Opinion
2014-UP-261
06-24-2014
South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Jamie Lee Hawkins and Ronald Keiser, Defendants, Of Whom Ronald Keiser is the Appellant. In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen. Appellate Case No. 2012-213246
Mary Elizabeth Parrilla, of The Parrilla Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant. Deborah Murdock, of Murdock Law Firm, LLC, of Mauldin, for Respondent. Michael Todd Thigpen, of Spartanburg, for Guardian ad Litem
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted May 29, 2014
Appeal From Spartanburg County James F. Fraley, Jr., Family Court Judge
Mary Elizabeth Parrilla, of The Parrilla Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Deborah Murdock, of Murdock Law Firm, LLC, of Mauldin, for Respondent.
Michael Todd Thigpen, of Spartanburg, for Guardian ad Litem
PER CURIAM
Ronald Keiser (Father) appeals the family court's order terminating his parental rights (TPR) to his minor child (Child). See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2013). On appeal, Father argues the family court erred by finding (1) Father's failure to visit and support was willful, and (2) TPR was in Child's best interest. We affirm.
1. The family court found the following statutory grounds for TPR were met: (1) Child lived outside Father's home for six months and Father failed to remedy the conditions that caused the removal; (2) Child lived outside Father's home for six months and Father willfully failed to visit Child; (3) Child lived outside Father's home for six months and Father willfully failed to support Child; and (4) Father willfully abandoned Child. We find the family court properly found Father willfully abandoned Child. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(1) (2010) ("'Abandonment of a child' means a parent or guardian [willfully] deserts a child or [willfully] surrenders physical possession of a child without making adequate arrangements for the child's needs or the continuing care of the child."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Ledford, 357 S.C. 371, 376, 593 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding a parent is required to take the necessary steps to assure that his or her child is continuing to receive care).
Because the family court correctly found abandonment was a ground for TPR, no other statutory ground is necessary. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2013) ("The family court may order [TPR] upon a finding of one or more of the [statutory grounds]." (emphasis added)); Doe v. Baby Boy Roe, 353 S.C. 576, 581, 578 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Having found one ground on which the family court properly terminated [the parent]'s parental rights, we need only determine that [TPR] is in [the child]'s best interests to affirm the family court's termination." (emphasis added)).
2. We find the family court properly found TPR was in Child's best interest. See Charleston Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson, 368 S.C. 87, 102, 627 S.E.2d 765, 774 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In TPR cases, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration."); id. ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict." (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010))).
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
FEW, C. J, and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ, concur.