Opinion
No. 2021-08138 Docket Nos. V-33501-17 V-2164-18
03-15-2023
In the Matter of Hector Soto, respondent, v. Samanda Marrero, appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Samanda Marrero, appellant, v. Hector Soto, respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)
Jacqueline Cabrera, Jamaica, NY, for appellant. Elliot Green, Brooklyn, NY, for respondent. Karen P. Simmons, Brooklyn, NY (Eva D. Stein and Janet Neustaetter of counsel), attorney for the child.
Jacqueline Cabrera, Jamaica, NY, for appellant.
Elliot Green, Brooklyn, NY, for respondent.
Karen P. Simmons, Brooklyn, NY (Eva D. Stein and Janet Neustaetter of counsel), attorney for the child.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, LARA J. GENOVESI, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Rupert V. Barry, J.), dated August 31, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, in effect, granted the father's petition for sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child and denied the mother's petition for sole legal and physical custody of the child.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The parties are the parents of a child born in 2013. In November 2017, the father filed a petition for sole legal and physical custody of the child, and in January 2018, the mother filed a petition for sole legal and physical custody of the child. After a hearing, the Family Court awarded the father sole legal and physical custody of the child, with parental access to the mother. The mother appeals.
In a child custody dispute, the court's paramount concern is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171; Matter of Brisard v Brisard, 211 A.D.3d 838; Matter of Olea v Diaz, 194 A.D.3d 721, 722). In determining the child's best interests, the court must consider, among other things, "(1) which alternative will best promote stability; (2) the available home environments; (3) the past performance of each parent; (4) each parent's relative fitness, including his or her ability to guide the child, provide for the child's overall well being, and foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent; and (5) the child's desires" (Matter of Brisard v Brisard, 211 A.D.3d at 838 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Devine v Dominguez, 210 A.D.3d 768, 769; Matter of Olea v Diaz, 194 A.D.3d at 722). "Since the Family Court's determination with respect to custody and parental access depends to a great extent upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, its findings are generally accorded great deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Langenau v Hargrove, 198 A.D.3d 650, 651-652; see Matter of Sneed v Campagn, 211 A.D.3d 957). Here, the Family Court's determination that the child's best interests would be served by awarding the father sole legal and physical custody of the child has a sound and substantial basis in the record and will not be disturbed (see Matter of Devine v Dominguez, 210 A.D.3d at 769; Matter of Olea v Diaz, 194 A.D.3d at 722).
BARROS, J.P., MILLER, GENOVESI and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.