlement Agreement reached by the parties is attached hereto and fully incorporated herein, with appropriate redactions. ")) (emphasis in original). Under Chmielarz , either expressly retaining jurisdiction or incorporating the terms of a settlement into a final order provides the judicial imprimatur necessary to confer prevailing party status. Chmielarz , 289 F.3d at 1320. Therefore, S.C. qualifies as a "prevailing party," and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) entitles her to an award of attorney's fees.
"The term ‘court-ordered’ [judicial relief] in this opinion or any similar IDEA precedent encompasses relief ordered by a non-judicial, administrative hearing officer." J.S.R. by Childs v. Dale Cty. Bd. of Educ. , No. 1:13-CV-582-WKW, 2015 WL 5692804, at *9 n. 16 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2015) (citing Abraham v. D.C. , 338 F.Supp.2d 113, 120 (D.D.C. 2004) ).
Because S.C.'s Complaint falls under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), the Board's Rule 12(b)(6) motion on this issue falters. Even so, the Board has already tendered S.C. $6,900 in attorney's fees based upon the parties' prior agreement, which S.C. accepted after filing of this action. Therefore, the posture of this case incites concerns about the efficiency of proceeding with a prolonged undertaking given the relative stakes. Therefore, the undersigned discerns the benefits of convening a hearing to discuss the most efficient and appropriate path to proceed in this action.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
As resolved, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to enforce an IDEA settlement agreement under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) and 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) or a state law breach of contract claim. The court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) attorney's fees cause of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Therefore, the court GRANTS in part the Board's Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES any state law breach of contract claim or motion to enforce an IDEA settlement agreement under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) and 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). The court will contact the parties to convene a hearing regarding the path forward.
DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of February, 2020.