Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1098 (SDW).
December 6, 2007
OPINION
Before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The Court, having considered the parties' submissions and having decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, and for the reasons set forth below, GRANTS the motion.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has original jurisdiction over the Federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as the claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
II. BACKGROUND and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff pro se Lorenzo Soto ("Plaintiff") is a prisoner confined in Bergen County Jail. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) He alleges, inter alia, that Defendants deprived him of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16, 24-26.) Specifically, he alleges that Bergen County Jail Corrections Officer Weingrin ("Defendant Weingrin") entered his cell on or about March 24, 2003, and "brutally beat [him]," while Bergen County Jail Corrections Officer Turre ("Defendant Turre") ignored his calls for help. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-12.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Weingrin and Turre subsequently ignored his requests for medical attention, causing him "to suffer fear, mental anguish and pain radiating through his head, neck and shoulders." (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff also alleges that between March 25, 2003 and July 9, 2003, he filed a number of Inmate Grievance Complaints against Defendants Weingrin and Turre alleging harassment and use of racial slurs. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18-23.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Weingrin and Turre retaliated against him for these grievances by using threatening language and subjecting him to physical assault. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff further alleges that he submitted a number of handwritten memoranda to Bergen County Jail Warden Duffy (`Defendant Duffy") and Bergen County Sheriff Trella ("Defendant Trella") describing the alleged beatings and harassment, indicating that he feared for his safety, and requesting protection, but has yet to receive any response. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.)
On September 16, 2003, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint alleging that Defendants deprived him of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed opposition on October 19, 2007, and Defendants filed a reply on November 19, 2007.
Plaintiff's opposition alleges a claim of "failure to protect plaintiff from other inmates." (Pl.'s Opp'n 1.) As this claim is not alleged in Amended Complaint, the Court declines to consider it as part of the instant motion.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
IV. DISCUSSION
56Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242248Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317323-25Nat'l State Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 15791581 Id. Id.56Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 47648156 Anderson,477 U.S. at 249Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983West v. Atkins,487 U.S. 4248 Harlow v. Fitzpatrick, 457 U.S. 800
Plaintiff also alleges that the March 24, 2003 incident violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. As Plaintiff is not a pre-trial detainee or a convicted but unsentenced prisoner, his claim is cognizable only under the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1983); Hubbardv. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005).
A. Plaintiff's excessive force claims
B. Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim
Rhodes v. Chapman,452 U.S. 337347Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312320-21
1) "the need for the application of force"; (2) "the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used"; (3) "the extent of injury inflicted"; (4) "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them"; and (5) "any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response."Brooks v. Kyler,204 F.3d 102106 Whitley,475 U.S. at 321 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 103-04 Id. Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 272-73 Farmer v. Brennan,511 U.S. 825837-38Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.2d 192197
These witnesses include inmates Brian Sullivan, Michael Darrigo, Michael Wagner, F. McMillian, and Ryaheen Butler. All but Mr. Darrigo could not be located despite the diligent and concerted efforts of counsel.
On the current record, Plaintiff has not established that he suffered any injury, much less one that amounts to a "serious medical need." The Amended Complaint alleges that on March 24, 2003, Defendant Weingrin "began to bang [Plaintiff's] head against the concrete wall" and continued thereafter to "brutally beat" him. (Am. Comp. ¶ 11.) The Amended Complaint further alleges that Defendants Weingrin and Turre ignored Plaintiff's subsequent pleas for medical attention. (Am. Comp. ¶ 14.) Nothing in the record, however, supports either contention. Bergen County Jail maintains an extensive written record of Grievance Logs, Daily Log Reports, Disciplinary Reports, and Investigation Reports. Nowhere in these materials is there any report that Plaintiff suffered from "intense pain and injury." In fact, the only record in this vein shows that Plaintiff visited the infirmary on March 26, 2003, for which an examining nurse provided him Tylenol. (Def.'s Mot. ¶ 2m.) In light of the vicious attacks that Plaintiff alleges and describes, and the lack of supporting evidence as to either an assault or an injury, Plaintiff's contentions cannot stand on mere allegations. As no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claims, Defendants are awarded summary judgment as no jury could reasonably find that Defendants violated Plaintiff's right to medical care.
As there is no evidence that Plaintiff had a "serious medical need," the Court need not address whether Defendants engaged in deliberate indifference thereto.
C. Plaintiff's retaliation claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Weingrin and Turre retaliated against him for filing grievances against them, in violation of his First Amendment rights. "Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution. . . ." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990). To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must establish that (1) he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) he suffered adverse action by a state actor; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the state actor's decision to take adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the third element-the causal nexus between the exercise of a constitutional right and the state actor's adverse action. Id. "[O]nce a prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." Id. at 334.
The record clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot establish the third element-that the constitutionally-protected activity was a "substantial or motivating factor" in Defendants' decision to impose the alleged adverse actions. Between March 25, 2003, and July 9, 2003, Plaintiff filed a number of grievances, and civil and criminal complaints against Defendants Weingrin, Turre, Trella, and Duffy. Plaintiff has identified three incidents when Defendants allegedly took retaliatory action against him as a consequence of these constitutionally-protected activities. On March 25, 2003, Defendant Weingrin allegedly entered Plaintiff's cell and indicated he would file false disciplinary charges against Plaintiff in retaliation for his previous grievances. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) On March 28, 2003, Defendant Weingrin allegedly used racial obscenities against Plaintiff and revoked his recreation time. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) And on June 20, 2003, Defendant Turre allegedly threatened Plaintiffs life if he did not cease filing grievances against him. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) Defendants summarily deny making any such threats or using racial obscenities, and instead argue that any "retaliatory action" taken against Plaintiff was a consequence of his repeated penological transgressions. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff clearly satisfies the first element, as prisoners have a constitutionally-protected right to file grievances and lawsuits against prison officials. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff also satisfies the second element. An adverse action is action that is retaliatory conduct "sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising" his constitutional rights. Allah, 229 F.3d at 225. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered "adverse action" in the form of "physical assault, threatening behavior and harassment" by Defendants Turre and Weingrin after he filed his grievances. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) For instance, Plaintiff alleges that after he filed a grievance on April 2, 2003, Defendant Weingrin used racist and offensive language towards Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of recreation time. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.)
Defendant Jail's Inmate Rule Book explicitly prohibits, inter alia, refusing to comply with an order, using abusive or obscene language to a staff member, engaging in conduct that disrupts or interferes with the safety or orderly operation of the facility, and being in an unauthorized area. The record demonstrates that on numerous occasions during the period in question, Plaintiff was found to have repeatedly violated these provisions. By way of example, on March 22, 2003, several officers found a 24-26 inch braided wire concealed in Plaintiff's cell (Def.'s Mot. ¶ 2g); on March 30, 2003, Defendant Turre cancelled Plaintiff's recreation time after he refused to stop yelling and banging his cell door (Def.'s Mot. ¶ 2p); on April 22, 2003, a prison committee transferred Plaintiff into Administrative Separation because he had been convicted of five major disciplinary convictions (Def.'s Mot. ¶ 2t); and on at least three separate occasions from April 22, 2003 to April 29, 2003, Plaintiff yelled sexual and profane expletives at prison guards (Def.'s Mot. ¶¶ 2u-w). These incidents are emblematic of Plaintiff's perpetually disruptive and unruly conduct during his incarceration. The purported retaliatory actions by Defendants were plainly made in accordance with standard operating procedures and necessary to the safe and orderly operation of the facility. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to substantiate or even set forth minimally corroborating evidence of the incidents that he alleges as retaliation. As no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims, Defendants are awarded summary judgment as no jury could reasonably find that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his constitutionally-protected rights.
D. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Duffy and Trella
V. CONCLUSION
The Court notes that the motion record indicates that Defendants, pursuant to their standard operating procedures, investigated and answered Plaintiff's numerous allegations and determined that they were either without merit or fabricated. See (Def.'s Mot. 34-35.)