The fact that McFadden failed to stop demonstrated that she violatated Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1142(a) and 1172(a), which constituted negligence as a matter of law ( see Francavilla v. Doyno, 96 A.D.3d 714, 715, 945 N.Y.S.2d 425;Gallagher v. McCurty, 85 A.D.3d at 1110, 925 N.Y.S.2d 897;Pollack v. Margolin, 84 A.D.3d at 1342, 924 N.Y.S.2d 282;Martin v. Ali, 78 A.D.3d at 1136, 912 N.Y.S.2d 610). The plaintiff, who was a passenger in the vehicle driven by Small–Warner, failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to any alleged comparative fault on said defendant's part. Small–Warner's deposition testimony that he did not see the McFadden vehicle until he was hit was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Adobea v. Junel, 114 A.D.3d 818, 820, 980 N.Y.S.2d 564;Soto–Bay v. Prunty, 115 A.D.3d 586, 587, 982 N.Y.S.2d 123;Figueroa v. Diaz, 107 A.D.3d at 755, 967 N.Y.S.2d 109). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Small–Warner's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. SKELOS, J.P., DILLON, MALTESE and BARROS, JJ., concur.

Further, even assuming that the bus driver heard plaintiff's request to allow her to take a seat, plaintiff's own testimony was that she uttered this request after the bus operator had "started to move" (plaintiff's deposition at 45, line 8 through 46, line 25). Given that plaintiff's request was made while the bus was already in motion, and that plaintiff's fall occurred in the span of less than 10 seconds, it is purely speculative that following plaintiff's request and stopping a bus already in motion would have prevented plaintiff's fall, which allegedly resulted from a stop while the bus was in motion (see Nova Soto-Bay v Prunty, 115 A.D.3d 586, 587 [1st Dept 2014] [plaintiff's argument that driver could have avoided collision in the few seconds preceding the accident was purely speculative]).

A driver who lawfully enters an intersection may still be found partially at fault for an accident if he or she fails to use reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle in the intersection (Nevarez v S.R.M. Mgt. Corp., 58 AD3d at 297-298). In this regard, "a motorist always has a duty to operate his or her vehicle with reasonable care (PJI 2:77)" (Ohlhausen v City of NY, 73 AD3d 89, 92 [1st Dept 2010]; see Soto-Bay vPrunty, 115 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2014]; O'Farrell v Inzeo, 74 AD2d 806, 807 [1st Dept 1980]).

See Foreman v Skeif, 115 AD3d 568 (1st Dept 2014) (Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment when movant presented unrefuted evidence that co-defendant made a left turn across the path of movant's vehicle, and movant applied the brakes but could not avoid the collision). Additionally, a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively at fault for failing to avoid the collision (see Nova Soto-Bay v Prunty, 115 AD3d 586, 982 NYS2d 123 [1st Dept 2014] citing Figueroa v Diaz, 107 AD3d 754, 967 NYS2d 109 [2d Dept 2013]; Barbato v Moloney, 94 AD3d 1028, 943 NYS2d 204 [2d Dept 2012]). Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing this action on the grounds that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the subject accident is granted, and the action is hereby dismissed.

Thus the impact, which occurred about a second after Cooper saw the flash of red (Cooper T. p. 25, lines 13-16), was to the passenger-side doors of Rivera's vehicle, more toward the rear. A driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively at fault for failing to avoid the collision (see Nova Soto-Bay v Prunty, 115 AD3d 586, 982 NYS2d 123 [1st Dept 2014] citing Figueroa v Diaz, 107 AD3d 754, 967 NYS2d 109 [2d Dept 2013]; Barbato v Moloney, 94 AD3d 1028, 943 NYS2d 204 [2d Dept 2012]). In the instant motion, the Coopers move to dismiss all claims against them.